lililillilil 


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iiiiiiiiii! 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
LOS  ANGELES 


li..^ 


THE 


PROGRESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


IN  THE  PAST  AND  IN  THE  FUTURE. 


By   SAMUEL   TYLER, 


OF   THE   MARYLAND   BAR. 


"Whatever  I  write,  as  soon  as  I  shall  discover  it  not  to  be  truth,  my  hand 
shall  be  forwardest  to  throw  it  into  the  fire." — Locke. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

J.   B.   LIPPINCOTT    &    CO. 

LONDON:    TRUBNER   &   CO. 

1858. 


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Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1858,  by 

SAMUEL    TYLER, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  Maryland. 


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SECRETARY  OP  THE  SJHTHSONIAN  INSTITUTION, 

Who,  while  he  has  devoted  his  life  with  eminent  success  to 
the  investigation  and  advancement  of  physical  science,  has 
always  recognized  the  usefulness  as  well  as  the  intellectual 
dignity  of  rational  philosophy,  this  tract  is  appropriately  in- 
scribed by  his  friend  the  author. 

Frederick  City,  Md.,  July,  1858. 


PREFACE. 


In  August  1857,  an  eminent  philosopher*  of  Europe 
in  a  letter  to  me  said:  "The  position  of  America  in 
many  respects  qualifies  it  admirably  for  the  task  of  sift- 
ing the  wheat  from  the  chaf  in  the  various  conflicting 
philosophies  of  Europe,  and  producing  from  the  mate- 
rials of  the  older  literature,  aided  by  the  independent 
spirit  of  her  own  thinkers,  a  system  adapted  to  the  cha- 
racter and  wants  of  the  age."  It  is  to  do  something 
towards  the  development  of  such  a  system  that  I  have 
prepared  this  tract.  I  have  endeavoured  to  show  that 
the  true  philosophy  is  founded  upon  an  analysis  of  con- 
sciousness within  the  bounds  of  common  sense.  I  have 
pursued  this  course  of  speculation  from  the  beginning 
of  the  Greek  epoch  down  to  the  present  time,  and  have 
pointed  out,  both  by  positive  and  negative  criticism,  the 
one  perennial  doctrine  advancing  from  age  to  age  by 
new  contributions,  until  it  seems  manifest,  that  its  con- 
flicts with  other  systems  have  only  served  to  develop  it 
into  that  complete  doctrine  which  will  be  evolved  by  the 

*  Mr.  H.  L.  Mansel,  of  Oxford. 


6  PREFACE. 

discussions  of  the  future  directed  in  the  same  course,  and 
reposing  on  the  same  foundation  in  the  data  of  con- 
sciousness. I  have,  too,  at  appropriate  points  indicated 
what  seem  to  me  initials  of  new  revelations  in  the  one 
perennial  evolution  of  philosophical  truth. 

This  tract  has  been  composed  from  two  articles  con- 
tributed by  me  to  Reviews.  The  one,  constituting  the 
first  part,  was  published  in  the  Southern  Quarterly  Re- 
view for  T^ovember,  1856.  The  other,  constituting  the 
second  part,  was  published  in  the  Princeton  Review  for 
October,  1855.  The  articles  met  with  so  much  favour 
in  Europe  and  America,  that  I  am  induced  to  publish 
them  in  this  form.  The  article  in  the  Princeton  Review 
was  read  by  Sir  William  Hamilton  before  his  death,  and 
he  intended*  to  honour  me  with  an  answer  to  my  dissent- 
ing criticisms,  but  death  deprived  us  of  the  light  which 
he  doubtless  would  have  shed  upon  the  points  in  dispute. 
His  forthcoming  lectures  will,  perhaps,  give  us  more 
light. 

*  Letter  to  me  from  Lady  Hamilton. 


CONTENTS. 


PART    FIRST. 


ANCIENT    PERIOD. 


Throe  Epochs:  I.  From  Thalcs  to  Socrates;  2.  From 
Socrates  to  Christianity;  3.  From  Christianity  to  the 
Sixth  Century 11 


MEDIEVAL   PERIOD. 


From  Charlemagne,  to  the  Capture  of  Constantinople 
by  the  Turks    . 43 


MODERN   PERIOD. 


From  the  Discovery  of  America  to  the  Second  Quarter 
of  the  Nineteenth  Century 48 


PART   SECOND. 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH. 


From  the  Second  Quarter  of  the  Nineteenth  Century, 
and  still  in  progress 125 


PROGRESS  OF  rillLOSOPII Y. 


Pxi  iirst. 


THREE   GREAT   PERIODS. 

The  relation  of  philosophy  to  its  history  is 
such,  that  the  best  mode  of  teachiug  it,  even 
in  system,  if  regard  be  had  to  its  future  as 
well  as  its  past,  is  to  exhibit  it  in  its  progress 
through  its  various  aspects  in  the  changing 
conditions  of  thought  in  the  successive  gene- 
rations of  men.  By  such  a  review,  under 
the  illumination  of  a  criticism  which  throws 
over  the  doctrines  of  the  earlier  ages,  the 
light  of  the  more  mature  doctrines  of  the 
later  times,  and  brings  forward  to  the  later 
times,  the  various  aspects  which  the  prob- 
lems presented  to  the  struggling  reason  of 
the  earlier  ages,  a  fuller  understanding  of  the 


10  PROGRESS    OF    PniLOSOPHY. 

doctrines  of  philosophy  and  of  the  problems 
both  solved  and  unsolved  -may  be  attained. 
And  the  method  of  philosophising,  which 
science  may  have  constructed,  will  receive 
confirmation  and  correction  and  exj^ansion 
from  the  one  perennial  method  which  the 
endeavours  both  positive  and  negative  of  all 
sects  of  philosophers  to  explain,  or  to  deny 
all  explanation  of,  the  phenomena  of  exist- 
ence, will  disclose  as  the  rational  tentative  of 
universal  reason  striving  for  mastery  over  the 
unknown.  By  such  a  comprehensive  survey, 
the  narrowness  of  schools  with  their  special 
points  of  view  and  their  technicalities  will 
be  stepped  over,  and  the  basis  of  the  one 
catholic  philosophy  will  be  discerned  in  those 
assumptions  implicitly  made,  even  in  para- 
doxes, from  the  necessities  of  intelligence  by 
all  sects  of  philosophers;  and  on  which  as 
explicitly  enounced  doctrine,  the  bewildered 
reason  has,  at  last,  been  content  to  seek  its 
rest.  And  upon  this  one  catholic  doctrine, 
can  be  grafted  whatever  of  original  thought 
we  may  have  to  contribute  to  the  great  tree 
of  philosophy,  at  the  parts  of  its  growth 
where  it  most  fitly  pertains. 


ANCIENT    PERIOD.  11 

Such  is  the  pLm  of  this  tract,  as,  in  our 
judgment,  especially  suited  to  America  where 
there  are  no  schools  of  philosophy,  but  where 
a  superstructure  of  our  own  is  to  be  reared 
upon  the  foundations  of  European  thought. 

The  progress  of  philosophy  (overlooking 
the  Eastern  period  anterior  to  that  of  Greece,) 
presents  three  great  periods:  1.  Antiquity; 
2.  The  Middle  Ages;   3.  Modern  Times. 


ANCIENT    PERIOD. 

Ancient  philosophy  comprehends  three 
epochs.  The  first,  from  Thales  to  Socrates, 
about  one  hundred  and  thirty  years,  gave 
rise  to  four  principal  sects — the  Ionic,  founded 
by  Thales;  the  Italic,  founded  by  Pythago- 
ras; the  Eleatic,  founded  by  Xenophanes; 
and  the  Atomic,  founded  by  Lcucippus  and 
Democritus.  The  second  epoch  was  from 
Socrates  to  the  promulgation  of  Christianity, 
about  five  centuries.  The  third  epoch  ex- 
tends from  the  preaching  of  Christianity  to 
the  age  of  Charlemagne,  or  rather  into  the 


12  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

sixth  century;  for  philosophy,  like  all  other 
cultivation,  was  extinguished  in  the  barbar- 
ism which  immediately  preceded  the  reign  of 
that  great  monarch. 

From  Tliales  to  Socrates,  but  one  problem 
was  discussed — the  origin  of  existence;  the 
essence  of  things;  the  formation  of  the  uni- 
verse. Each  of  the  four  sects  of  philoso- 
phers, during  this  epoch,  was  distinguished 
for  the  boldness  of  its  hypothesis  in  attempt- 
ing to  account  for  the  origin  of  the  universe. 
The  different  sects  varied  from  each  other 
only  in  the  principles  of  their  solution  of  the 
one  problem.  The  magnificence  of  the  world 
without  withdrew  philosophers  from  contem- 
plating the  world  within.  Philosophy  was, 
therefore,  physical,  not  psychological  —  of 
nature,  not  of  the  mind.  The  contemplation 
of  nature  had  filled  the  poets  Hesiod  and 
Homer  with  mythical  dreams.  Every  part 
of  the  physical  world  had  been  personified  by 
them.  In  their  age,  the  Greek  mind  had  no 
other  notion  of  causation  than  the  agency 
of  actual  personages.  All  the  operations  of 
nature  were  supposed  to  be  carried  on  by  the 
immediate   agency   of  actual   persons.     The 


ANCIENT    PERIOD.  13 

four  sects  of  philosopliers  which  we  have 
mentioned,  dispelled  the  myths  of  the  poets 
from  the  contemplation  of  nature,  and  substi- 
tuted for  persons,  powers  or  forces  inherent 
in  matter,  as  the  causes  or  formative  princi- 
ples of  nature.  And  Anaxagoras  even  sug- 
gested one  Mind  as  the  framer  of  all  things. 
These  four  sects  of  philosophers  made  the 
first  step  in  philosophy  beyond  the  mytho- 
poeic  conceptions  of  the  poets.  In  the  poets, 
the  emotional  element  of  the  mind  was  para- 
mount, expending  itself  in  a  personifying 
sympathy,  peopling  the  earth  with  all  those 
personages  which  figure  in  Greek  mythology. 
In  the  philosophers,  the  intellectual  element 
was  paramount,  looking  at  the  operations  of 
nature  as  mechanical  and  dynamic.  Still, 
the  thoughts  of  the  highest  minds  were  di- 
rected to  the  contemplation  of  the  panorama 
of  the  external  world. 

To  the  sects  of  philosophers  which  we  have 
considered,  succeeded  the  Sophists.  This  class 
of  thinkers  belongs  to  a  peculiar  stage  in 
human  progress — to  a  period  of  criticism  or 
transition.  The  previous  sects  of  philoso- 
phers had  failed  to  find  any  platform  of  truth 

1* 


14  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

on  whicli  the  reason  of  man  could  rest  satis- 
fied.    Their  labours  had  ended,  and  no  fruits 
had  been  garnered  into  the  treasury  of  know- 
ledge.    They,  too,  had  no  successors  in  their 
labour  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  universe. 
The  diiferent  views  of  nature,  taken  by  the 
several  sects,  had  all  proved  unsatisfactory, 
and  yet  seemed  to  have  left  no  other  possible 
view.     This,  the  Sophists  saw.     The  Sophists 
were,  in  truth,  the  offspring  of  the  thinking 
of  these  sects  of  naturalists.     Their  parentage 
is  shown  in  the  fact,  that,  in  general,  they 
were  materialists.     The  common  doctrine  of 
the  Sophists  was,  that  doubt  attaches  to  every 
opinion,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  find  cer- 
tainty  in   anything.     They   were    thorough 
skeptics.     However  much  these  actors  in  the 
great  drama  of  thought  may  differ  in  special 
doctrines,  on  the  one  thing  of  skepticism  they 
were  agreed ;  and  in  their  skepticism,  we  find 
the  place  on  which  they  stand,  in  the  great 
order  in  which  the  leaders  of  thought,  at  dif- 
ferent epochs,  are  marshaled  in  the  sequences 
of  history.     We   must  not,  as  has  been  so 
often  done,  regard  this  era  as  one  only  of  de- 
cadence; for,  while  we  repudiate  the  opinion 


ANCIEXT    PERIOD.  15 

of  Mr.  Grote,  that  the  Sophists  were  as  honest 
teacliers  as  Socrates,  and  their  doctrines  only 
a  little  less  enlightened,  we  readily  admit  that 
they  planted  in  the  field  of  thought  many 
fruitful  germs.  They  called  out  investiga- 
tions in  the  theory  of  knowledge,  in  logic, 
and  in  language.  Tlie  methodical  treatment 
of  many  branches  of  knowledge  was  begun 
by  them.  They  were  the  first  to  make  style 
a  special  object  of  study  amongst  the  Greeks. 
Greek  rhetoric  sprung  out  of  their  teachings. 
They,  in  a  word,  prepared  instruments,  and 
also  cleared  the  way,  to  some  extent,  for  the 
new  progress  which  was  to  succeed. 

Now  begins  the  second  epoch  of  ancient 
philosophy.  Socrates  is  the  leader  in  this 
period  of  the  struggles  of  the  mind  of  man 
with  the  difficulties  of  knowing  theoretically 
— of  construing  to  one's  consciousness  what 
he  feels  and  sees  within  and  without  himself 
The  Sophists  had  withdra^vn  attention  from 
nature,  and  the  solutions  of  those  problems 
which  had  engaged  the  first  four  sects  of 
Greek  philosophers,  and  had  fixed  attention 
on  language  in  itself,  and  in  its  contents. 
They,  in  fact,  began  a  revolution  in  the  think- 


16  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPUY. 

ing  of  the  nation.  Socrates  was  trained  in 
their  discipline.  He  profited  especially  by 
the  lectures  of  Prodicus  and  Anaxagoras.  In 
fact,  his  method  was  that  of  the  Sophists; 
and  when  he  turned  his  assaults  upon  them, 
his  victories  were  not  due  more  to  the  greater 
truth  which  armed  his  doctrines,  than  to  his 
greater  skill  in  their  own  art  of  dialectics ;  but 
yet,  we  must  carefully  distinguish  the  Socratic 
from  the  Sophistical  spirit  of  philosophising. 
That  of  the  Sophists  was  proud  and  boastful, 
as  their  very  nsune,  Go<pLgroL,io{se7nen,  indicates: 
that  of  Socrates  was  humble,  as  the  name  he 

>'  adopted,  <pi?LO<Jo(pog,  lover  of  wisdom,  to  distin- 
guish himself  and  school  from  the  Sophists, 
shows.  And  while  the  spirit  of  the  Sophists 
was  boastful,  it  was  skeptical ;  but  while  that 
of  Socrates  was  diffident,  it  was  hopeful  of 
certainty  and  truth.  The  fruitful  germ  which 
Socrates  introduced  into  philosophy,  was  the 
problem  of  human  consciousness.  The  mind 
was,  in  his  philosophy,  its  own  point  of  de- 
parture, and  its  principal  object.  With  him 
began  the  new  era  in  philosophy,  where  the 
inscription    on   the   Delphic  temple,  "Know 

'     Thyself,"  became  the  watchword  of  philoso-  ,  - 

-'■  -  '  -  •         V4 .  ac,^s,L.  %uui^  V.  3 . 4  - 


ANCIENT   PERIOD.  17 

phy.  In  consciousness  Socrates  found  that 
basis  of  truth  wliich  the  Sopliists  had  failed 
to  discover.  They  dwelt  upon  language  and 
its  contents,  and  as  these  contents  were 
merely  the  factitious  unities  of  popular  and 
uncritical  observations,  much  contradiction, 
as  well  as  vagueness,  would  be  found  in  the 
doctrines  of  all  prevailing  thought.  Socrates, 
therefore,  based  his  method  upon  conscious- 
ness, and,  by  what  he  called  intellectual  mid- 
wifery, unfolded  truth  from  the  minds  of  those 
with  whom  he  conversed.  This  w^as  the  posi- 
tive application  of  his  method ;  and  so  far  it 
w^as  his  own.  But  then,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  Socrates  merely  taught  men  hoio  to 
pJiilosopJiise,  and  did  not  teach  them,  philoso- 
pliy,  for  he  declared  that  he  had  none  to 
teach.  Through  the  negative  application  of 
his  method  he  refuted  the  Sophists,  by  show- 
ing contradiction  between  their  doctrines. 
This,  however,  was  but  the  common  dialecti- 
cal method  of  the  Sophists  themselves,  of 
asking  questions  adroitly  chosen  for  their 
logical  relations  to  the  doctrines  in  disj)ute, 
and  making  the  answ^ers  obtained,  the  premi- 
ses from  which  conclusions  are  deduced  at 


18  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

variance  with  the  doctrines  of  your  antago- 
nist, and  yet  consonant  with  his  admissions 
in  the  answers  to  your  questions.  Socrates 
achieved  his  triumphs  in  the  thinking  of  his 
age,  by  adding  a  new  force  to  the  method  of 
the  Sophists,  which  made  it  positive  as  well 
as  negative,  and  that  in  the  profoundest  ap- 
plications as  well  as  in  ordinary  problems 
which  lie  more  on  the  surface  of  knowledge. 

Socrates  had  many  followers,  who,  though 
they  diverged  much  from  each  other  in  doc- 
trines, all  gave  much  attention  to  human 
consciousness,  and  continued  the  Socratic 
movement.  Amongst  these  were  the  two 
greatest  thinkers  of  antiquity,  Plato  and 
Aristotle. 

Plato,  like  every  other  philosopher,  saw 
that  the  great  end  of  philosophy  is  to  explain 
the  phenomenal  world,  and  especially  the 
sensible  universe.  For  it  is  this  universe 
that,  from  his  earliest  infancy,  presses  with- 
out ceasing  upon  the  attention  of  man. 
Nowhere  else  is  this  object  of  philosophy 
more  distinctly  displayed  than  in  the  writ- 
ings of  Plato.  He  wrote  no  systematic  trea^ 
tise  of  philoso[)liy;  but  his  philosophical  doc- 


ANCIENT    PERIOD.  19 

triiies  are  woven  through  his  various  dia- 
logues, not  so  much  for  themselves  as  for  a 
basis  to  liis  moral,  political,  and  physical 
theories;  in  the  Pliaulo,  to  prove  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul :  in  the  Republic,  to  sustain 
his  ethical  and  political  principles;  in  the 
Timaius,  to  explain  and  verify  his  physical 
theories.  Plato's  philosophy  is  but  the  life, 
the  central  principle,  of  his  practical  doc- 
trines. Man,  living  and  acting  amidst  mys- 
teries, and  himself  the  greatest  mystery  of 
all,  was  the  great  object  of  the  philosophy 
of  Plato.  To  explain  man,  and  all  that  con- 
cerns him,  either  in  the  past,  the  present, 
and  the  future,  was  what  Plato  strove  to  do 
by  his  philosophy.  He  did  not  turn  away 
from  the  realities  of  nature,  and  spend  his 
life  in  unreal  dreams,  as  those  who  talk  so 
much  about  his  mysticism,  opine.  It  was 
the  actual,  passing  before  our  senses  and  ex- 
perienced in  our  consciousness,  that  he  at- 
tempted to  explain,  and  to  found  upon  a  basis 
of  verity. 

With  tliis  view  of  the  scope  and  purpose 
of  Plato's  philosoph}^,  let  us  inquire  into  the 


\ 


20  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

method  by  which  he  endeavoured  to  accom- 
plish his  ends. 

Socrates,  the  master  of  Plato,  was  duly 
impressed  with  the  weakness  of  the  human 
mind,  and  felt  how  narrow  are  the  limits  of 
human  knowledge.  In  fact,  he  circumscribed 
human  knowledge  within  much  narrower 
bounds  than  most  of  the  great  teachers  of 
our  race.  Physical  inquiries  he  entirely  re- 
pudiated as  beyond  the  comprehension  of 
man.  He  was,  in  truth,  rather  a  moralist 
and  dialectician,  than  a  philosopher  in  the 
sense  of  one  addicted  to  the  higher  walks  of 
speculation.  And  the  vice  of  his  method 
was  the  one,  common  to  the  Greek  philoso- 
phers, of  taking  for  granted  that  the  notions 
contained  in  common  language  are  sufficiently 
accurate  and  expressive  of  realities  for  a  basis 
of  philosophy.  This  is  sufficiently  exempli- 
fied in  the  discussion  reproduced  by  Plato  in 
the  Phsedo.  It  is  taken  for  granted,  that  the 
doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  is  de- 
ducible  from  the  common  notions  then  enter- 
tained upon  the  topics  out  of  which  the  argu- 
ment is  constructed.  There  is  no  attempt  to 
evolve  new  principles  out  of  the  facts  of  con- 

>  '     r  /'D»/  \/n    I.    rfff 


ANCIENT    PERIOD.  21 

sciousness;  no  effort  to  trace  lines  of  original 
speculation  through  secrets  of  ps3'cliological 
manifestations;  but  all  the  proofs  are  deduced 
from  the  inaccurate  notions  embodied  in  the 
language  of  the  times.  The  doctrine,  that 
all  acquired  knowledge  is  but  a  reminiscence 
of  what  was  learned  in  a  prior  state  of  exist- 
ence, approaches  nearer  to  an  attempt  at  the 
evolution  of  a  new  principle  by  reflective 
analysis  from  psychological  phenomena,  than 
anything  else  in  the  dialogue;  but  this  w^as 
doubtless  a  sophism  of  Plato's  own,  put  into 
the  mouth  of  Socrates,  and  is^  after  all,  a 
shallow^  pretence  resting  upon  mere  assump- 
tion. The  whole  inquiry  consists  of  assump- 
tions and  ratiocinations.  There  is  no  sifting 
of  premises,  no  searching  for  principles  amidst 
psychological  facts  manifested  in  self-con- 
sciousness; but  the  whole  fabric  rests  upon 
the  notions  embodied  in  the  language  of  the 
people.  There  is  no  designed  attempt  at  any 
more  accurate  basis  for  the  deduction  of  con- 
clusions. Though  he  saw,  as  we  have  said, 
that  consciousness  is  the  criterion  of  truth. 

The  doctrine  of  Plato,  as  to  the  circle  of 
human    knowledge    and    the    powers   of  the 


22  TROGRESS    OF    PUILOSOPHY. 

mind,  differed  widely  from  that  of  Socrates. 
Plato  thought  that  no  speculation  is  beyond 
the  reach  of  the  human  mind.  His  was  an 
ambitious .  philosophy.  But  we  will  show, 
that,  like  the  speculations  of  the  other  Greek 
philosophers,  his  philosophy  was  founded 
upon  popular  notions  and  remnants  of  doc- 
trine handed  do-wn,  in  loose  traditions,  from 
older  speculators,  who  built  u^^on  the  same 
superficial  basis. 

The  fundamental  doctrine  of  Plato's  philoso- 
phy is,  that  there  are  real  entities  subsisting 
in  the  universe,  corresponding  to  the  general 
terms  used  in  language;  and  that  these  gene- 
ral entities,  called  ideas,  are  the  only  proper 
objects  of  science:  and  that  the  method  of 
philosophising  is  to  close  the  senses,  and 
dwell  in  intellectual  contemplation  on  these 
ideas,  and  to  note  their  relations  and  combine 
them  into  propositions,  and  deduce  conclu- 
sions from  these  propositions:  and  that  the 
conclusions  will  correspond  with  the  empiri- 
cal truths  of  physics  and  the  practical  truths 
of  morals,  because  the  logical  relations  of 
these  ideas  correspond  with  the  physical  and 
moral  relations  of  their  images  or  represen- 


ANCIENT    PERIOD.  23 

tations — the  phenomena  of  the  physical  and 
moral  worlds.  Such  is  the  metliod  of  Plato 
when  explicitly  unfolded. 

It  results  from  such  a  metliod,  that  Plato's 
physics  and  Plato's  logic,  or,  more  strictly, 
Plato's  metaphysics  and  Phito's  dialectics,  are 
the  same.  His  physics  is  a  logico-physics. 
The  words  of  popular  language  embodied  his 
whole  field  of  observation.  And  the  logical 
relations  of  the  words,  therefore,  constituted, 
or  were  commuted  with,  the  physical  rela- 
tions of  the  things  signified  by  them;  because 
these  things  were  nothing  else  than  the  popu- 
lar meaning  of  these  words.  This  is  suffi- 
ciently exemplified  in  tlie  Platonic  doctrine 
of  contraries.  This  doctrine  is,  that  the  ulti- 
mate powers  of  nature  are  contraries,  and 
that  everything  is  generated  by  its  contrary. 
"There  is  (says  Plato)  a  certain  medium 
between  the  two  contraries.  There  are  two 
'  births,  or  processions — one  of  tlds  from  that, 
and  of  that  from  tlds.  The  medium  between 
a  greater  and  a  less  thing  is  increase  and 
diminution.  The  same  is  the  case  of  what 
we  call  mixing,  separating,  heating,  evolv- 
ing, and  all  other  things  without  end.     For, 


24  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

though  it  sometimes  falls  out,  that  we  have 
not  terms  to  express  those  changes  and 
mediums,  yet  experience  shows,  that  by  an 
absolute  necessity,  things  take  rise  from  one 
another,  and  pass  reciprocally  from  one  to 
another  through  a  medium."  It  is  manifest, 
that  the  two  births,  or  processions,  spoken  of 
as  subsisting  in  nature  between  contraries, 
are  nothing  but  the  logical  relations  of  the 
meaning  of  the  words  greater  and  Jess.  There 
are  no  births,  or  processions,  in  nature,  corre- 
sponding with  these  relations,  constituting 
a  generative  medium  between  the  entities 
greater  and  less.  The  whole  doctrine  is  an 
affair  of  words.  The  reasoning  is  logico- 
physical.  There  is  nothing  real  beyond  the 
meaning  of  the  words.  The  whole  of  philoso- 
phy and  science  is  made  nothing  more  than 
the  development  of  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
of  common  language.  Plato's  philosophy, 
therefore,  like  all  ancient  philosophy,  reposes 
upon  mere  popular  notions.  He  finds  the 
words,  equality,  big,  little,  and  other  like 
words,  in  popular  language,  and,  instead  of 
looking  into  nature  for  the  real  things  in- 
tended to  be  signified  by  these  terms,  he  con- 


ANCIENT   PEMOD.  25 

ceives  that  there  are  realities  independent  of 
nature  corresponding  with  them. 

That  Plato's  supposed  higher  objects  of 
knowledge,  called  ideas,  are  but  the  popular 
signification  of  general  terms,  is  sufficiently 
manifest  from  Plato's  own  theory  of  the  origin 
of  this  sort  of  knowledge.  His  theory  is, 
that  though  the  knowledge  of  ideas  is  ac- 
quired in  a  prior  state  of  existence,  yet  it  is 
recovered  in  this  world  by  the  ministry  of 
the  senses  exercised  upon  individual  objects, 
which  recall  the  idea^  by  reminiscence.  This 
theory  shows,  that  these  ideas  are  but  the 
general  notions  formed  by  every  one  in  the 
exercise  of  his  faculties  upon  the  objects  of 
nature.  In  other  words,  ideas  are  only  the 
meaning  of  general  terms,  w^hich  express  only 
relations,  and  afford  no  irrespective  objects. 

So,  then,  the  Idealism  of  Plato,  when  sifted 
to  the  bottom,  is  found  to  be  the  mere  Phe- 
nomenalism of  the  common  mind — a  lame 
empiricism.  There  is  no  deeper  principle 
underlying  it,  as  is  pretended — no  knowledge 
of  higher  essences  remembered  from  a  prior 
state  of  existence.  A  severe  logic  takes  off 
the  veil,  and  Plato  is  seen  to  stand  on  the 

2* 


26  PKOGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

common  ground  of  the  meagre  empiricism  of 
the  ancient  philosophy.  All  philosophers  ne- 
cessarily take  their  departure  from  the  same 
general  experiences,  whatever  may  be  pre- 
tended to  the  contrary;  and  the  different  re- 
sults of  their  speculations  will  depend  upon 
the  difference  in  the  accuracy,  the  extent, 
and  the  completeness  of  their  observations, 
and  legitimate  inferences  or  deductions. 

Aristotle  appears  next  in  Greek  philoso- 
phy; he  was  the  very  genius  of  subtlety  and 
of  system;  and  no  greater  thinker  has  yet 
appeared  in  the  family  of  man.  He  saw 
that  the  basis  of  science  and  philosophy  must, 
from  the  very  structure  of  the  human  mind, 
be  phenomenal.  Therefore,  he  strove  to  fix 
logic  on  a  psychological  basis.  With  this 
view,  he  proceeded  to  analyze  the  senses,  and 
account  for  the  origin  of  knowledge  through 
sensation.  He  repudiated  the  Platonic  doe- 
trine  of  ideas,  and  contended  that  the  only 
real  existences  are  individuals,  and  that  gene- 
rals m,aij  be  nothing  more,  so  far  as  the  pur- 
pose of  demonstration  is  concerned,  than 
terms  denoting  a  property  common  to  an  in- 
definite number  of  individuals.     "The  steady 


ANCIENT   PERIOD.  27 

contemi)lution  (says  Aristotle,  in  his  Metii- 
plnsics),  of  any  individual  object  under  that 
aspect  in  which  it  agrees  with  other  indi- 
viduals, will  recall  many  similar  objects  to 
the  mind;  the  staljility  of  the  one  will  com- 
miuiicate  stability  to  the  others,  and  thus 
give  birth  to  what  are  called  universals,  that 
is,  to  general  terms,  equally  applicable  to  an 
indofniite  number  of  individuals."  Laying 
down  this  doctrine  as  the  basis  of  his  theory 
of  knowing,  he  at  once  constructed  his  logic 
in  accordance  with  it.  Therefore,  in  his  Pos- 
terior Analytics,  he  thus  lays  down  the  psy- 
chological basis  of  demonstration:  "For  the 
purpose  of  demonstration,  it  is  not  necessary 
to  suppose  the  existence  of  general  ideas,  but 
only  that  one  general  term  can  be  applied 
with  truth,  and  in  the  same  sense,  to  many 
individuals.  It  is  not  necessary  to  suppose 
that  general  terms,  denoting  any  class  of  sul> 
stances,  express  anything  besides  the  different 
particulars  to  which  they  apply,  any  more 
than  the  general  terms  denoting  qualities, 
relations,  or  actions.  One  general  term  stands 
for  a  variety  of  particulars,  considered  under 
one  and  tlie  same  aspect;  but  to  suppose  that 


28  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

this  term  requires  one  substantial  archetype 
or  idea,  as  general  as  itself,  is  the  hearer's 
fault;  such  a  supposition  not  being  necessary 
for  the  purpose  of  demonstration." 

If  we  should  stop  our  inquiry  here,  Aris- 
totle would  appear  to  be  a  mere  Sensation- 
alist; and  such  is,  sometimes,  the  account  of 
him  in  history.  Plato  is  represented  as  a 
pure  Idealist,  while  Aristotle  is  represented 
as  a  pure  Sensationalist.  This  is  a  great  mis- 
take; each  is  both  an  Idealist  and  a  Sensa- 
tionalist— maintaining  that  human  know- 
ledge is  derived  from  both  the  intellect  and 
the  senses.  Plato,  it  is  true,  considers  intel- 
lect exercised  upon  ideas,  the  sole  source  of 
science;  yet  he  ascribed  some  degree  of  know- 
ing to  the  senses.  Aristotle  ascribed  much 
more  importance  to  sense,  but  yet  made  both 
intellect  and  sense  the  conjunct  principle  of 
science.  He  rejected  the  Platonic  doctrine 
of  ideas,  but,  as  we  shall  see,  did  not  advance 
as  far  beyond  it  as  the  quotations  from  his 
writings  which  we  have  given  above  seem  at 
first  to  indicate. 

It  behooves  us  here  to  inquire,  what  is  the 
Platonic  doctrine  of  ideas?     The  word  idea, 


ANCIENT    PERIOD.  29 

since  the  time  of  Des  Cartes,  has  been  cm- 
ployed  to  denote  the  objects  of  our  conscious- 
ness in  general;  and,  since  the  time  of  Gas- 
sendi  and  Condihac,  whose  school  analyzed 
our  highest  faculties  into  our  lowest,  the  word 
has  been  used  to  denote  the  objects  of  our 
senses  in  general.  We  have  already  seen 
that  Plato  used  the  word  in  a  far  different 
sense  from  either  of  these.  He  employed  it 
to  express  the  real  forms  of  the  intelligible 
world  in  lofty  contrast  with  the  images  of  the 
sensible.  It  was  in  this  Platonic  sense  that 
Aristotle  rejected  the  doctrine  of  ideas. 
"Plato  (says  Aristotle,)  came  to  the  doctrine 
of  ideas,  because  he  was  convinced  of  the 
truth  of  the  Heraclitic  view,  which  regards 
the  sensible  w^orld  as  a  ceaseless  flowing  and 
changing.  His  conclusion  from  this  was,  that 
if  there  be  a  science  of  anything,  there  must 
be,  besides  the  sensible,  other  substances 
which  have  permanence;  for  there  can  be 
no  science  of  the  fleeting."  In  Plato's  view, 
science  demanded  the  reality  of  ideas  as  per- 
manent existences,  independent  of  sensible 
phenomena.  Aristotle  maintained  that  there 
is   no   proof  of  the   independent   reality  of 


30  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

ideas;  and  that,  at  any  rate,  the  doctnne  fur- 
nishes no  ground  for  the  exphmation  of  being. 
That  Plato,  in  order  to  make  science  possible, 
had  arbitrarily  posited  certain  substances  in- 
dependent of  the  sensible  and  uninfluenced 
by  changes — but  that  only  individual  things 
are  offered  to  us  objectively.  Therefore,  that 
it  is  the  individual  which  is  conceived  as  uni- 
versal, or  perhaps,  that  the  universal  is  per- 
ceived in  the  individual;  and  that  this  con- 
ception or  perception  is  the  objectified  idea 
of  Plato. 

The  doctrine,  that  the  universal  can  be 
perceived  in  the  individual,  which  was,  ^jer- 
haps,  the  opinion  of  Aristotle,  when  sifted  to 
the  bottom,  is  simply  this.  The  products  of 
the  understanding  or  generalising  faculty  have 
both  a  general  and  an  individual  element,  con- 
stituting two  opposite  logical  poles.  The  sim- 
plest operation  of  this  faculty  is  to  compare 
together  the  points  of  resemblance  between 
objects,  and  reduce  them  to  one  in  the  syn- 
thesis of  thought.  The  product  of  tliis  pro-" 
cess  is  a  concept.  A  conce[)t  being  the  result 
of  a  comparison,  necessarily  expresses  a  rela- 
tion; it  therefore  affords  no  absolute  or  irre- 


ANCIENT    PERIOD.  81 

spective  object  of  knowledge.  In  this  aspect, 
it  is  general ;  but  it  can  be  realized  in  con- 
sciousness, by  applying  it,  as  the  term  of  re- 
lation, to  one  or  more  of  the  objects  which 
agree  in  the  point  or  points  of  resemblance 
which  it  expresses.  In  this  aspect,  it  is  indi- 
vidual. A  concept,  therefore,  is  a  synthesis 
of  the  universal  and  the  individual  expressed 
in  a  term  of  relation.  And  it  iS  the  obscure 
consciousness  of  this  conjunction  of  the  uni- 
versal and  the  individual  in  the  products  of 
the  understanding,  which  has  led  men  to 
assert  the  existence  of  universals  in  nature. 
It  is  but  the  common  error  in  philosophy  of 
commuting  the  subjective  for  the  objective. 
This  criticism,  we  believe,  has  never  been 
made  before.  It  seeitis  to  us  to  furnish  a  clue 
to  the  fundameijtal  errors  m  philosophy  *  n  ^  -» 

*  It  is  the  clue  "to  the  error  that  all  knowlediie  must 
be  throui^h  })revious  knowledge — that  our  cognition  of 
a  class  or  universal  is  prior  to  that  of  the  individual. 
Though  intuition  must  precede  conception,  yet  the  in- 
dividual as  such  and  the  universal  are  discerned  simul- 
taneously. We  cannot  distinguish  one  individual  from 
another  without  being  conscious  of  the  notion  which  that 
individual  exemplifies     The  general  notion  is  necessarily 


32  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

From  the  criticism  of  Plato's  doctrine  of 
ideas,  arose  Aristotle's  doctrine  of  matter  and 
form.  Aristotle  enumerates  four  metaphysi- 
cal causes  or  principles;  maiter,  form,  moving 
cause,  and  end.  But  these  four  can  be  re- 
solved into  the  fundamental  antithesis  of 
matter  and  form.  Matter  and  form,  there- 
fore, are,  according  to  the  Aristotelic  doctrine, 
the  only  things  which  cannot  be  resolved  into 
each  other.  Matter,  according  to  Aristotle, 
is  capable  of  the  widest  diversity  of  forms, 
but  is  itself  without  determinate  form:  it 
is  everything  in  possibility,  but  nothing  in 
actuality.  Matter  is  thus  a  far  more  positive 
thing  with  Aristotle  than  with  Plato,  who 
treated  it  as  a  shadow.  We  must  guard 
against  the  supposition,  that  Aristotle  means 
by  form  what  we  mean  by  shape.  The  Aris- 
totelic form  is  an  activity  which  becomes  ac- 
tualized, through  matter,  in  individual  objects. 

Aristotle's  theory  of  knowledge  corresponds 
with  his  theory  of  forms.     As,  according  to 

conceived  along  with  the  individual  which  is  discerned 
under  it.  This  is  possible,  because  things  are  presented 
in  plurality,  and  conception  must  begin  at  once  in  aid  of 
intuition  to  complete  the  a})prehension  of  the  individual. 


ANCIEXT    PERIOD.  33 

his  mctaplij'sical  doctrine,  forms  or  universals 
exist  not  apart  from,  but  in  individual  objects, 
he  made,  as  we  have  said  before,  both  intellect 
and  sense  important  faculties  in  science.  He 
held  that  there  is  an  a  priori  knowledge  para- 
mount to,  but  not  exclusive  of,  the  a  posteriori. 
That,  though  universals  are  known  through 
the  intellect  and  implicitly  contain  particu- 
lars, yet  we  may  remain  ignorant  of  particu- 
lars until  they  are  realized  through  the  senses. 
Therefore,  that  intellect  and  sense  combine  in 
framing  the  fabric  of  science.  Accordingly 
Aristotle's  method  is  two-fold,  deductive  and 
inductive;  the  first  allied  with  intellect  and 
forms  or  universals;  the  second,  with  sense 
and  individuals.  In  conformity  with  this 
doctrine,  Aristotle  seems  to  have  considered 
syllogism  proper,  or  deduction,  no  less  amplia- 
tive  than  induction;  that  deduction  did,  in 
some  way,  assure  us,  or  fortify  our  assurance, 
of  real  truth. 

Though  Aristotle  turned  the  mind  to  out- 
ward contemplation,  he  did  not  perceive  the 
full  import  of  observation,  nor  the  full  scope 
of  induction.  He  still,  in  conformity  with 
ancient  thinking,  made  universals  the  para- 

3 


34  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

mount  element  of  science,  and  intellect  the 
paramount  principle.  It  is  true,  that  his 
doctrine  of  universals  differed  metaphysi- 
cally from  that  of  Plato;  but  logically  it 
came  to  very  much  the  same  result  in  its  in- 
fluence upon  method.  There  are,  according 
to  Aristotle's  theory  of  knowledge,  certain 
universal  principles  existing  in  the  mind, 
rather  as  native  generalities  than  as  mere 
necessities  of  so  thinking,  which  furnish  the 
propositions  for  syllogism ;  therefore  S3'llogism 
or  deduction  is  not  dependent  for  these  on  in- 
duction. Syllogism  is  thus  the  paramount 
process,  and  induction  an  inferior  process, 
which  may  be  used  as  corroborative  of  deduc- 
tion; and  may  be  especially  used  by  such 
minds  as  cannot  a  priori  realize  universals, 
but  may  perceive  them  in  individuals.  Aris- 
totle directed  all  his  energies  towards  con- 
structing a  system  of  deductive  logic.  And 
he  assumed  that  the  notions  contained  in  the 
language  of  his  day  were  sufficiently  accurate 
for  philosophy  and  science.  Some  of  the  pro- 
foundest  distinctions  of  his  philosophy  are  to 
be  found  in  the  very  structure  of  the  Greek 
language.      The  distinction,  for  instance,  of 


ANCIENT    PERIOD.  35 

power  into  active  and  passive  wliicli  is  said  to 
have  been  established  by  Aristotle,  and  was 
adopted  by  Locke  and  by  Leibnitz,  is  found 
in  the  very  fabric  of  the  Greek  language, 
which  possesses  two  sets  of  potential  adjec- 
tives, the  one  for  active  and  the  other  for 
passive  power.  Those  significant  of  active 
power  are  denoted  by  the  termination  izog, 
and  those  of  passive,  by  that  of  ro$.*  Though, 
therefore,  Aristotle  extricated  logic  from  the 
metaphysical  errors  of  Plato,  he  fell  into  a 
like  error,  but  not  so  gross,  under  a  different 
name;  for  Plato's  ideas  and  Aristotle's  forms 
are,  at  bottom,  but  the  common  notions  ex- 
pressed by  general  terms.  In  his  investiga- 
tions, Aristotle  generally  starts  out  by  say- 
ing: "It  is  said  so  and  so;"'and  his  procedure 
is  ratiocination  founded  upon  common  no- 
tions. The  doctrine  of  contraries,  too,  as 
was  the  case  with  Plato,  is  a  sophistry  by 
which  he  deceived  himself.  And  in  his  rea- 
sonings, his  doctrine  of  forms,  sometimes,  un- 


*  ridCTjTixov  signifies  that  which  can  make,  and  -oirjrov, 
that  which  can  be  made  ;  y.f^rjTuuv,  that  which  can  move, 
and  xivfjTov,  that  which  can  be  moved. 


36  PROGRESS    OP   PHILOSOPHY. 

consciously  to  himself,  slips  into  Plato's  doc- 
trine of  ideas.  And  we  doubt  whether  Aris- 
totle's estimate  of  induction,  as  a  method  of 
material  inquiry,  was  higher  than  that  of  the 
ancient  Greek  skeptics  as  recorded  by  Sextus 
Empiricus  in  these  words :  "  Induction  is  the 
conclusion  of  the  universal  from  individual 
things.  But  this  induction  can  only  be  cor- 
rect in  as  far  as  all  the  indi^-idual  things 
agree  with  the  universal.  This  universality 
must,  therefore,  be  verified  before  its  induc- 
tion can  be  made:  a  single  case  to  the  con- 
trary would  destroy  the  truth  of  the  induc- 
tion." The  weakness  of  induction,  as  indi- 
cated by  this  criticism  of  the  skeptics,  was 
overrated  by  Aristotle;  as  his  whole  logic 
seems  to  assume,  in  the  very  subordinate 
place  given  to  induction.  But  yet  Aristotle 
was  so  superior  to  all  other  Greek  philoso- 
jDhers  as  an  observer  of  nature,  that  we  find 
in  Suidas,  he  is  called  the  mterpreter  of  nature 
— 'Api(TroT£/l>7g  Ty;$  ^vaeioc,  ypai-i^arevg  nv. 

Let  it  not  be  supposed,  from  what  we  have 
^aid  of  the  deficiencies  of  the  Aristotelic  logic, 
that  we  value  it  at  a  low  estimate;  it  is  far 
otherwise.      We    put   the   highest   estimate, 


ANCIENT    PERIOD.  37 

both  upon  the  influence  which  it  has  exer- 
cised directly  upon  the  progress  of  knowledge, 
and  indirectly  in  disciplining  the  higher  facul- 
ties of  the  mind.  It  was  as  great  a  need  in 
Aristotle's  time  as  the  inductive  method  was 
in  Bacon's.  The  work  to  be  done,  in  the 
state  of  knowledge  in  Aristotle's  time,  was 
to  sift  the  thought  accumulated,  discover  its 
logical  dependencies,  eliminate,  by  the  princi- 
ple of  contradiction,  as  Socrates  did  in  his 
conversations  with  the  Sophists,  apparent 
errors,  and  retain  what  would  stand  the  test 
of  logical  principles.  The  time  had  not 
arrived  for  the  inductive  method  of  objective 
observation  and  material  illation.  This  we 
will  endeavour  to  elucidate. 

All  thinking  is  either  materially  false,  or 
formally  false,  or  both.  We  have  shown, 
that  there  was  much  material  falseness  in 
ancient  philosophy;  as  the  notions  which 
formed  its  matter  were  the  result  of  unscien- 
tific observation.  But  this  was  not  the  only 
vice  of  ancient  philosophy.  There  was  in  it, 
also,  a  great  deal  of  formal  or  logical  false- 
ness; and,  until  this  was  corrected,  the  time 
had  not  come  for  correcting  its  other  vice. 


3* 


38  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

Even  in  so  profound  a  thinker  as  Plato,  there 
are  paralogisms  of  every  kind  so  gross  as  to 
astonish  the  modern  mind  not  familiar  with 
the  looseness  of  ancient  thought.  The  very 
ingenuity  of  the  Greek  mind  led  to  sophisms. 
And  many  of  these  sophisms,  which  are  seen 
by  the  modern  mind  to  be  a  mere  play  of  wit 
and  acuteness,  were  deemed  very  important 
by  some  of  the  most  distinguished  thinkers 
of  antiquity.  In  ancient  times,  men  lived 
more  in  public,  and  carried  on  scientific  in- 
vestigations more  in  oral  discussions,  or  con- 
versations, than  in  the  soliloquy  of  private 
meditation.  IJrofundity,  therefore,  would  be 
less  valued  than  wit,  dexterity  in  question- 
ing, and  adroit  discovery  of  objections.  The 
Sophists  were  accomplished  masters  in  this 
art.  There  were,  too,  certain  artificial  rules, 
by  which  their  dialogues  were  regulated. 
Every  answer  to  a  question,  for  instance,  was 
to  be  yes  or  no.  The  interrogator,  therefore, 
could  constrain  his  adversary  to  move  in  a 
foreseen  manner. 

Now,  as  the  method  of  science  was  not 
understood,  men  might  perceive  a  fallacy, 
and  yet  not  be  able  to  point  it  out;  for  they 


AXCIENT   PERIOD.  39 

had  not  even  the  requisite  language  to  ex- 
press these  fallacies.  How  compendiously 
does  the  technical  expression,  "begging  of 
the  question,"  indicate  a  common  fallacy! 
Such  expressions,  furnished  by  logic,  not  only 
facilitate  the  exposure  of  error,  but  enable  us 
to  get  clearer  views  of  truth.  It  was,  there- 
fore, the  first  demand  of  science,  that  the 
laws  of  thought  should  be  investigated  and 
understood,  so  that,  by  their  application,  fal- 
lacious reasonings  might  be  discovered.  This 
Aristotle  attempted  by  considering  the  reason- 
ings embodied  in  ancient  thought.  He  saw 
that  the  clue  to  the  whole  scheme  of  Sophis- 
try, was  to  discriminate  the  essence  of  the  in- 
ternal thought  from  the  accident  of  the  ex- 
ternal expression.  In  this  way,  he  discovered, 
that  the  syllogism  is  the  one  form  of  reason- 
ing, and  that  fallacies  consist  in  the  covert 
violations  of  the  logical  laws  which  govern 
the  syllogism.  He  developed  this  doctrine 
into  the  greatest  monument  of  speculative 
genius  which  illustrates  the  history  of  philoso- 
phy. The  great  purpose  of  the  Aristotelic 
logic,  was  to  purge  the  understanding,  and  to 
keep  it  free  of  those  errors  which  arise  from 


40  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

the  confusion  and  perplexity  of  inconsequent 
thinking. 

The  purpose  of  this  tract  forbids  any  more 
extended  review  of  the  doctrines  of  the 
followers  of  Socrates.  Plato  and  Aristotle 
rise  so  far  above  all  others,  in  the  importance 
of  their  contributions  to  the  progress  of 
philosophy,  that,  in  a  sketch  like  this,  an 
examination  of  their  doctrines  must  suffice. 

The  Romans  were  not  acquainted  with 
philosophy  until  after  their  conquest  of 
Greece;  and  they  never  did  succeed  in  specu- 
lative inquiries.  Cicero  reproduced  and  de- 
veloped the  moral  philosophy  of  the  Greeks, 
and,  carrjdng  the  spirit  of  the  orator  into 
philosophy,  he  clothed  it  in  the  grand  ha- 
biliments of  the  eloquence  nurtured  amidst 
the  meditative  shades  of  Tusculum.  '^  Hanc 
enim  ■^erfectam  philosopliiam  (says  Cicero), 
semper  judicavi  qitce  de  maximis  qucestionihus 
copiose  posset  orncdeque  dicere."  But,  for  the 
most  part,  philosophy  was  at  Rome  degraded 
to  a  menial  to  serve  personal  interests,  by  dis- 
playing an  apparent  love  of  truth  in  a  pre- 
tended devotion  to  elevated  studies/  Rome 


.  uu. 


^K^ 


(fit'  •''  ■   t      i'Tin-iTKa/c:)^ 


ANCIENT    PERIOD.  4l 

has,  therefore,  no  contribution  in  the  progress 
of  pliilosophy. 

After  the  Macedonian  conquests,  Alexan- 
dria became  the  great  focus  of  learning. 
From  its  situation,  it  was  the  centre  of  the 
commerce  of  the  world ;  many  were  attracted 
thither  by  the  libraries  of  the  Ptolemies. 
Here  met  philosophers  from  the  East  and  the 
West;  the  religious  dogmas  of  Jew  and  Gen- 
tile, Pagan  and  Christian,  and  systems  the 
most  opposing,  met  on  the  same  arena.  Plo- 
tinus,  Proclus,  and  Porphyry,  were  the  most 
distinguished  philosophers  of  this  school. 
Their  doctrines  were  Platonic,  and  therefore 
the  school  was  called  Neoplatonic.  Their 
philosophy  was,  however,  a  cloudy  exhala- 
tion from  the  vast  inundation  of  the  con- 
fluent streams  of  diverse  doctrines  which  had 
flooded  in  from  many  nations.  It  vanished 
before  the  light  of  Christianity.  The  only 
doctrines  of  Paganism,  which  existed  after 
this  period,  were  those  adopted  by  the  fathers 
of  the  Christian  Church. 

The  fathers  of  the  Church  devoted  little  /? 
attention    to    pliilosophy,    and    still    less   to  ' 
nature.     They  gave   a   preference  to  Plato, 


42  PROGRESS   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

but  were  adherents  of  no  particular  system, 
culling  and  selecting  from  all.     "God  (says 
Clirysostom)  did  not  send  men  into  the  world 
to  syllogise  and  form  arguments,  but  to  ex- 
pound the  truth — not  to  dispute  and  contend 
with  one  another,  but  to  deal  out  truth  with 
impartiality.      It   was    not   in    philosophical 
arguments  that  the  Apostles  interested  them- 
selves, but  they  preached  simply  and  clearly, 
and  it  is  from  their  example  that  we  are  to 
act."      And    Clement    of   Alexandria    says: 
"  What  I  call  philosophy,  is  not  what  Plato 
and  Aristotle   have   promulgated,  but  what 
they  have  spoken  true  and  favourable  to  re- 
ligion."    Such  are  the  most  favourable  views 
of  philosophy  entertained  by  the  fathers  of 
tlie  Church.     Some  of  the   sects,  especially 
the  Epicureans  and  Stoics,  they  openly  at- 
tacked.    St.  Augustine  did   more    than  any 
other  of  the  fathers  of  the  Church  to  further 
philosophy;  but  he  conformed  his  doctrines 
to  Christianity. 

But  this  twilight  of  philosophy  at  last  sunk 
into  night  in  the  sixth  century,  and  for  seve- 
ral ages  there  is  a  blank  in  the  progress  of 
speculation. 


MEDIiEVAL    PERIOD.  43 


MEDIEVAL    PERIOD. 

'  Our  modern  philosophy,  like  our  civiliza- 
tion, takes  its  rise  in  the  middle  ages.  Its 
character  in  these  ages,  is  philosophy  under 
ecclesiastical  authority — pldlosophia  ancillans 
tlieolofjicB.  The  middle  ages  begin  when  the 
church  became  disencumbered  from  the  ruins 
of  ancient  philosophy.  This  crisis  was  not 
until  the  time  of  Charlemagne.  He  was 
the  vassal  of  the  Pope.  Pie  opened  schools 
throughout  his  vast  empire;  and  from  these 
philosophy  ol)tained  the  name  Scholastic. 
The  clergy  were  the  cultivators  of  this 
philosophy,  and  its  character  is  given  in  the 
nature  of  its  origin,  and  may  be  summed  up 
in  the  saying  of  Joannus  Scotus  Eregina, 
Tliere  are  not  two  studies  of  pliilosaphy  and  re- 
ligion, hut  icliat  is  true  pliilosophy  is  also  true 
religion. 

The  Scholastic  j^liilosophy  is  distributed 
into  several  epochs  or  changes.  During  the 
first,  philosophy  was  under  absolute  subordi- 
nation to  religion;  during,  the  second,  the 
subordination  was  softened  down  to  an  alii- 


44  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

ance;  and  in  the  third,  a  separation  took 
place,  indistinct  at  first,  but  finally  more 
discriminating;  and  at  last,  terminating  in 
modern  j^hilosophy. 

The  rampant  spirit  of  physical  inquiry  in 
this  age,  is  too  prone  to  look  back  at  the 
schoolmen  as  mere  logical  knightr-errants,  and 
their  philosophy  as  logic  run  mad,  because  it 
did  not  advance  physical  science.  Because 
the  schoolmen,  not  perceiving  the  relativity 
of  general  terms,  and  that  they  afibrd  no 
irrespective  objects,  wasted  so  much  time  in 
disputes  about  Nominalism  and  Realism;  and 
not  discriminating  the  primary  and  secondary 
qualities  of  matter,  and  tlierefore  not  perceiv- 
ing that  the  words  denoting  the  secondary 
qualities  were  ambiguously  applied  both  to 
the  knowing  mind  and  the  object  known,  dis- 
puted, whether  fire  is  hot,  sugar  sweet,  grass 
green,  and  other  like  questions;  it  has  been 
concluded  that  all  their  discussions  were  idle 
disputes  of  mere  words.  And  because  they 
were  subject  in  all  their  judgments  to  the 
Church,  as  recognized  arbiter,  it  has  been  sup- 
posed that  all  the  doctrines  of  the  schoolmen 
were  the  blind  opinions  ordered  by  the  un- 


MEDIAEVAL    PERIOD.  45 

reasoned  decrees  of  the  ecclesiastical  hier- 
archy. In  these  conclusions  there  is  great 
error;  for,  with  all  the  circumscription  of  the 
Church,  there  was  ample  scope  left  for  the 
loftiest  speculations.  Though  the  authority 
of  the  Church  was  imperative  when  it  issued 
its  mandate,  yet  it  left  a  large  proportion  of 
the  problems  of  pliilosoj^hical  theology  unde- 
termined; and  questions  which,  among  Pro- 
testants, would  cause  a  difference  of  sects, 
were  decided  in  either  alternative  without 
impairing  the  orthodoxy  of  the  parties.  The 
f'dct  is,  that  the  f^xcidties  of  the  human  mind 
were  never  more  vigorously  exerted  (just  as 
is  the  case  with  lawyers,  though  their  dis- 
cussions move,  too,  within  the  limits  of  au- 
thority), than  during  the  middle  ages  by  the 
schoolmen;  though  often  on  trivial  questions, 
with  trivial  results,  but  often  on  important 
questions,  with  important  results. 

We  are  indebted  to  the  schoolmen  for  much 
of  the  analysis  which  shows  from  the  nature 
of  the  thing  that  the  formal  laws  of  thought 
are  the  adequate  object^matter  of  logic.  We 
are  also  indebted  to  them  for  the  proper  scien- 
tific definition  of  truth,  as  the  correspondence 

4 


46  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

or  agreement  of  a  cog^iitlon  or  a  cognitive  act 
of  tliought  vnilt  its  ohjed.  The  schoolmen  did 
also  much  towards  fitting  the  modern  lan- 
guages for  philosophical  thinking.  The  great 
problem  of  philosophy  is,  to  analyze  the  con- 
tents of  our  acts  of  knowledge  or  our  cogni- 
tions, and  discriminate  what  elements  have 
been  contributed  by  the  knowing  subject  and 
by  the  object  known.  There  must,  therefore, 
be  terms  adequate  to  designate  these  correlor- 
tive  opposites,  and  discriminate  the  share 
each  has  in  the  total  cognition.  The  exact 
distinction  of  subject  and  object  was  first  made 
by  the  schoolmen.  This  distinction  involves 
the  whole  science  of  mind;  for  this  science  is 
nothing  more  than  the  articulate  discrimina- 
tion  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  in 
themselves  and  in  their  mutual  relations. 
The  two  opposite  nouns,  subject  and  object, 
and  the  corresponding  adjectives,  subjective 
and  objective,  taken  together  and  correla- 
tively,  enable  us  to  designate  tlie  primary 
and  most  important  antithesis  of  philosophy 
in  the  most  precise  and  complete  manner. 
Therefore  it  is  seen  that  the  most  important 


u 


MEDIEVAL    PERIOD.  47 


seeds  of  modern  philosophy  are  to  be  found 
in  the  Scholastic. 

The  capture  of  Constantinople  by  the 
TurkSj  in  the  year  1453,  scattered  over  the 
West  the  learned  Greeks  of  that  capital;  and 
then  it  was  that  philosophy  rebelled  against 
the  supremacy  of  Aristotle  and  the  Church. 
Philosophy,  which  had  been  the  mere  hand- 
maid of  the  Church,  came  now  to  be  cultiva- 
ted for  itself.  New  schools  were  opened,  and 
almost  every  school  of  antiquity  had  its  sup- 
porters. Europe  beheld  the  revival  of  the 
Academy,  the  Lyceum,  and  the  Porch.  The 
system  which  first  rose  into  greatest  repute 
was  the  Platonic,  contaminated  with  many 
mysteries  of  the  Alexandrian  fathers.  But 
there  arose  a  sect  of  independent  thinkers, 
whose  doctrines  were  subversive  of  even  the 
spirituality  of  God  and  man.  Cardamus,  Tu- 
lesimus,  Beregard,  Cesalpinus,  and  Verini, 
present  a  group  of  philosophers  who  cannot 
be  classed  under  any  particular  sect.  They 
launched  out  into  speculations  which  we  are 
forced  to  admire  for  their  vigour  and  inde- 
pendence. Skepticism  had  its  supporters,  at 
this  time,  in  Montaigne  and  others.     But  the 


48  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

whole  pliilosophy  of  this  age,  was  a  mere  re- 
flex of  that  of  antiquity.  The  want  of  method 
was  the  fundamental  defect;  and  exclusive 
deference  to  authority  was  the  great  impedi- 
ment to  mental  progress.  It  is  difficult  for 
us,  in  this  age  of  free  thought  and  speech, 
to  realize  the  extreme  submission  to  the  au- 
thority of  the  Church,  when  that  authority 
was  exerted,  and  the  absolute  deference  paid 
to  Aristotle,  during  the  scholastic  period. 
The  two  great  ends  to  be  accomplished,  in 
order  to  set  free  the  human  mind,  were  to 
discover  a  better  method  of  philosophizing 
and  to  shake  off  the  yoke  of  authority. 


o? 


MODERN   PERIOD. 

Scholasticism  had  turned  away  the  minds 
of  thinkers  from  nature.  But  now,  nature 
begun  to  receive  a  remarkable  degree  of  at- 
tention. The  discovery  of  America,  and  of 
the  passage  to  the  East  Indies,  had  widened 
the  scope  of  view;  and  the  discoveries  of 
Copernicus,  Kepler,  and  Galileo,  had  carried 


MODERN    PERIOD.  49 

the  thoughts  of  men  beyond  the  limits  of 
tradition  and  authority,  and  given  an  entirely 
new  direction  to  the  thinking  of  the  age. 
These  discoveries  refuted  a  series  of  tradi- 
tional errors  and  prejudices,  and  gave  the 
thinking  mind  a  self-dependence  which  caused 
it  to  break  loose  from  the  fetters  of  authority, 
and  place  itself  upon  the  basis  of  observation 
and  experiment,  inquiry  and  proof. 

At  this  juncture  in  the  progress  of  thought, 
the  most  majestic  and  prophetic  mind  known 
to  the  history  of  philosophy,  rose  up  to  lead 
men  in  the  new  career  of  investigation  which 
had  been  begun.  Trained  in  the  practice  of 
a  jurisprudence  the  most  technical,  and  in 
its  routine  the  most  servile,  and  the  most 
obedient  to  authority  and  traditional  usage 
of  any  which  has  been  established  amongst 
men,  Ave  see  the  remarkable  spectacle  of  a 
Lord  Chancellor  of  England  laying  aside,  for 
the  moment,  the  king's  seals,  to  become  the 
keeper  of  the  seals  of  nature.  And  in  a 
majesty  of  diction  unparalleled  in  the  history 
of  philosophy,  this  great  thinker  proclaimed 
to  the  world  a  new  method  of  philosophizing 
to  guide,  the  mighty  spii^t  of  inquiry  which 

4* 


50  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

■^as  abroad,  over  the  fields  of  observation. 
Philosophy,  no  longer  confined  to  the  schools, 
is  led  forth  by  a  politician  and  lawyer,  out 
from  the  confines  of  authority  into  the  ampli- 
tudes of  nature.  From  this  moment,  the 
freedom  of  the  human  mind  was  established. 
This  man  of  business,  this  accomplished  cour- 
tier, this  cunning  lawyer,  this  consummate 
orator,  this  leader  in  the  afiairs  of  the  world, 
appears  on  the  stage  of  philosophical  thought, 
with  a  more  comprehensive  grasp  of  thinking 
and  a  greater  forecast,  than  any  one  of  even 
the  many  trained  especially  to  philosophy, 
who  had  preceded  him.  It  is,  at  once,  mani- 
fest to  the  eye  of  history,  that  a  great  revo- 
lution in  the  modes  of  philosophical  thinking 
has  been  accomplished;  and  that  henceforth 
philosophy  is  to  pursue  new  paths.  The 
power  of  the  schools  is  gone,  and  that  of  the 
individual  is  asserted  and  established.  Au- 
thority can  no  longer  prevail  against  reason. 

The  revolution  which  Bacon  efiected  is 
analogous  to  that  accomplished  by  Socrates; 
for  as  the  latter  was  said  to  bring  down  phi- 
losophy from  heaven  to  earth,  so  the  former 
may  be  said  to  have  brouglit  pliilosophy  from 


MODERN    PERIOD.  51 

V' 

books  and  tradition  to  nature.  The  philoso- 
phy of  antirpiity,  Bacon  showed,  leaped  at 
once  to  the  highest  generalizations  or  laws, 
without  attending  to  those  intervening  par- 
ticulars, through  which  we  must  pass  to 
arrive  at  a  perfect  generalization.  Its  method 
was  a  treacherous  logic,  as  we  have  shown, 
which  limited  everything  to  the  mechanism 
of  language;  and  as  words  serve  only  as 
registers  of  our  thoughts,  our  doctrines  cannot 
be  exempt  from  error,  unless  w^e  determine 
the  original  notions  for  ourselves.  It  is, 
therefore,  says  Bacon,  necessary  to  purge  the 
mind  of  these  errors  which  it  has  imbibed. 
He  therefore,  attempted,  what  was  never  at^ 
tempted  before,  a  systematic  classification  of 
the  kinds  of  error.  Of  these  he  enumerates 
four,  and  calls  them  Idols.  The  first,  he  calls 
Idols  of  the  Tribe,  being  inherent  in  human 
nature;  the  second  he  calls  Idols  of  the  Den, 
being  those  of  each  individual;  the  third  he 
calls  Idols  of  the  Market,  being  those  formed 
from  the  society  of  men;  the  fourth  he  calls 
Idols  of  the  Theatre,  being  false  notions  de- 
rived from  systems  of  philosophy,  and  the 
contents  of  popular  language.     Bacon  makes 


52  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophy  a  mere  interpretation  of  nature, 
and  says:  "The  doctrine  of  idols  bears  the 
same  relation  to  the  interpretation  of  nature 
as  that  of  the  confutation  of  sophisms  does 
to  common  logic."  Therefore,  the  first  step 
in  a  true  method  of  philosophizing  (interpret- 
ing nature)  is  to  point  out  "the  idols  and  false 
notions  which  have  already  preoccupied  the 
human  understanding,  and  are  deeply  rooted 
in  it."  The  second  step  is,  "the  formation  of 
notions  and  axioms  on  the  foundation  of  true 
induction,  which  is  the  only  fitting  remedy 
by  which  we  can  ward  off  and  expel  these 
idols." 

Bacon  points  out  the  difference  between 
the  ancient  method  and  his  own  in  these 
words:  "There  are  and  can  exist  but  two 
Avays  of  investigating  and  discovering  truth. 
The  one  hurries  on  rajjidly  from  the  senses 
and  particulars  to  the  most  general  axioms; 
and  from  them  as  principles,  and  their  sup- 
posed indisputable  truth,  derives  and  dis- 
covers the  intermediate  axioms.  This  is  the 
way  now  in  use.  The  other  constructs  its 
axioms  from  the  senses  and  particulars,  by 
ascending  continually  and  gradually,  till  it 


MODERN   PERIOD.  ■  53 

finally  arrives  at  the  most  general  axioms, 
which  is  the  true  but  unattempted  way." 

It  is  important  to  have  distinctly  in  mind 
the  precise  end  which  Bacon  designed  to  ac- 
complish by  his  new  method,  or  Novum  Or- 
ganum.  It  was  manifestly  intended  to  super- 
sede the  old  method,  or  Organon  of  Aristotle. 
Its  very  name  evinces  this.  Much  difficulty, 
however,  has  been  created  in  regard  to  this 
question,  by  making  distinctions  in  logic, 
which  neither  Aristotle  nor  Bacon  under- 
stood. Logic  has  very  properly  come  to  be 
distinguished  into  pure  and  concrete  or  modi- 
fied logic.  Pure  logic  is  conversant  about 
the  form  of  thought;  concrete  logic  is  con- 
versant about  the  form  of  thought  as  modified 
by  the  empirical  circumstances,  external  and 
internal,  under  which  man  exerts  his  facul- 
ties. Pure  logic,  therefore,  proposes  as  its  / 
end,  the  formal  or  lotjkal  perfection  of-^""  - 
thought,  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  its  real 
truth;  while  the  end  of  concrete  logic  is  real 
or  material  truth.  Now,  it  has  been  con- 
tended that  Aristotle's  logical  treatises  are  of 
pure  logic,  while  Bacon's  treatise  is  of  con- 
crete logic;  and  that  consequently  their  scopes     ^ 


54  PKOGRESS   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

are  entirely  different,  and  the  ends  intended 
to  be  accomplished  by  Aristotle  and  Bacon 
are  different  also.  In  this  ojoinion  there  is 
some  truth  and  much  error.  Aristotle  had 
no  definite,  certainly  no  adequate^  notion  of 
the  distinction  between  pure  and  concrete 
logic;  and  therefore  has,  throughout  the  logi- 
cal treatises  which  have  come  down  to  us, 
confounded  the  two.  The  end  of  his  logical 
treatises  was  not  merely  formal  or  logical 
truth,  but  real  or  material  truth  also;  the 
two  not,  in  fact,  being  discriminated.  It  was 
as  a  means  towards  real  or  material  truth, 
that  Bacon  considered  the  Aristotelic  logic; 
and  it  was  in  this  aspect  he  designed  to  super- 
sede it.  The  whole  force  of  the  Novum 
Organum  rests  upon  this  fact.  The  Aristo- 
telic logic  had  in  fact  confounded  the  distinc- 
tion between  formal  and  material  truth;  and 
it  was  this  very  confusion  which  constituted 
its  vice.  In  consequence  of  this  confusion,  it 
was  considered  a  method  of  philosophizing,  a 
means  by  which  new  truths  could  be  elicited 
or  gathered'  in.  It  was,  in  other  words,  con- 
sidered creative,  and  not  merely  plastic.  It 
is  true,  that  Aristotle  hangs  the  whole  chain 


MODERN    PERIOD.  55 

of  our  mediate  knowledge  upon  a  comprehen- 
sive belief,  and  maintains  that  the  ultimate 
or  primarj^  principles  of  knowledge  are  in- 
comprehensible, and  rest  in  a  blind,  passive 
Itiith.  Yet,  such  seems  to  have  been  his  no- 
tion of  the  scope  of  syllogistic  reasoning, 
that,  somehow "  or  other,  as  we  have  already 
said,  he  makes  it  independent  of  induction; 
and  in  this  seems  to  ignore  his  principle  of 
primary  beliefs.  At  all  events,  he  has  left 
the  relation  and  correlation  of  S3'llogism  and 
induction  so  confused,  and  his  psychological, 
metaphysical,  and  logical  doctrines  so  ill  ad- 
justed, that  we  feel  warranted  in  saj-ing  that 
Aristotle  confounded  formal  and  concrete 
logic,  and  formal  and  material  truth.  Bacon, 
therefore,  viewing  the  Aristotelic  logic  as  a 
method  of  philosophizing,  of  searching  for 
material  truth,  attempted  to  supersede  it  in 
that  purpose :  but  to  leave  it  as  a  means  of 
formal  truth,  of  discussing  questions  about 
which  there  was  no  dispute  as  to  the  data. 
This  was  certainly  Bacon's  view  and  purpose. 
His  whole  doctrine  of  method  is  directed  to 
the  contents,  and  not  to  the  form  of  thought 
— to  the  matter,  and  not  to  the  consecution, 


56  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

of  our  thinking.  It  is  from  this  point  of 
view  we  must  look  at  the  Novum  Organum 
to  appreciate  it. 

The  great  fallacy  which  Bacon  directed  his 
hostility  against,  as  the  one  which  especially 
vitiated  ancient  philosophy,  is  the  commuta- 
tion of  the  subjective  with  the  objective.  All 
the  errors  Avhich  Bacon  classified  as  Idols  are 
subjective  illusions,  which  had  been  commuted 
in  the  ancient  philosophy  with  objective  re- 
alities. This  fallacy  manifests  itself  in  two 
ways.  The  one  is  to  assume  that  the  notions 
of  things  contained  in  common  language  are 
correct  and  complete  interpretations  of  nature, 
and  that  the  true  mode  of  building  up  science 
is  to  analyze  these  notions,  and  combine  them 
in  their  logical  relations,  because  the  logical 
relations  of  the  notions  will  correspond  with 
the  real  relations  of  their  objects.  The 
other  way  is  to  assume  that  there  are  general 
notions  or  principles,  which  are  an  original 
furniture  of  the  mind,  or  are  remembered 
from  another  state  of  existence,  and  that 
nature  must  conform  in  its  manifestations  to 
these  ideas,  and  that  by  considering  these 
ideas  we  can  interpret  nature.     Both  of  these 


MODERN    PERIOD.    •  57 

manifestations  of  this  cardinal  error  are,  as 
we  have  shown  in  our  review  of  ancient  phi- 
losophy, at  bottom  the  same.  That  its  true 
character  is  the  commuting  of  the  subjective 
with  the  objective,  is  manifest  in  the  con- 
sideration, that  as  a  notion  is  the  joint  pro- 
duct of  the  action  of  the  subject  and  object, 
it  follows  that  whatever  a  notion  contains  not 
corresponding  with  the  object,  must  be  the 
contribution  of  the  thinking  subject  alone; 
and  if  the  notion  be  only  a  partial  interpreta- 
tion of  the  object,  but  is  considered  complete, 
it  is  still  mistaking  an  ideal  illusion  for  a  real 
object.  The  grand  error  of  the  ancient  j)hi- 
losophy  was  to  combine,  and  by  syllogistic  or 
deductive  reasoning  develop,  these  subjective 
illusions  into  systems  supposed  to  be  explana- 
tions of  objective  realities. 

The  whole  scope  and  end  of  Bacon's  method 
was,  therefore,  real  or  material  truth.  And 
here  the  question  arises,  what  is  truth?  The 
schoolmen,  as  we  have  already  shown,  have 
given  an  answer  which  is  now  acquiesced  in 
as  correct.  Truth  is  the  correspondence  or 
agreement  between  our  thought  and  its  object — 
between  our  thought  and  what  ice  tlmik  about. 

5 


58  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

The  Baconian  method  was  especially  directed 
to  maintain  this  view  of  truth.  "  For  we  are 
founding  (says  Bacon)  a  real  model  of  the 
Avorld  in  the  understanding;  such  as  it  is 
found  to  be,  not  such  as  man's  reason  has  dis- 
torted." Again  he  says :  "  We  neither  dedi- 
cate nor  raise  a  capitol  or  pyramid  to  the 
pride  of  man,  but  rear  a  holy  temple  in  his 
mind,  on  the  model  of  the  universe,  which 
model  we  imitate."  And  still  further :  "  Let 
men  learn  the  difference  that  exists  between 
the  idols  of  the  human  mind  and  the  ideas 
in  the  divine  mind.  The  former  are  mere 
arbitrary  abstractions;  the  latter,  the  true 
marks  of  the  Creator  on  his  creatures,  as 
they  are  imprinted  on  and  defined  in  matter 
by  true  and  exquisite  touches."  It  was, 
therefore,  to  the  objective  world  that  Bacon 
especially  directed  attention,  so  as  to  secure 
the  mind  from  the  vice  of  the  ancient  philoso- 
phy— of  commuting  the  subjective  with  the 
objective — of  substituting  the  fictions  of  the 
imagination  for  the  realities  of  nature. 

As,  then.  Bacon's  method  has  in  view  the 
advancement  of  the  real  sciences,  it  may  be 
well,  for  the  sake  of  precision,  to  state  what 


MODERN    PERIOD.  59 

are  the  objects  of  these  sciences,  as,  according 
to  the  view  of  truth  above  given,  the  corres- 
pondence between  these  sciences  as  systems 
of  thought  and  their  respective  objects  consti- 
tute their  truth. 

The  real  sciences  are  sciences  of  fjict;  for 
the  point  of  departure  from  which  they  set 
out  is  always  a  fact,  a  presentation  of  mind. 
Some  of  these  rest  upon  the  presentations  of 
self-consciousness,  and  these  are  facts  of  mind. 
Others  rest  upon  presentations  of  sensitive 
perception,  and  these  are  facts  of  nature. 
The  former  are  the  mental  sciences;  the 
latter  are  the  natural  sciences.  The  facts 
of  mind  are  given  partly  as  contingent  and 
partly  as  necessary.  The  latter,  the  ne- 
cessary, are  universal  virtually  and  in  them- 
selves; the  former  only  obtain  a  factitious 
universality  by  a  process  of  generalization. 
The  facts  of  nature,  whether  necessary  in 
themselves  or  not,  are  given  to  us  only 
as  contingent  and  isolated  phenomena,  and 
therefore  have  only  that  empirical  generality 
which  we  bestow  on  them  by  classification. 

Now,  it  is  with  the  facts  of  nature  that 
Bacon's   method,   as   developed    by   himself, 


60  PROGRESS    OF    PniLOSOPHT. 

more  especially  deals.  The  great  end  of  his 
Novum  Organum,  therefore,  is  to  ascertain 
that  empirical  generality,  or  factitious  uni- 
versality, amongst  isolated  phenomena  of 
nature,  which  is  accomplished  by  classifica- 
tion ;  for  it  is  only  in  this  way,  according  to 
Bacon,  that  man  can  bring  the  immensity  of 
nature  within  the  scope  of  his  knowledge. 

In  accordance  with  this  view  of  philoso- 
phy, particulars  or  individuals  become  the 
important  objects  of  consideration  in  the  Ba- 
conion  method.  And  Bacon,  in  the  fiice  of 
ancient  philosophy,  which  busied  itself  about 
universals,  had  to  defend  the  study  of  par- 
ticulars in  these  words :  "  With  regard  to  the 
meanness  or  even  filthiness,  of  particulars? 
for  which  (as  Pliny  observed)  an  apology  is 
requisite,  such  subjects  are  no  less  worthy  of 
admission  into  natural  history  than  the  most 
magnificent  and  costly;  nor  do  they  at  all 
pollute  natural  history,  for  the  sun  enters 
alike  the  palace  and  the  privy,  and  is  not 
thereby  poUuted.  For  that  which  is  deserv- 
ing of  existence  is  deserving  of  knowledge, 
the  image  of  existence." 

As,  then,  particulars  are  the  primary  objects 


MODERN    PERIOD.  01 

of  the  Baconian  method,  this  method  must 
begin  with  the  senses.  Accordingly,  Bacon 
says,  "We  must  guide  our  steps  by  a  chie, 
and  the  whole  patli,  from  the  very  first  per- 
ceptions of  our  senses,  must  be  secured  by  a 
determined  method."  And  he  enounces  his 
method  in  these  words:  "It  ought  to  be 
eternally  resolved  and  settled,  that  the  under- 
standing cannot  decide  otherwise  than  by  in- 
duction, and  a  legitimate  form  of  it." 

Here  the  question  emerges,  loliat  is  induc- 
tion? Bacon  had  not  a  very  discriminate 
notion  of  it.  In  the  procedure  which  he 
calls  induction,  or  rather  by  which  he  exem- 
plifies it,  he  confuses  analysis  and  synthesis, 
and  does  not  even  sufficiently  discriminate 
between  observation  and  induction;  as  he  in- 
cludes, in  what  he  calls  induction,  the  objec- 
tive process  of  investigating  individual  facts 
as  preparatory  to  illation,  as  well  as  the  illa- 
tion from  the  singular  to  the  universal.  Nor 
has  any  writer,  as  far  as  we  know,  sufficiently 
explained  and  exemplified  induction.  The 
loosest  notions  are  entertained  on  the  subject. 
By  the  best  writers,  induction  is  said  to  be 
analytical,  whereas   it   is  synthetical.     This 

5* 


62  PROGRESS   OP   PHILOSOPHY. 

confusion,  however,  often  arises  from  the  con- 
fused and  even  contradictory  notions  which 
are  entertained  of  analysis  and  synthesis. 
The  process,  Avhich  by  some  is  called  analysis, 
is  called  synthesis  by  others,  and  vice  versa. 
These  discrepancies  and  contradictions  we 
will  endeavour  to  explain,  and  found  upon 
the  explanation  a  more  accurate  determina- 
tion of  induction. 

There  is  and  can  be  but  one  method  in 
philosophy;  and  what  have  been  called  the 
different  and  more  or  less  perfect  methods, 
are  merely  different  applications  of  this  one 
method  to  the  objects  of  knowledge.  Method 
is  a  rational  progress — a  progress  of  the  mind 
towards  an  end;  and  method  in  philosophy 
signifies  the  progress  conducive  to  the  end 
which  philosophy  proposes.  The  ends  of 
philosophy  are  two — the  first  being  the  dis- 
covery of  causes;  and  the  second,  the  resolu- 
tion of  things  into  unity.  These  ends,  how- 
ever, fall  into  one ;  as  the  higher  we  ascend  in 
the  discovery  of  causes,  we  approximate  the 
nearer  to  unity.  The  detection  of  the  one 
in  the  many  is,  therefore,  the  end  to  which 
philosophy  tends  continually  to  ai)])roximate. 


MODERN   PERIOD.  63 

What  the  method  in  philosophy  is,  will  appear 
the  more  clearly,  if,  in  the  first  place,  we  con- 
sider philosophy  in  relation  to  its  first  end — 
the  discovery  of  causes. 

Causes,*  taking  the  name  for  a  synonym  of 
that  without  which  their  effect  would  not  be 
— and  they  are  only  coefficient  elements  of 
their  eft'ect;  and  effect  is  the  combination  of 
these  primary  elements  to  which  we  give  the 
name  of  causes,  and  the  concurrence  of  which 
gives  existence  to  the  effect.  The  acid  and 
the  alkali,  for  example,  are  the  causes  of  the 
neutral  salt,  and  also  its  coefficient  elements. 
To  the  elements  we  give  the  name  causes ;  to 
the  combination,  we  give  the  name  effect. 
Now,  as  it  is  by  experience  we  discover  what 
causes  are  necessary  for  the  production  of  an 
effect,  it  follows  that  the  only  way  by  which 
we  can  attain  to  the  knowledge  of  causes,  as 
causes,  is  in  and  through  their  effect;  and 
the  only  way  we  can  Ijecome  aware  of  their 
effect,  as  effect,  is  in  and  through  its  causes. 
In  as  far,  therefore,  as  philosophy  is  the  re- 
search of  causes,  the  only  necessary  condition 

*  The   metaphysical  doctrine   of  causation   is   con- 
sirlered  in  the  second  part  of  this  tract. 


64  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  possibility  of  philosophy  is  decomposi- 
tion. The  decomposition  of  effects  into  their 
causes  is  called  analj^sis.  In  its  philosophical 
signification  it  means  the  separation  of  the 
parts  of  any  complex  whole. 

But,  though  analysis  is  the  fundamental 
process,  it  is  not  the  only  one.  We  analj^ze 
only  that  we  may  comprehend  the  objects; 
and  we  can  comprehend  only  as  we  are  able 
to  reconstruct,  in  thought,  if  not  in  reality, 
what  has  been  decomposed.  This  mental  re- 
construction is,  therefore,  the  final  procedure 
in  philosophy,  and  is  called  synthesis.  Of 
these  two  j)rocesses,  the  former  is  called  the 
regressive,  as  ascending  from  effects  to  causes ; 
the  latter  is  called  the  progressive,  as  de- 
scending from  causes  to  effects.  These  two 
processes  are  the  necessary  parts  of  one 
method,  and  are  relative  and  correlative  of 
each  other.  Analysis,  without  synthesis,  is 
only  a  begun  knowledge.  Synthesis,  without 
analysis,  is  no  knowledge  at  all ;  for  synthesis 
receives  from  analysis  whatever  elements  it 
recomposes.  Synthesis  supposes  analysis  as 
the  prerequisite  of  its  existence,  and  is  de- 
pendent on  it  for  the  qualities  of  its  existence; 


MODERN   PERIOD.  G5 

for  the  value  of  every  synthesis  dej^ends  on 
the  value  of  the  foregone  analysis.  If  the 
elements  furnished  by  analysis  be  assumed, 
or  not  really  discovered,  the  synthesis  will, 
at  best,  be  but  a  conjectural  theory;  and  if 
the  analysis  be  false,  so  will  be  the  synthesis. 
The  legitimacy  of  every  synthesis,  therefore, 
depends  on  the  legitimacy  of  the  analysis' 
which  it  presupposes.  These  two  relative 
procedures  are  thus  ec|ually  necessary  to  each;: 
other  in  the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  and 
are  as  indisj)ensable  to  the  existence  of  phi- 
losophy as  the  processes  of  inspiration  and 
expiration  are  to  animal  life.  It  is,  however, 
to  analysis  that  the  preeminence  is  due,  if  to 
either;  for  though  it  be  only  a  commence- 
ment, yet  it  is  the  preferable,  inasmuch  as  it 
lays  the  foundation  for  synthesis;  whereas 
synthesis  without  analysis  is  radically  void. 

As  regards,  therefore,  the  first  end  of  phi- 
losophy— the  discovery  of  causes — there  is 
only  one  possible  method,  of  which  analysis 
is  the  foundation,  and  synthesis  the  com- 
pletion. 

Considering  philosophy  in  relation  to  its 
second  end — the  resolution  of  our  knowledge 


66  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

into  unity — the  same  doctrine  is  equally  ap- 
parent. Everything  presented  to  our  con- 
sideration in  the  external  or  internal  word — 
whether  through  the  medium  of  sense,  or  of 
self-consciousness — is  presented  in  complexity . 
The  senses  present  objects  in  multitudes,  in 
each  of  which  there  is  a  congeries  of  many 
various  qualities;  and  the  same  holds  true  of 
the  presentations  of  self-consciousness,  since 
every  modification  of  mind  is  a  complex  state, 
and  the  different  elements  of  each  state  mani- 
fest themselves  in  and  through  each  other. 
Thus  there  is  nothing  but  multiplicity  pre- 
sented to  us.  And  our  foculties  are  so  limited, 
that  they  are  able  to  take  in  only  one  object 
or  combination,  and  that  the  very  simplest, 
at  a  time.  It  is  therefore  only  by  analysis 
and  synthesis  that  multiplicity  can  be  brought 
into  unity.  In  fact,  the  search  for  a  cause, 
and  the  search  for  unity  in  cases  where  the 
notion  of  cause  does  not  enter,  are  both 
governed  by  the  same  regulative  principle — 
the  principle  or  law  of  identity  in  its  empiri- 
cal application — as  we  shall  show  presently. 

We  see,  then,  that  in  any  iictual  investiga- 
tion, analysis  and  synthesis  are  necessarily 


MODERN    PERIOD.  G7 

used  intcrdependently  and  intcrcliangeablj. 
They  cannot  be  separated;  and  the  two 
together  make  up  the  one  method  of  philoso- 
phy. This  method,  according  to  Bacon,  is 
observation  and  induction.  As,  then,  analy- 
sis and  synthesis  constitute  the  one  method, 
and  observation  and  induction  constitute  it 
also,  it  behooves  us  to  correlate  analj^sis 
and  synthesis  with  observation  and  induc- 
tion. Before,  however,  we  do  this,  let  us 
give  an  articulate  discrimination  between  ob- 
servation and  induction. 

There  are  two  ways  by  wdiich  we  may 
become  acquainted  with  things.  In  the  first 
place,  we  may  know  a  thing  as  simply  exist- 
ing. This  is  the  knowledge  of  what  simply 
is — of  facts  known  in  our  own  experience  or 
that  of  others — and  is  called  empirical  or  his- 
torical knowledge ;  for  history  is  properly  only 
the  narration  of  a  consecutive  series  of  phe- 
nomena in  time.  It  comprises  all  that  infor- 
mation which  we  obtain  from  the  physical 
world  by  sense,  and  from  the  mental  world 
by  self-consciousness.  The  process  by  which 
this  degree  or  sort  of  knowledge  is  obtained, 
is  what  Bacon  means  by  observation;  and  it 


68  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

manifestly  involves  both  analysis  and  syn- 
thesis. The  knowledge  obtained  in  this  way 
is,  however,  not  philosophy.  It  requires  an- 
other process  to  elevate  it  to  that  dignity. 

Let  us,  then,  consider  the  second  way  by 
which  we  may  know  things.  The  mind  is 
so  constituted,  that  it  cannot  perceive  the  ex- 
istence of  anything  without  referring  it  to 
something  else  as  its  cause,  and  without 
which  it  could  not  have  existed.  Things  do 
not  occur  isolated  from  each  other.  There  is 
no  phenomenon  but  is  the  effect  of  some 
cause.  Thus,  when  we  see  a  rainbow,  we 
may,  in  a  certain  sense,  be  said  to  know  it; 
but  with  such  knowledge,  the  mind  does  not 
rest  satisfied ;  and  it  is  only  when  we  discover 
that  the  phenomenon  depends  on  the  reflec- 
tion and  refraction  of  light,  by  the  rain  fall- 
ing from  a  cloud  opposite  the  sun,  that  we 
can  be  said  fully  to  know  it.  This  is  done 
by  inferring  from  the  analogies  that  the  re- 
flection and  refraction  of  light  is  the  cause, 
and  then  by  mathematical  reasoning  deducing 
from  the  known  laws  of  reflection  and  refrac- 
tion, the  breadth  of  the  coloured  arch,  the 
diameter  of  the  circle  of  which  it  is  part,  and 


MODERN    PERIOD.  69 

the  relation  of  tlie  latter  to  the  place  of  the 
spectator  and  of  the  sun,  and  fuidhig  all  these 
to  come  out  of  the  calculus  just  as  they  are 
observed  in  nature.  This  knowledge  of  the 
cause  of  a  phenomenon  is  something  more 
than  that  phenomenon  considered  simply  as 
a  fact,  and  constitutes  the  second  way  in 
which  we  may  be  said  to  know  anything, 
and  is  called  philosophical,  scientific,  or  ra- 
tional knowledge — the  knowledge  of  effects, 
as  dependent  on  their  causes.  Now,  into  the 
procedure  of  acquiring  this  sort  or  degree  of 
knowledge,  induction  as  well  as  observation 
enters.  The  process  by  which  the  reflection 
and  refraction  of  light  are  inferred  or  assigned 
as  the  cause  of  the  rainbow,  is  induction,  and 
is  synthetic;  for  it  brings  the  phenomenon  of 
the  rainbow  under  the  laws  of  light — binds 
it  with  other  phenomena  of  the'  same  sort — 
is  an  illation  from  an  individual  or  particular 
to  a  class,  from  a  singular  to  a  universal.  It 
is  seen,  and  we  selected  it  for  that  reason, 
that  in  the  instance  given,  induction  is  aided 
by  mathematical  deduction,  but  only  aided 
by  it;  for  the  illation  is  purely  inductive,  and 
is  assumed  as  true  in  the  mathematical  deduc- 

6 


70  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

tion,  and  only  verified  or  confirmed  by  it ;  for 
mathematics  does  not  take  the  physical  sci- 
ences out  of  the  pale  of  induction,  but  only 
aids  induction.  That  induction  is  synthetic, 
all  the  discoveries  in  science  show.  From 
our  limited  experience  that  some  bodies  gravi- 
tate, we  infer  that  all  bodies  gravitate.  Here 
the  mind  binds  up  the  several  facts  of  observa- 
tion into  a  whole — as  it  were,  reconstructs  an 
analysis;  this  is  certainly  synthetic.  Induc- 
tion is  therefore  clearly"  synthetic,  and  not 
analytic,  as  it  has  sometimes  been  said  to  be. 
It  has  sometimes  been  called  both  analytic 
and  synthetic,  especially  by  the  mathematical 
physicists.  When  the  procedure  is  from 
effects  to  causes  it  is  called  analytic,  but 
when  the  procedure  is  from  an  ascertained 
cause  to  the  explanation,  by  it,  of  analogous 
or  resembling  phenomena  or  effects,  it  is  called 
synthetic.  These  procedures  correspond  with 
Bacon's,  or  rather  are  Bacon's  ascending  and 
descending  scales  of  induction.  This  nomen- 
clature is  adopted,  because  the  last  procedure, 
which  is  also  called  deductive,  is  apparently 
the  reverse  of  the  first — the  mere  retracing 
of  the  same  steps  from  the  cause  back  to  the 


MODERN    PERIOD.  71 

same  effects  from  which  it  was  inferred; 
whereas  other  eflects,  analogous  to  those  from 
which  the  cause  has  been  inferred,  are  at- 
tempted to  be  brought  within  the  same  cause 
and  exphiined  by  it.  As  the  first  process  is 
called  analytic,  this  is  called  synthetic.  But 
at  bottom  both  are  synthetic,  as  they  are  both 
induction  viewed  from  opposite  points.''' 

It  is  seen,  then,  that  method,  in  its  univer- 
sality, consists  of  two  processes,  analysis  and 
synthesis,  which  are  relative  to,  and  comple- 
mentary of,  each  other. 

As  philosophy  has  only  one  possible  me- 
thod, so  the  history  of  philosophy  only  shows 
the  more  or  less  imperfect  application  of  this 
one  method.  It  presents  many  aberrations  in 
the  method,  but  none  from  it.  There  never 
has  been  an  attempt  at  philosophy  wdiere  ana- 
lysis and  synthesis  were  not  both  used.  But 
sometimes  the  one,  and  sometimes  the  other, 

*  It  should  be  remarked,  that  the  terms  analysis  and 
synthesis,  which  have  been  derived  from  the  mathema- 
ticians, are  sometimes  reversed ;  the  first  being  applied, 
by  some,  to  the  process  to  which  the  latter  is  applied 
by  others ;  and  vice  versa.  But  this  is  not  the  occasion 
to  explain  this  confusion. 


■*-l-\^J.JO--. 


^> 


\.. 


i 


72  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

has  predominated ;  they  have  not  been  kept 
in  due  correlation  in  their  employment.  The 
ancient  philosophy  is  especially  defective,  by 
the  meagre  employment  of  analysis.  The 
analysis  of  phenomena  were  partial,  and  the 
synthesis  consequently  one-sided,  and  errone- 
ous. The  analysis  of  the  early  Greek  physi- 
cal philosophers,  of  whom  we  have  spoken, 
who,  fixing  upon  one  or  more  elements  as  su- 
perior to  all  others,  such  as  water  or  air,  was 
partial ;  and  consequently  the  synthesis,  that 
it  was  the  principle  of  all  things,  was  one- 
sided and  erroneous.  Bacon  has  exhibited 
the  deficiency  of  the  physics  of  Aristotle  in 
analysis,  when  he  says  :  ''  Nor  is  much  stress 
to  be  laid  on  his  frequent  recourse  to  experi- 
ment, in  his  books  on  animals,  his  problems 
and  other  treatises;  for  he  had  already  de- 
cided, icithout  having  properly  considfed  expe- 
rieyice  as  tJie  basis  of  decisions  and  axioms; 
and,  after  having  so  decided,  he  drags  experi- 
ment along  as  a  captive  constrained  to  accom- 
modate herself  to  his  decisions."  And  of  the 
empiric  school,  as  he  calls  it,  he  says,  their 
dogmas  are  founded  "in  the  confined  obscu- 
rity of  a  few  experiments."    We  have,  in  our 


MODERN    PERIOD.  73 

review  of  ancient  philosophy,  shown  that  it 
was  founded  on  the  crude  analysis  contained 
in  the  language  of  the  people.  The  great  pre- 
cept of  the  Baconian  method  is :  Do  not  lairry 
to  a  synthetic  induction  from  an  imperfect  ana- 
lysis, a  narroio  observation;  hut  let  your  analy- 
sis he  complete. 

Here  emerges  the  question,  how  are  ive  to 
observe  ?  In  order  to  scientific  knowledge,  as 
we  have  described  it,  observation  must  become 
or  turn  into  inquiry.  We  must  question  na- 
ture ;  but  a  question  implies  some  knowledge 
of  the  thing  inquired  about.  How,  then,  are 
we  to  inquire  of  nature,  unless  we  have  some 
intimation  of  her  secrets — the  human  mind 
having  no  a  priori  clue  to  them?  The  ques- 
tions put  to  nature  must,  too,  be  particular  or 
leading  questions. 

The  questioning  of  nature  springs  out  of 
observation,  by  nature  herself  disclosing  to  us 
some  clue  to  the  secret.  When  we  observe  a 
certain  correspondence  among  a  number  of 
objects  or  phenomena,  we  are  determined  by 
a  principle  of  our  intellectual  nature  to  sup- 
pose the  existence  of  a  more  extensive  cor- 
respondence than  experience  has  disclosed,  or 

6* 


74  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY, 

perhaps  may  ever  disclose.  This  judgment, 
that  where  much  is  found  accordant,  all  will 
-be  found  accordant,  is  the  result  of  an  original 
tendency  of  our  nature.  It  is  the  inventive 
principle  by  w^iich  we  generalize  our  know- 
ledge. This  judgment  is  first  only  hypotheti- 
cal— merely  an  invenfive  'princi]ple,  which 
prompts  us  to  put  questions  to  nature,  based 
upon  the  supposed  truth  of  the  judgment,  and 
is  called  hypothesis.  The  actual  procedure  of 
philosophizing,  therefore,  consists  of:  1.  Ob- 
servation; 2.  Hypothesis;  3.  Questioning;  4. 
Induction.  This  questioning  is  sometimes 
only  the  observation  of  the  ordinary  course  of 
nature.  Sometimes  it  is  experiment;  for, 
says  Bacon,  "the  secrets  of  nature  betray 
themselves  more  readily  when  tormented  by 
art,  than  when  left  to  their  own  course."  If 
the  answers  accord  with  the  first  inference — 
the  hypothesis  which  prompted  us  to  put  the 
questions — it  is  then  assumed  as  verified,  and 
the  induction  is  complete.  How  many  answers 
concurring  to  the  same  point  amount  to  proof 
in  any  case,  is  beyond  the  determination  of 
any  rule.  In  some  cases,  a  few  instances  war- 
rant an  induction ;    in    others,   an   immense 


MODERN    PERIOD.  75 

number  are  required  to  warrant  the  judgment. 
This  difference  results  from  the  fact,  that 
where  the  character  inquired  about  is  an  es- 
sential one,  like  the  lungs  in  a  terrestrial  ani- 
mal, a  few  instances  will  suffice;  but  when 
the  character  is  a  contingent  one,  like  the 
colour  of  things,  hardly  any  number  of  in- 
stances will  suffice.  And  whether  a  character 
is  an  essential  or  a  contingent  one,  is  itself  a 
question  of  science,  and  must  be  determined 
before  it  can  be  used  as  a  principle  of  evidence 
in  induction. 

The  presumption,  that  where  much  is  found 
accordant,  all  will  be  found  accordant,  has 
been  considered  by  jDhilosophers  to  be  of  tAvo 
kinds — to  be  either  induction  or  analogy. 
This  seems  to  us  to  be  erroneous.  Thou2;h 
induction  and  analogy  are  to  be  distinguished, 
they  are  not  to  be  distinguished  as  only  rela- 
tives of  one  kind ;  they  are  not  to  be  consi-^ 
dered  as  two  processes  of  reasoning;  but  in- 
duction is  to  be  considered  as  the  process,  and 
analogy  as  the  objective  law  warranting  the 
process.  In  this  view  of  the  subject,  induc- 
tion may  be  defined  a  material  illation  of  the 
universal  from  the  sincfular^  v'arranted  either 


76  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

hy  the  general  analogies  of  nature,  or  hij  the 
special  analogies  of  the  ohject-matter  of  any  real 
science.  The  synthetic  inference  is  not  neces- 
sitated by  a  law  of  thought,  but  only  war- 
ranted by  the  observed  analogies  which  mere- 
ly incline  the  judgment.  It  seems  to  us, 
therefore,  more  accurate  to  make  induction 
signify  the  process,  and  analogy  or  similarity 
signify  the  evidence  on  which  it  is  founded; 
for  such  is  the  true  account  of  the  process,  as 
the  definition  just  given  indicates. 

In  the  inductive  process,  the  conclusion  is 
always  wider  than  the  premises.  Whereas, 
in  strict  demonstration,  no  conclusion  can 
contain  more  than  the  premises.  In  the  in- 
ductive process,  experience  says,  this,  that,  and 
the  other  body  gravitate,  and  the  conclusion 
says,  all  bodies  gravitate.  In  explanation  of 
this,  it  has  been  said,  that  the  mind  adds 
something  of  its  own,  warranting  us  to  draw 
the  conclusion.  That  the  affirmation,  this, 
that,  and  the  other  bodies  gravitate,  is  con- 
nected to  the  conclusion,  all  bodies  gravitate, 
by  inserting  between  the  two  another  jDropo- 
sition,  to  wit:  the  supposition  of  the  tuiiformity 
of  nature.     And  tliat  as  this  supposition  is 


MODERN    PERIOD.  77 

not  the  product  of  induction,  it  must  be  in- 
terpolated into  all  inductive  reasoning  by  the 
mind.  And  that,  therefore,  where  the  rea^- 
soning  in  induction  is  fully  expressed,  it  will 
stand  thus  :  this,  that,  and  the  otlicr  body  gra- 
vitate; but  as  nature  is  uniform  in  all  her 
operations,  this,  that,  and  the  other  body  repre- 
sent all  bodies :  therefore,  all  bodies  gravitate. 
Though  this  is  the  most  scientific  explana- 
tion which  has  yet  been  given  by  any  philo- 
sopher, we  feel  constrained  to  demur  to  it;  as, 
to  us,  it  involves  a  concealed  error.  The  affir- 
mation of  the  uniformity  of  nature,  which 
seems  to  be  interpolated  in  inductive  reason- 
ing, can  be  resolved  into  something  simpler, 
Avliich  makes  the  process  accord  with  the  great 
mental  law,  tliat  thmujlit  is  ahoays  under  the 
antithesis  of  subject  and  ohject;  and  that  in  the 
products  or  conclusions  of  tliouyht,  nothing  is 
contained  as  objective  which  was  not  objective  in 
the  process  of  thinking.  In  other  words,  the 
laws  of  intelligence  never  warrant  an  illusive 
interpolation  of  the  objective  for  the  subjec- 
tive, as  it  must  do  if  the  uniformity  of  nature 
is  predicated  in  the  inductive  illation.  The 
veracity  of  human  consciousness  would  cer- 


78  PROGRESS   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

tainlj  seem  to  require  this  view — otherwise 
the  mind  practises  ilkisions  upon  itself,  under 
the  truest  conformity  to  its  owti  laws.  We 
think  this  supposed  uniformity  of  nature  may 
be  resolved  into  identity  objectively  perceived 
in  nature.  Thus,  the  principle  of  uniformity 
will  thereby  be  resolved  into  the  law  of  iden- 
tity.    This  we  will  now  show. 

There  are  but  three  ultimate  laws  of  intel- 
ligence:  1.  The  law  of  Identity;  2.  The  law 
of  Contradiction;  3.  The  law  of  Excluded 
Middle ;  and  a  corollary  from  these,  the  law 
of  reason  and  consequent.  Now,  reason,  whe- 
ther exerted  in  deductive  or  inductive  (in 
apodictic  or  hypothetical)  judgments,  must 
always  be  regulated  by  the  same  laws.  In 
other  words,  the  laws  of  thought  are  the  same 
in  the  deductive  and  the  inductive  processes; 
only  that  in  the  deductive  (apodictic)  they 
are  absolute,  and  in  the  inductive  (hypotheti- 
cal) they  are  modified  by  empirical  circum- 
stances. The  laws  of  thought  alone  determine 
the  deductive  process,  necessitating  the  con- 
clusion ;  but  the  laws  of  thought,  modified  by 
the  analogies  of  nature,  determine  the  induc- 
tive process  inclining  the  judgment.     In  the 


MODERN    PERIOD.  70 

inductive  process,  the  laws  of  thoiiglit  have 
an  empirical  application.  And  the  law  of 
identity  is  the  special  one  which  is  gratified 
in  the  synthetic  illation  by  which  the  analo- 
gies are  unified  into  identity.  Objects  which 
determine  undistinguishable  impressions  upon 
us,  are  perceived  and  represented  in  the  same 
mental  modification,  and  are  subjectively  to 
us  precisely  as  if  they  were  objectively  iden- 
tical. When,  therefore,  a  number  of  objects 
or  phenomena  are  found  to  possess  absolute 
similarity,  and  their  difierence  is  for  the  time 
lost  sight  of,  their  similarity  is  converted  into 
identity,  and  they  are  thereby  reduced  into 
the  unity  of  thought.  By  the  same  regula- 
tive law,  similar  phenomena  are  referred  to 
an  identical  cause.  Analogies  or  similarities 
are  the  footprints  of  identity.  And  what  has 
Ijeen  supposed  to  be  the  assumption  of  the 
uniformity  of  nature  in  every  induction,  is 
but  identity,  which  the  mind  aflirms  upon 
viewing  the  analogies  or  similarities;  for  what- 
ever is  identical  to  consciousness,  is  so  uni- 
formly or  universally.  It  is  not,  therefore, 
necessary  to  a  theoretical  explanation  of  in- 
duction, to  assume,  as  a  superficial  analysis 


80  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

seems  to  warrant,  that  the  uniformity  of  na- 
ture is  affirmed  as  the  major  premise,  which 
the  mind,  from  the  necessity  of  so  thinking, 
interpolates  in  the  reasoning.  The  mind  con- 
siders no  such  principle.  It  affirms  only  what 
it  perceives  objectively — identity  in  similaritj^ 
Some  water-fowl  have  web-feet — not  by  the 
assumption  of  the  uniformity  of  nature,  but 
by  the  law  of  identity — leads  the  mind  to 
affirm,  that  all  water-fowl  have  web-feet.  It 
is  as  though  the  mind  had  viewed  all  water- 
fowl. The  inductive  inference  is,  in  fact,  a 
sort  of  reaffirmation  of  what  has  been  actu- 
ally observed.  If  such  were  not  the  result  of 
the  guidance  of  the  law  of  identity  on  view- 
ing analogies  or  similarities,  the  mind  would 
contradict  itself — not  think  at  all.  For  affir- 
mation and  negation  are  the  ultimate  alterna- 
tives of  thought.  Therefore,  the  law  of  con- 
tradiction combines  with  the  law  of  identity, 
of  which,  in  fact,  it  is  a  phase,  in  leading  to 
the  inductive  synthesis  or  totalizing  result.* 

*  The  apparent  paradox  of  identity  in  diversity  con- 
stituted one  of  the  earliest  puzzles  in  incta[)liysics ;  and 
gave  origin  to  a  skepticism  which  denied  the  possibility 
of  uniting  two  notions  in  a  judgment,  which,  of  course. 


MODERN    PERIOD.  81 

The  error  which  we  have  thus  endeavoured 
to  expose  by  a  more  thorough  analysis,  results 
from  the  covert  assumption,  that  syllogistic  is 
the  only  reasoning;  and  that  every  general 
assumption  which  can  be  found,  by  reflective 
analj'sis,  to  be  the  condition  of  a  product  of 
the  mind,  must  have  been  realized  in  con- 
sciousness as  connate  Avith  the  product  at  the 
time  of  the  genesis  of  such  product.  For 
example :  as  the  notion  of  space  is  found  by 
reflective  analysis  to  be  the  condition  of  the 
notion  of  body,  it  is  supposed  that  the  notion 
was  natively  latent  in  the  mind,  and  was  eli- 
cited into  consciousness  in  the  process  of  cog- 
nizing an  external  object;  whereas,  space  or 
extension  is  cognized  objectively  as  a  neces- 
sary element  of  body,  and  must  be  realized  in 
the  cognition,  as  contributed  by  the  object  and 
not  by  the  subject.  The  human  mind  is  still 
fettered  in  philosophical  thinking,  by  the  an- 
cient  doctrine    of   universals,    and   that   all 

coutravened  the  validity  of  the  law  of  identity.  Any 
objection  to  our  explanation  of  empirical  thinking  under 
the  law  of  identity,  will  be  only  a  revival  of  the  old 
skepticism  which  objected  to  the  apparent  paradox  in 
the  law  of  identity  even  in  formal  thinking  or  deduction. 

7 


82  PROGRESS   OF   rHILOSOPHY. 

knowledge  is  througli  previous  knowledge, 
and  based  on  generals,  which  it  was  the  great 
purpose  of  Bacon's  philosophy  to  overthrow, 
and  to  emancipate  the  human  mind  to  the 
full  freedom  of  a  philosophy  of  observation  of 
individual  phenomena.    • 

As  hjqoothesis  is  the  great  inventive  princi- 
ple of  induction,  by  which,  as  we  have  al- 
ready indicated,  the  questioning  of  nature  is 
conducted,  it  demands  articulate  exposition. 
It  is  in  the  form  of  hypothesis  that  the  grand 
heresy  of  commuting  the  subjective  with  the 
objective  creeps  into  philosophy  and  science. 
Hypothesis  is  the  initial  ball,  which  is  rolled 
through  the  field  of  observation,  accumulating 
only  what  accords  with  it,  so  that  the  whole 
aggregation  will  be  of  the  same  character  with 
the  nucleus ;  and  if  what  is  first  set  in  motion 
be  erroneous,  so  will  all  that  is  accumulated. 
In  order,  then,  to  23revent  the  commutation  of 
the  subjective  with  the  objective,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  hypothetical  supposition  shall 
be  an  inference  from  phenomena,  as  it  always 
is,  in  that  which  we  have  descriljed  as  the 
normal  procedure  of  induction.  The  suppo- 
sition or  provisional  judgment  arises  upon  the 


MODERN    PERIOD.  83 

observation  of  phenomena,  and  guides  our 
questioning  of  similar  phenomena.  But  the 
great  danger  is,  that  our  provisional  judgment 
be  the  mere  application  of  a  pre-conception, 
like  the  vortices  of  Des  Cartes  in  explanation 
of  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  When 
a  phenomenon  is  presented  to  us  which  we  can 
explain  by  no  causes  within  the  sphere  of  our 
experience,  we  endeavour  to  recall  the  out- 
standing phenomenon  to  unity,  by  ascribing  it 
to  some  cause  or  class  to  which  there  is  a  pro- 
bability of  its  belonging.  The  great  maxim, 
regulative  of  this  procedure,  is  called  the  Law 
of  Parcemony,  and  is  adequately  expressed 
by  Sir  William  Hamilton  in  these  words : 
"Neither  more  nor  more  onerous  causes  are 
to  be  assumed  than  are  necessary  to  account 
for  the  phenomena."  In  commenting  on  this 
rule,  which  had  been  enounced  by  Newton, 
Sir  William  says,  it  is  almost  certain  that 
Newton,  when  he  says  we  are  to  admit  no 
causes  but  such  as  are  true  (vera)),  he  meant 
"to  denounce  the  postulation  of  hypothetical 
facts  as  media  of  hypothetical  explanation." 
Now,  it  is  not  only  almost  but  absolutely  cer- 
tain, that  this  was  Newton's  meaning :  because 


84  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

he  explicitly  says  so  in  the  general  scholium 
at  the  end  of  his  Principia :  "  I  have  not  been 
able  (says  he)  to  discover  the  cause  of  these 
properties  of  gravity  from  phenomena,  and  I 
frame  no  hypotheses ;  for  whatever  is  not  de- 
duced from  phenomena  is  called  hypothesis ; 
and  hypotheses,  whether  metaphysical  or 
physical,  whether  of  qualities  or  mechanical, 
have  no  place  in  experimental  philosophy. 
In  this  philosophy,  particular  propositions  are 
inferred  from  phenomena,  and  afterwards  ren- 
dered general  by  induction."  Here  Newton 
makes  cause  the  opposite  of  hypothesis,  and 
astricts  hypothesis  to  mere  assumptions  not 
deduced  from  phenomena.  He  therefore 
means  by  true  causes  real  causes — the  02:)po- 
site  of  supposititious  causes.  And  the  Prin- 
cipia is  an  exemplification  of  it;  for  amidst 
all  the  intricacies  of  mathematical  demonstra- 
tion, Newton,  with  the  most  marvellous  cau- 
tion and  sagacity,  never  for  a  moment  loses 
sight  of  phenomena  and  known  causes.  In- 
duction is  the  centre  and  the  circumference 
around  and  within  Avhicli  the  mathematical 
demonstrations  revolve.  NcAvton's  rule  about 
true   causes  does   not,  as  Dr.  Whewell  and 


MODERN    PERIOD.  86 

others  suppose,  reject  the  inquir}^  into  new 
causes.  In  the  questions  which  Newton  was 
considering,  the  true  cause  was  the  first  term, 
the  one  which  should  be  Ivnown,  and  not  the 
second,  the  one  unknown,  as  it  always  is,  in 
a  search  for  new  causes.  It  would  be  illegiti- 
mate, according  to  Newton,  to  assign  a  subtle 
ether  as  the  cause  of  the  retardation  of  the 
planetary  motions,  as  its  existence  is  not 
known ;  but  it  would  be  perfectly  legitimate 
as  a  iJTOvisional  judgment,  to  infer  the  exist- 
ence.of  a  subtle  ether  from  the  retardation  of 
the  planets  in  their  orbits.  It  was  legitimate, 
to  infer  the  existence  of  Leverrier's  planet,  as 
the  cause  of  the  perturbations  in  Uranus,  as 
a,  provisional  judyment,  to  be  verified  by  sub- 
sequent observation,  as  was  done ;  but  to  ac- 
count for  the  perturbations  by  the  existence 
of  the  planet,  would  be  reversing  the  order, 
placing  the  unknown  term  first  in  the  inquiry, 
and  accounting  for  the  known  by  the  unknown. 
Such  is  the  comprehensive  and  profound 
method — sweeping  as  it  does  through  all  the 
intricacies  of  the  heights  and  depths  of  nature 
— which  Bacon  proclaimed  in  his  Novum  Or- 
ganum.      "Although    (says   Newton,  in   his 

7* 


86  PROGKESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 


Optics),  tlie  arguing  from  experiments  and 
observations,  by  induction,  be  no  demonstra- 
tion of  general  conclusions,  yet  it  is  the  best 
way  of  arguing  which  the  nature  of  things 
admits  of."  And  the  marvels  accomplished 
by  tliis  method  in  unravelling  the  secrets  of 
nature,  have  long  since  vindicated  it  from  the 
objections  of  the  ancient  Greek  skeptics, 
which  we  noticed  in  treating  of  ancient  phi- 
losophy. 

Des  Cartes  comes  next  in  the  history  of 
philosophy.  He  was  contemporary  with  Ba- 
con, but  thirty  years  younger.  The  influence 
for  truth  of  no  philosopher  has,  in  our  opinion, 
been  more  overrated.  It  is,  therefore,  time 
that  his  philosophy  should  be  weighed  in  the 
scales  of  criticism,  and  its  true  value  fixed  in 
the  progress  of  philosophy. 

IFrom  the  manner  in  which  our  023inions 
are  formed,  amidst  the  circumstances  of  life, 
our  supposed  knowledge  caiiinot  but  be  a  med- 
ley of  truths  and  errors.\\|Jt  is  therefore  im- 
portant to  institute  a  critical  examination  of 
the  constituents  of  this  knowledge\_Pes  Car- 
tcs  proposed  that  we  should^QnijiLeiice._the 
examination    by  doubting  all   our  opinions. 

t 


'^  1 


MODERN    PERIOD.  87 

Now,  this  initial  or  preliminary  doubt  of  Des 
Caries  has  always  seemed  to  us,  as  a  practical 
rule,  extremely  idle.  For,  let  it  be  observed, 
this  preliminary  doubt  is  to  be  the  forerunner 
of  any  system  of  truth.  The  whole  contents 
of  the  mind  are  to  be  condemned  until  their 
truth  is  established.  But  how  are  we  to  be- 
gin the  examination  of  our  judgments?  Not 
at  random,  of  course,  but  by  selecting  tliein 
according  to  some  principle,  and  arranging 
them  in  some  order  and  dependence.  But  the 
distribution  of  things  into  their  classes  is  one 
of  the  most  difficult  tasks  of  philosophy,  as 
well  as  one  of  the  last  that  are  accomplished. 
Amongst  our  opinions  there  are  many  which 
can  only  be  tested  by  profound  investigation 
and  extensive  knowledge.  This  precept  of 
Des  Cartes,  which  is  intended  to  show  how 
we  are  to  begin  to  be  a  philosopher,  requires 
us  to  be  one  before  we  begin.  The  true  pre- 
cept, therefore,  is  not  the  unconditional  one 
of  absolute  preliminary  doubt,  as  Des  Cartes 
teaches,  but  a  gradual  and  progressive  repre- 
hension of  prejudice.  We  should  examine  all 
our  opinions  with  the  circumspection  which 
merely  supposes  that  they  contain  some  truth 


88  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

combined  with  much  error.  All,  therefore,  of 
value  in  the  preliminary  doubt  of  Des  Cartes 
is,  that  it  ignores  authority.  It  implies  that 
the  judgments  bequeathed  to  us  shall  not  be 
decided  by  authority,  but  by  a  principle  supe- 
rior to  authority  within  the  sphere  of  truth — 
the  principle  of  free  thought  acting  within  the 
limits  prescribed  by  its  own  laws,  and  not 
subordinated  to  authority,  and  by  it  astricted 
to  deduce  conclusions  from  such  principles  as 
authority  has  admitted  or  ordained.  But  all 
this  had  before  been  articulately  proclaimed 
by  Bacon  in  the  Novum  Organum,  in  his 
masterly  criticisms  of  the  previous  systems  of 
philosophy,  which  he  closes  in  these  words : 
"Here,  too,  w^e  should  close  the  demolishing 
branch  of  our  Instauration,  which  is  com- 
prised in  three  confutations:  1.  The  confuta- 
tion of  natural  human  reason  left  to  itself;  2. 
The  confutation  of  demonstration;  3.  The 
confutation  of  theories  or  received  systems  of 
philosophy  and  doctrines."  So  that,  at  most, 
the  preliminary  doubt  of  Des  Cartes  is  but  a 
crumb  dropped  from  the  critical  doctrines  of 
Bacon. 

This  dou])t  of  Des  Cartes  was  a  preliminary 


MODERN   PERIOD.  89 

to  the  cstablisliment  of  a  system  of  positive 
doctrine;  for  Des  Cartes  was  anything  tlianji 
skeptic.  IiiHced,  Tie  hastened  to  his  conclu- 
sions; and,  as  D'Alembert  said,  "began  with 
doubting  everything,  and  ended  in  believing 
that  he  had  left  nothing  unexplained." 

How,  then,  did  Des  Cartes  essay  to  lay  tlie^ 
foundatiori  ofj^nowledge  ?     By  reflection^  ha_ 
finds  a  basis  for  certainty  in  the  fact  of  thought 
Itself ;  In  the  fact  of  the  very^oubt  that  per- 


plexes4iim.  For,  to  doubt  is  to  exist;  there- 
iTore,  tIie~doubt  reveals  in  consciousness  b^rth 
thinking  and  existence^  This  fundamental 
truth  Des  Cartes  thus  expressed :  Coglto,  er<jo 
sum.  Tlius  lar.  Ins  philosophy  is  purely.j5ub- 
jectiveT  As  yet,  the  operations  of  his  mind— ^ 
liis"  mere  thinking  implying  his  existence — is 
alltliat  lie  can  Tiold  truo.''""^^ike  all  modern"" 
phiro.^ophei's  prior  to  Keidf  he  held  thaf  the 
mind  possesses  no  immediate  knowledge  of 
anything  but  its  own  modifications,  which  the 
mind  mistakes  for  external  reality.  cJIow 
then,  inrpiires  Des  Cartes,  can  it  be  known 
that  external  things  exist,  when  the  mind  has, 
no  immediate  knowledge  of  their  existence  ?  \ 
Dea_Cartes_must,  ex  /u/pothesi,  find   in.  " 


90  PROGRESS   OF   PniLOSOPHY. 

mind  itself  some  jnedia  of  proof  for  external 
existence.  ^Saanjliing,  therefore,  in  his  mind, 


he  finds  the  idea  of_God— a  pertecrlntelli^ 
gence,  eternal,  infinite — necessary.  This  idea, 
he  argnes,  must  have  an  adequate  cause, 
which  can  only  be  a  corresponding  being;  for 
it  cannot  be  the  product  of  the  finite  mind. 
Having  thus  established  the  existence  of  God, 
he  deduces  therefrom  the  existence  of  the 
outward  world.  If  God  be  veracious,  he  ar- 
gues, it  follows  that  he  who  is  the  author  of 
the  sensible  existences,  is  the  author  of  the 
appearances  which  induce  us  to  believe  their 
existence,  and  that  he  would  not  exhibit  these 
appearances  as  a  snare  and  illusion;  conse- 
quently what  ajDpears  to  exist  does  exist,  and 
God  himself  is  the  guarantor  that  it  is  no 
illusion.  / 

Now,  this  argument  is  wholly  invalid.  In- 
deed, it  proves  that  God  is  the  author  of  illu- 
sion. It  cannot  be  denied,  that  we  believe 
that  the  very  objects  whicli  we  perceive  exist; 
and  not  that  there  is  something  representative 
of  them  which  alone  is  perceived,  and  suggests 
their  existence.  We  believe  in  the  existence 
of  things  because  we  believe  that  we  know 


MODERN   PERIOD.  91 

tliem  as  existing.  [  Now,  Pes  Cartes,  hy  his 
own  theory,  was  deceived  in  the  belieTThat 

we  see  thint^s  existing^ God,  therefore,  is  the 

author  of  illusion  j  and  if  the  author  of  this 
deception,  the^onclusion  is  the  very  reverse^ 
oj  that  drawn  by  Pes  Cartes.__  But  his  rea- 
soning involves  a  further  fallacy.  It  assumes,.. 
that  God  is-veracious.  IIow  is  this  known? 
It  can  only  be  known  by  our  faculties  of 
knowing.  But  the  argument  assumes  that 
our  faculties  are  not  trustworthy,  because  we 
believe  that  we  see  things  existing,  and  it  is 
not  so.  Therefore,  we  are  not  sure  of  the 
existence  of  God ;  for  it  rests  upon  our  men- 
dacious faculties. 

Pes  Cartes,  therefore,  never  got  beyond  his 
co^oyergoynm.  This  is  both  the  beginning 
and  the  end  of  his  philosophy.  The  only  im- 
portant truth  which  he  signalized  is,  Thai  the 
ultimate  orfjcin  of  science  consists  in  an  amyeal 
to  the  facts  of  co)i&cioxisness.  ^_^u{  lliis  truth  he 
arbitrarily  limits  to  self-consciousness,  and  as 
arbitrarily  applies  it  to  the  outward  world, 
through  the  false  assumption  of  an  innate 
idea  of  God;  thus  creating  or  assuming  a 
chasm  Avhere  none  exists,  and  then  bridging 


92  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

it  over  with  a  figment  of  his  imagination.  His 
denial  of  the  contemporaneousness  of  the 
knowledge  of  one's  self  and  of  the  outward 
world,  at  once  ignored  the  possibility  of  any 
knowledge  at  all  of  external  nature,  and  put 
the  mind  on  that  track  of  preposterous  specu- 
lation of  endeavouring  to  bridge  the  imaginary 
chasm  between  the  subjective  and  the  objec- 
tive, which  could  only,  from  such  a  starting- 
point,  end  in  the  identification  of  the  last 
with  the  first ;  and  thus  commute  the  subjec- 
tive with  the  objective,  to  a  degree  of  extra- 
vagance that  would  make  Bacon  smile  at  the 
smallness  of  the  same  error  in  the  ancient 
philosophy,  which  his  whole  method  was  de- 
signed to  counteract.  In  the  philosophy  of 
Des  Cartes,  in  fact,  begun  that  exaltation  of 
human  reason,  which,  in  the  philosophy  of 
Schelling  and  Hegel,  ended  in  the  dethrone- 
ment of  God  and  the  inauguration  of  man  to 
the  sceptre  of  omniscience. 

The  extraordinary  influence  which  the  phi- 
losophy of  Des  Cartes  has  exerted  on  modern 
speculation  is,  therefore,  in  our  judgment,  to 
be  attributed,  rather  to  its  ministering  to  a 
cardinal  weakness  of  the  Iiuman  mind,  fhe 


MODERN   TEEIOD.  .  93 

tendency  fo  a  pj'iorl  speculation,  than  to  any 
force  of  truth  in  its  doctrines  or  of  forecast  in 
its  regulative  principle  of  method.  This  me- 
thod is  an  arbitrary  formula,  as  inapplicable 
in  the  hunting-ground  of  investigation  as  the 
stereotyped  forms  of  the  schoolmen.  The 
provisional  doubt,  the  assumed  conviction  that 
truth  is  possible,  and  the  cogito,  ergo  sum,  as  a 
direction  to  the  inquirer,  are  but  a  beggarly 
account  of  empty  boxes.  It  must  lead  to  a 
priori  speculation,  disjoined  from  the  a  poste- 
riori elements  of  thought,  to  an  unmitigated 
Idealism  or  Rationalism.  Nothing  can  show 
more  clearly  the  bias  of  Des  Cartes  towards  a 
demonstrative  or  rationalistic  philosophy,  than 
the  fact  that,  in  his  attempt  to  exj)ress  the 
simultaneity  and  identity  of  the  hiowing  that 
loe  tliinh,  and  the  Jcnoivimj  that  toe  exist,  that 
they  are  hut  one  indivisible  deliverance  of  corv- 
sciousness,  he  enunciates  it  in  a  form  of  ex- 
.^ression  which  indicates  a  relation  of  subordi- 
natioii  and  !<e(picuce;  cogito,  <  rgo  sum.  The 
external  expression  is  certainly  an  enthymeme 
with  a  suppressed  major,  whatever  the  inter- 
nal thought  of  the  thinker  was.  The  expres- 
sion is  certainly  not  a  simple  affirmation  of 

8 


94  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

the  identity  of  thought  and  being  in  the 
sphere  of  consciousness,  but  indicates  both  the 
priority  of  self  in  consciousness,  and  that  the 
notion  of  self  and  the  notion  of  being  are 
found  apart  and  are  conjoined  through  the 
higher  principle — ivliat  tlmiks,  is.  This  bias 
at  the  starting-point  is  impressed  on  the  whole 
Cartesian  philosophy. 

In  estimating  the  value  of  the  Cartesian 
philosophy,  two  things  have  been  confounded, 
which,  if  not  distinguished,  must  involve  us 
in  the  most  perplexing  confusions.  By  no 
one  have  these  two  things  been  more  signally 
confounded  than  by  Cousin,  the  learned  and 
brilliant  editor  of  the  works  of  Des  Cartes. 
Speaking  of  two  little  tracts  by  Des  Cartes, 
he  says :  "  We  see  in  these  more  unequivo- 
cally the  main  object  of  Des  Cartes,  and  the 
spirit  of  the  revolution  which  has  created 
modern  philosopliy,  and  placed  in  the  under- 
standing itself  the  principle  of  all  certainty, 
the  point  of  departure  for  all  legitimate  in- 
quiry." The  great  error  in  this  passage  is  the 
making  "the  principle  of  all  certainty,  the 
2)oint  of  departure  for  all  legitimate  inquiry." 
This  is  the  germinal  vice  of  the  Cartesian 


MODERN   PERIOD.  95 

philosophy.  In  the  regressive  analysis,  by 
which  we  pass  backwards  to  the  basis  of  cer- 
tainty, we  arrive  at  consciousness  as  the  ulti- 
mate arbiter,  the  last  oracle.  But,  to  make 
this  the  2)oiiit  of  departure,  as  Des  Cartes  did, 
for  inquiry  into  philosophy,  is  erroneous,  and 
was  the  great  blunder  in  the  Cartesian  me- 
thod. From  facts  of  consciousness,  "seeds  of 
truth  in  the  mind,"  as  he  called  them,  Des 
Cartes  even  essayed  to  project  the  system  of 
the  physical  universe,  and  thereby  make  the 
physical  sciences  mere  educts  of  the  under- 
standing. He  restored  the  ancient  method  of 
reasoning  a  imori,  from  causes  to  effects. 
Facts  of  observation  must  be  the  starting-  -\ 
point  in  all  philosophy,  whether  mental  or 
phj^sical.  Des  Cartes  reversed  the  scholastic 
proposition,  and  made  it  read.  Nihil  est  in 
sensu,  quod  non  fidt  jpi^ius  in  intellectu. 

The  philosophy  of  Des  Cartes  had  produced 
upon  the  thinking  of  the  succeeding  age  an 
impression  adverse  to  the  whole  Baconian 
method.  It  had  given  an  extreme  subjective 
turn  to  thought.  This  sulyective  character 
would  be  the  point  of  attack  by  any  one  tak- 
ing   the    Baconian   view   of    philosophizing. 


96  PROGRESS    OF    PUILOSOPHY. 

Therefore  it  was  that  Locke,  in  the  very  be- 
ginning of  his  Essay  on  the  Human  Under- 
standing, enters   upon   the    question   of  the 
origin  of  our  ideas  or  knowledge.     This  ques- 
tion involves  the  problem  of  the  objectivity 
and  subjectivity  of  knowledge.     We  think, 
therefore,  that  the  criticism  of  Cousin  and 
others,  that  Locke's  method  is  entirely  wrong, 
because  of  his  entering  upon  this  question 
before  determining  what  are  the  actual  pro- 
ducts of  thought  in  the  maturely  developed 
consciousness,  is  entirely  futile.     The  origin 
of  our  knowledge  was  the  problem  Ij'ing  at 
the  threshold  of  the  issue  between  the  objec- 
tive method  of  Bacon  and  the  subjective  me- 
thod of  Des  Cartes.     If  all  science  could  be 
excogitated  a  ])riori,  out  of  human  reason, 
with  some  little  resort  to  external  observation, 
as  Des  Cartes  maintained,  then  the  Baconian 
method,  which  placed  the  possibility  of  science 
exclusively  in  the  observation  of  the  invaria- 
ble coexistence,  and   the    invariable   antece- 
dence and  sequence  of  the  phenomena  of  nature, 
was  a  grovelling  puerility.     How,  therefore, 
could  tliis  antagonism  between  the  subjective 
and  the  objective  methods  be  determined,  but 


MODERN    PEIirOD.  97 

by  considering  how  far  thought  is  objective, 
and  how  far  subjective?  It  is  in  fact  a  dis- 
cussion of  method  in  its  ultimate  analysis. 
The  discussion  of  the  origin  of  knowledge  was 
demanded  by  the  polemical  conditions  of 
thought  at  that  day.  Progress  was  impossible 
until  the  problem  was  laid  open.  And  how- 
ever weak  Locke's  discussion  of  the  doctrine 
of  innate  ideas  may  be,  when  viewed  under 
the  higher  light  of  the  present  times,  it  did 
great  good  in  its  day.  It  gave  insight  into 
the  problem  of  subjectivity,  in  a  form  that 
would  be  appreciated  by  the  largest  number 
of  minds,  and  make  them  ignore  the  subjec- 
tive method.  It  matters  not,  therefore,  so  far 
as  the  fortunes  of  philosophy  are  concerned, 
whether  Des  Cartes  or  any  other  philosopher 
ever  held  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas  in  the 
form  in  which  Locke  exhibits  it.  He  chose 
to  exhibit  the  error  of  subjectivity  in  such  a 
form  as  that  in  which — according  to  his  judg- 
ment, and  in  this  we  believe  he  was  right — it 
presented  itself  to  most  thinkers  of  those 
times.  Indeed,  after  the  most  careful  consi- 
deration of  the  subject  in  all  its  bearings,  we 
cannot  but  believe  that  Des  Cartes  assumed, 

8* 


98  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

at  least  in  his  philosophy,  a  doctrine  of  innate 
ideas  almost  precisely  such  as  Locke  presents 
it.  It  is  true,  that  when  Gassendi  charged 
upon  him  the  doctrine,  much  as  Locke  after- 
wards exhibited  it,  he  swallowed  half  that  he 
had  written,  and  said  he  only  meant  by  in- 
nate ideas,  innate  faculties.  This,  however, 
avails,  we  confess,  nothing  with  us;  for,  in 
those  parts  of  his  method,  where  he  maintains 
that  from  a  few  a  priori  principles  assumed  as 
facts  of  consciousness,  he  could  evolve  by  logi- 
cal deduction  what  was  the  mode  in  which 
suns,  planets,  water,  light,  minerals,  plants, 
animals — the  last,  however,  he  admits,  require 
ample  experiments — must  have  been,  or  at 
least  may  have  been  successively  constituted, 
he  certainly  assumes  a  psychological  basis  of 
thought  substantially  the  same  with  Locke's 
doctrine  of  innate  ideas.  "The  order  (says 
Des  Cartes)  I  pursued,  was  this :  First,  I  en- 
deavoured to  discover,  in  general,  the  princi- 
ples or  first  causes  of  everything  which  is  or 
can  be  in  the  world,  witliout  consideri7ig  any- 
tJiing  for  this  purpose,  except  God  alone,  ivho  has 
created  it,  nor  deducing  tJiese  p)rinciples  from 
aught  else  tlianfrom  certain  seeds  of  truth  which 


MODERN    PERIOD.  99 

exist  naturaUij  in  our  souls.  After  that,  I  ex- 
amined what  would  be  the  first  and  most 
ordinary  effects  which  might  be  deduced  from 
these  causes ;  and  it  seems  to  me  that  I  could 
hence  discover  heavens,  stars,  and  earth,  and 
even  upon  that  earth,  water,  air,  fire,  mine- 
rals, and  some  other  things  which  are  the 
most  easy  to  be  known."  This  is  but  the 
general  doctrine  of  method  expounded  in  the 
wriimgs  of  Des  Cartes.  The  "  seeds  of  truth," 
existing  naturally  in  the  soul,  are  spoken  of 
by  Leibnitz  and  by  Cudworth,  both  of  whom 
are  Idealists,  the  first  much  the  same  as  Des 
Cartes,  the  latter  a  little  more  Platonic ;  but 
both  maintaining,  or  at  least  assuming,  a  doc- 
trine in  its  logical  import  much  like  the  doc- 
trine of  innate  ideas  presented  by  Locke, 
which,  however,  be  it  remembered,  Locke 
ascribes  to  no  one  in  particular. 

We,  therefore,  dissent  from  those  who  think 
Locke's  discussion  of  innate  ideas  of  little  im- 
portance in  the  progress  of  philosophy;  but, 
with  the  qualifications  which  we  have  stated, 
we  are  ready  to  admit  that  Locke's  philoso- 
phy is  weak  on  its  negative  side — its  hostile 
discussion  of  the  a  priori  element  of  human 


100  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

thought.  But  on  its  positive  side,  its  aecount 
of  the  origin  of  our  ideas  or  knowledge,  it  is 
all  that  could  have  been  expected  in  his  time. 
From  the  fact,  that  Locke  opposed  with  so 
much  earnestness  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas, 
he  has  been  represented,  by  many,  as  a  pure 
Sensationalist,  one  who  believes  that  all  our 
knowledge  is  derived  from  or  through  the 
senses.  A  more  erroneous  interpretation  of 
an  author  was  never  recorded  in  the  joages  of 
criticism.  The  blunder  is  a  marvel  of  misap- 
prehension. However  far  Locke's  account  of 
the  origin  of  our  ideas  may  fall  short  of  the 
whole  truth,  as  we  readily  admit  it  does,  it 
certainly,  in  the  most  explicit  manner,  main- 
tains that  our  ideas  are  derived  from  two 
sources,  sensation  or  sensitive  perception,  and 
reflection  or  self-consciousness.  "External 
objects  (says  Locke)  furnish  the  mind  with 
ideas  of  sensible  qualities;  and  the  mind  fur- 
nishes the  understanding  with  the  ideas  of  its 
own  operations.  The  understanding  seems 
to  me  not  to  have  the  least  glimmering  of 
any  ideas  which  it  doth  not  receive  from  one 
of  these  two  sources."  How  criticism  has 
brought  itself  to  interpret  this  and  number- 


MODERN    PERIOD.  101 

less  other  passages,  in  wliicli  Locke  distinctly 
and  carefully  affirms  that  there  are  two  dif- 
ferent sources  of  our  ideas,  sensation  and  re- 
flection, so  as  to  make  Locke  resolve  them 
into  one,  is  strange  enough,  and  but  evinces 
the  perversity  of  human  judgment.  And 
Cousin,  with  all  the  light  to  the  contrary, 
which  Dugald  Stewart,  in  his  Preliminary 
Dissertation,  had  shed  upon  the  question, 
pronounces  Locke  a  Sensationalist.  Enslaved 
by  the  spirit  of  a  system  which  required  him 
to  find  in  Locke  the  root  of  the  Sensationalism 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  he  says :  "  Locke  is 
the  father  of  the  whole  Sensualistic  school  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  He  is  incontestably, 
in  time  as  well  as  genius,  the  first  metaphysi- 
cian of  this  school."  The  vile  Sensualism  or 
Sensationalism  of  Condillac  andCabanis  is  thus 
made  a  justifiable  extension  of  Locke's  phi- 
losophy—  fruit  springing  legitimately  from 
the  germ  which  Locke  planted  in  the  fields 
of  thought.  And  prone,  with  a  predisposi- 
tion, increased  by  the  heat  of  progress,  to 
exaggerate  every  indication  of  Sensational- 
ism in  the  writings  of  Locke,  he  maintains 
that  Locke  makes  an  interval  between  the 


102  PKOGRESS   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

time  of  acquiring  the  ideas  of  sensation  and 
those  of  reflection;  and  thus  opens  the  way 
for  the  theory  of  "transformed  sensations" — 
of  sensation  as  the  sole  principle  of  all  the 
operations  of  the  soul.  This  is  a  shallow 
criticism.  The  purpose  of  Locke  was  to 
rescue  philosophy  from  subjectivity,  and  turn 
observation  upon  the  objective.  Whether  by 
innate  ideas  Des  Cartes  meant  something  co- 
eval in  its  existence  with  the  mind  to  which 
it  belongs,  and  illuminating  the  understand- 
ing before  the  external  senses  begin  to  ope- 
rate, or  not,  as  Locke  supposed,  certainly  the 
great  tendency  of  his  philosophy  was  to  com- 
mute the  subjective  with  the  objective — to 
lead  to  a  high  a  j^rioi^i  philosophy  and  science 
— to  turn  back  the  Baconian  movement  by 
reversing  its  method.  The  task,  therefore, 
of  Locke's  philosophy  was  to  restore  the  Ba- 
conian method  by  developing  its  psychologi- 
cal basis.  Therefore,  repudiating  all  know- 
ledges prior  to  experience  beginning  in  the 
senses,  Locke  says :  "  If  it  be  demanded  when 
a  man  begins  to  have  any  ideas,  I  think  the 
true  answer  is,  when  he  first  has  any  sensa- 
tion.    I   conceive   that   ideas  in  the  under- 


MODERN   PERIOD.  »  103 

standing  are  coeval  with  sensation."  Locke 
then  enounces  two  sources  of  ideas,  in  the 
passage  which  we  have  ah^eady  quoted;  and, 
in  accordance  with  the  principle  that  sensa- 
tion is  prior  to  all  ideas  in  the  understanding, 
he  treats  of  the  ideas  of  sensation  first,  and 
of  reflection  second;  being  induced  to  do  this 
by  the  great  purpose  of  his  philosophy — to 
throw  observation  upon  external  nature. 
But  that  Locke  meant  to  assert  that  there  is 
an  interval  of  time  between  our  knowledsre 
of  matter  and  of  mind,  cannot  be  maintained; 
and  least  of  all,  that  tlie  knowledge  of  matter 
has  the  'priovliy.  It  really  mortifies  us  that 
these  stale  criticisms,  which  make  Locke  a 
mere  Sensationalist,  should  be  written  anew 
in  the  history  of  philosophy  by  a  countryman 
of  Locke's  at  this  late  day.  Mr.  Morell  has, 
as  it  were,  permitted  Cousin  to  hold  his  hand) 
while  he  writes  the  history  of  philosophy. 
He  has,  therefore,  divided  all  philosophers 
into  two  classes,  Sensationalists  and  Idealists. 
This  division  is  based  upon  the  supposition, 
that  Eclecticism  is  the  true  account  of  the 
development  of  philosophy.  This  view  of 
the  development  of  philosophy,  taught  him 


104  PROGRESS   OF   PHILOSOPnY. 

by  Couski,  led  him  to  follow  that  philosopher 
in  his  strictures  upon  Locke,  and  class  him 
amongst  Sensationalists.  Eclecticism  assumes 
that  no  one  man,  from  the  very  necessary 
order  of  philosophical  development,  can  lay 
open  the  foundations  of  philosophy  broad 
enough  to  bear  the  superstructure — can  lay 
open  sufficiently  sensation  and  self-conscious- 
ness as  sources  of  knowledge.  It  postulates, 
that  every  philosopher  and  his  age  has  de- 
veloped either  the  one  or  the  other  of  these 
sources  of  knowledge,  but  never  both.  And 
that,  in  the  order  of  things,  a  great  mind, 
endowed  with  a  universal  genius  of  criticism, 
and  possessed  of  all  learning  in  philosophy, 
must  discover  a  higher  method  than  had  thus 
far  been  pursued — the  method  of  Eclecticism, 
a  method  assumed  to  be  as  far  above  induc- 
tion and  reflective  analysis,  as  the  eclectic 
philosopher  is  above  those  one-idea  j^jhiloso- 
pliers  who,  given  up  to  either  Sensationalism 
or  Idealism,  are  his  necessary  forerunners  in 
the  development  of  philosophy.  But  this 
/  boasted  Eclecticism,  when  searched  to  the 
.  bottom,  is  discovered  to  be  a  mere  scheme  of 
'  compilation,  a  universal  plagiarism. 


MODERN   PERIOD.  105 

As  we  can  know  things  only  in  so  far  as 
we  have  a  faculty  of  knowing  in  general,  it 
is  necessary,  in  order  to  a  true  theory  of 
knowledge,  that  we  determine  the  scope  of 
this  faculty.  This  Locke  endeavoured  to  do. 
He  maintained  that  all  our  knowledge  is  ob- 
tained through  observation.  Pie  further  main- 
tained that  the  faculties  of  observation  are 
two:  1.  Sense,  or  external  perception ;  2.  Self- 
consciousness,  or  internal  perception.  The 
fundamental  problem,  therefore,  of  Locke's 
philosophy,  was  to  determine  the  conditions 
of  our  faculties  of  knowing.  But  Locke  did 
not  see  this  problem  very  definitely,  if  at  all. 

All  knowledge  is  divisible  into  two  great 
branches:  1.  The  objects  of  hioicledge ;  2.  The 
mode  of  IcnoioiiKj.  The  objects  of  knowledge 
Locke  properly  divided  into  two  great  classes, 
external  and  internal,  corresponding  to  his 
two  faculties  of  seivse  and  rejiectkm  or  self- 
consciousness.  The  mode  of  knoAvmg  is  also 
divisible  into  two  parts:  1.  The  posslbllitf/  of 
knmvuifj  from  the  nature  of  tliowjht;  2.  The 
jiossibiUty  of  hioicing  from  the  nature  of  exist- 
ence. This  last  discrimination  Locke  had  no 
notion  of.     The  problem  of  the  conditions  of 

9 


106  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

knowledge,  therefore,  never  presented  itself 
distinctly  to  Locke,  It  is  true,  that  occasion- 
ally he  is  constrained  by  the  exigencies  of 
thought  to  utter  truths  which  properly  fall 
under  the  problem  of  the  conditions  of 
thought.  He  says,  for  instance:  "He  would 
be  thought  void^of  common  sense  who,  asked 
on  the  one  hand  or  on  the  other,  were  to  give 
a  reason  why  it  is  impossible  for  the  same 
thing  to  be  and  not  to  be."  Here  is  a  dis- 
tinct recognition  of  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction, which,  of  course,  has  its  origin  and 
guarantee  in  the  intellect  or  common  sense. 
Locke,  too,  believed  in  necessary  and  uni- 
versal truths,  as  distinguished  from  contin- 
gent; which,  of  course,  can  only  find  their 
guarantee  in  the  intellect,  being  in  no  way 
derivable  from  or  through  sensitive  cognition. 
And  in  his  criterion  of  certainty  he  was  ex- 
tremely subjective,  maintaining  that  the  sub- 
jective in  knowledge  is  much  more  certain 
than  the  objective;  thereby  erroneously  ignor- 
ing the  simultaneity  of  the  subjective  and 
objective  in  the  fundamental  antithesis  of 
consciousness,  and  the  consequent  equal  cer- 
tainty of  each.     "Our  existence  (says  Locke) 


MODERN   PERIOD.  107 

is  known  to  us  by  a  certainty  yet  higher  than 
our  senses  can  give  us  of  the  existence  of 
things,  and  that  is  internal  perception,  or 
self-consciousness,  or  intuition,  from  whence 
may  be  drawn,  by  a  train  of  ideas,  the  surest 
and  most  incontestible  proof  of  the  existence 
of  God."  This,  surely,  is  not  the  doctrine  of 
a  mere  Sensationalist.  If  Locke  had  been 
called  by  the  polemical  necessities  of  his  times 
to  consider  the  conditions  qftlioiajJd  as  a  special 
problem,  he  would  doubtless  have  evolved 
other  principles  similar  to  those  we  have  just 
mentioned;  and,  while  he  would  have  denied 
that  they  are  innate,  as  articulate  proposi- 
tions, he  would  have  admitted  that  they  are 
silent  in  laws  necessitating  thought  to  its 
judgments.  For  it  should  be  observed  that 
Locke's  essay  was  not  the  mere  theory  of  a 
recluse  student,  but  had  a  polemical  birth  in 
the  midst  of  an  age  in  which  the  discussion 
of  great  fundamental  doctrines  were  stirring, 
in  an  extraordinary  degree,  the  practical  ac- 
tivities of  life.  Locke  was  a  might}^  cham- 
pion in  the  universal  strife;  and  his  essay 
was  written  to  counteract  the  subjective  ten- 
dency of  the  Cartesian   philosophy.     Hence 


108  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  great  stress  laid  on  sensation  as  a  source 
of  knowledge  or  ideas,  to  the  comparative 
neglect  of  the  other  source,  termed  by  him 
reflection.  But  it  is  only  a  compurative  ne- 
glect; for,  in  the  first  place,  he  purges,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  source  of  reflection  from  the 
doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  which,  in  a  logical 
point  of  view,  are  substantially  the  idols  of 
Bacon.  Then,  after  carefully  affirming  the 
existence  of  two  sources  of  ideas,  he  proceeds, 
in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  philoso- 
phy in  that  age,  to  develop  the  source  of 
sensation.  Locke's  philosophy  is,  therefore, 
not  a  one-sided  philosophy.  Like  Bacon, 
Locke  was  a  labourer  in  the  great  field  of 
practical  activity.  Not  only  was  he  a  physi- 
cian skilled  in  the  practice,  and  well  read  in 
the  theory  of  medicine,  but  he  was  a  power- 
ful writer  on  government  and  legislation,  and 
not  only  these,  but  a  polemic,  strong  in  theo- 
logical discussion.  To  estimate,  therefore, 
the  mental  theory  of  Locke's  essay,  it  is  ne- 
cessary to  view  it  through  the  medium  of  the 
times,  and  of  the  part  he  took  in  the  strifes 
of  thought.  But  what  is  chiefly  to  be  praised 
in  Locke's  writings,  is  the  love  of  truth  which 


MODERN    PERIOD.  109 

everywhere  prevails.  "AVhatever  I  write 
(saj'S  he),  as  soon  as  I  shall  discover  it  not 
to  be  trutli,  my  hand  shall  be  forwardest  to 
throw  it  into  the  fire." 

Locke  had  enounced  the  doctrine  that  all 
our  knowledge  is  founded  on  experience, 
meaning  by  experience  the  whole  sphere  of 
conscious  mental  activity,  thereby  embracing 
in  it  reflection  as  well  as  sensation.  Hume, 
seizing  upon  this  doctrine,  and  narrowing  ex- 
perience to  sensation,  resolved  all  our -uni- 
versal necessary  judgments  into  mere  facti- 
tious habits  of  mind,  and  subverted  the  foun- 
dations of  theoretical  truth,  and  laid  the  basis 
of  a  scheme  of  absolute  skepticism.  For,  if 
our  fundamental  primary  judgments  are  not 
necessary,  but  are  mere  habits  of  mind  formed 
from  the  observation  of  the  contingent,  coex- 
istent, and  antecedent,  and  consequent  phe- 
nomena of  external  nature,  then  is  human 
opinion  but  waves  of  thought  moved  by  the 
accidents  of  the  shifting  winds  of  ever-chang- 
ing phenomena;  and  what  seems  true  this 
moment  may  seem  false  the  next.  This 
chaos  of  thought  was  brought  into  order  and 
certainty  by  Reid.     He  it  was  who  evolved 

9* 


110  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

out  of  the  contents  of  human  consciousness 
those  fundamental,  necessary,  primary  behefs, 
which  constitute  both  the  basis  and  the  cri- 
terion of  human  knowledge.  In  Locke's  time, 
the  vice  of  philosophy  was  too  great  subjec- 
tivity. In  Keid's  time,  it  was  a  total  abnega- 
tion of  all  certain  knowledge,  but  especially 
of  those  fundamental  judgments  which  alone 
fix  certainty  in  thought — a  vice  which  sprung 
out  of  the  extravagant  objectivity  to  which 
Locke's  philosophy  had  been  carried  by 
Hume,  confining  all  thought  to  the  elements 
furnished  by  sensation.  If  Hobbes  and  Gas- 
sendi  had  obtained  in  Britain  as  great  ascend- 
ency in  Locke's  time  as  Hume  did  in  Reid's, 
Locke  would  perhaps  have  dwelt  as  much 
more  on  reflection  as  he  did  on  sensation, 
and  the  philosophy  of  Reid  would  have  been 
anticipated.  But,  in  the  conditions  of  the 
development  of  human  thought,  it  was  per- 
haps necessary  that  the  development  by 
Locke  should  take  place,  so  that  its  apparent 
one-sidedness  should  appear  in  Hume,  and 
thus  a  necessity  be  produced  for  a  reexamina- 
tion of  human  thought  to  its  ultimate  basis 
in  the  primary  facts  of  consciousness.     Reid, 


MODERN    PERIOD.  Ill 

therefore,  in  fact,  took  up  philosophy  where 
Locke  left  it,  and  continued  the  Baconian 
movement,  with  a  fuller  development  of  the 
subjective  than  there  was  in  Locke,  but  still 
guided  by  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  Bacon, 
that  truth  consists  in  the  correspondence  or 
agreement  between  thought  and  its  object; 
and  that,  in  order  to  secure  the  truth,  observa- 
tion of  phenomena  is  the  indispensable  con- 
dition. The  movement  was  still  towards  a 
fuller  outward  observation  of  external  nature. 
And  the  Baconian  method  received  a  fuller 
theoretical  development  in  the  psychological 
doctrine  of  lleid,  that  we  perceive  external 
objects  themselves,  as  consciousness  testifies, 
and  not  merely  representations  of  them,  as 
all  previous  philosophers  had  taught.  And 
by  his  doctrine  of  the  simultaneity  and  con- 
sequent equal  certainty  of  the  knowledge  of 
the  objective  and  the  subjective,  Reid  over- 
threw the  doctrine  of  Des  Cartes,  that  our 
knowledge  of  external  things  must  be  referred 
by  a  secondary  act  of  thought  to  conscious- 
ness for  verification.  And  in  this  doctrine  of 
Reid,  for  the  first  time  in  philosophy,  the  sub- 
jective and  the  objective  obtained  their  equi- 


112  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

librium.  In  his  philosophy  neither  prepon- 
derates over  the  other.  While,  therefore,  in 
the  philosophy  of  Reicl,  the  subjective  is  pre- 
vented from  being  commuted  with  the  objec- 
tive, the  certainty  of  the  objective  is  equalized 
with  the  subjective. 

But  it  came  to  pass,  that  the  doctrines  of 
Reid  were  misrepresented  and  perverted  by 
Brown,  and  the  Sensationalism  of'  Destutt 
Tracy  of  France,  and  kindred  doctrines  of 
Hume,  diluted  with  rhetoric,  were  proclaimed 
by  him  in  their  stead.  Brown  made  conscious- 
ness convertible  with  feeling;  and  the  thought, 
that  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part,  is  con- 
sidered by  him  as  a  feeling.  Thus  the  most 
extravagant  Sensationalism  again  prevailed 
in  Britain.  And  though  the  proud  boast  of 
Bacon — that,  so  potent  was  his  induction  as  a 
method  of  investigation,  that  it  would  put 
common  minds  on  a  level  with  the  most 
powerful — had  not  been  realized,  yet  it  brought 
into  the  fields  of  physical  science  the  merest 
empirics  in  company  with  true  sciencists. 
Thus  the  downward  tendency  of  physical  in- 
quiry needed  to  be  counteracted  by  a  discip 
line  of  higher  studies.     Human  reason  needed 


J 
MODERN    PERIOD.  113 

to  be  rescued  from  the  dirt  of  a  gross  Sensa^ 
tionalism. 

While  this  downward  tendency  of  the  ob- 
jective method  of  Bacon  had  been  realized  in 
Britain,  the  subjective  method  of  Des  Cartes 
had  been  realizing  its  results  on  the  continent 
of  Europe.  In  the  philosophy  of  Spinosa,  it 
tended  to  Pantheism.  In  that  of  Leibnitz, 
from  its  opposite  pole,  it  made  man  a  mere 
machine,  and  the  physical  world  his  counter- 
part, moving  in  harmony,  not  by  interdepen- 
dent cog-wheels,  but  by  an  unseen  spiritual 
agency;  which  doctrine,  when  sifted  to  the 
kernel,  is  also  of  Pantheistic  tendency.  But 
under  the  influence  of  the  Cartesian  method, 
enlarged  in  its  scope  to  suit  the  necessities  of 
its  condition,  human  reason,  at  last,  in  the 
philosophy  of  Schelling  and  Hegel,  consum- 
mated the  grand  apotheosis  of  error,  by  throw- 
ing aside  the  many  idols  of  the  ancient  philo- 
sophy pointed  out  by  Bacon,  and  substituting 
for  them  one  supreme  idol,  impiously  called 
the  Absolute  or  Lifinite. 

But  the  greatest  degradation  of  philosophy 
remains  to  be  told.  The  prejudice  against 
the  Aristotelian  logic,  which  begun  in  Bacon, 


114  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

was  augmented  by  Locke;  so  that  logic  was 
almost  ignored  in  Britain,  The  marvels  ac- 
complished in  physics,  by  cooperation,  through 
the  method  of  induction,  gave  importance  to 
men  whose  moderate  abilities  would  ever  ex- 
clude them  from  the  higher  study  of  our  in- 
tellectual nature;  while  the  patient  attention 
to  details,  which  physical  inquiries  demand, 
caused  an  almost  exclusive  cultivation  of  the 
powers  of  observation,  to  the  neglect  of  the 
higher  faculties  of  the  mind.  Logic,  there- 
fore, as  well  as  metaphysics,  sunk  to  the 
lowest  level,  in  the  almost  exclusive  cultiva- 
tion of  physics. 

Li  this  state  of  philosophy.  Archbishop 
Whately  revived  logic,  in  a  work  not  display- 
ing, any  great  ability,  but,  at  all  events,  at- 
tracting the  attention  of  thinkers.  The  work 
did  not,  however,  place  logic  on  that  elevation 
which  the  indications  of  its  history  in  the 
mediaeval  and  the  succeeding  ages  would  have 
pointed  out  to  any  one  well  read  in  its  litera- 
ture. Nevertheless,  it  was  an  omen  of  the 
beginning  of  the  cultivation  of  the  higher 
faculties  of  the  mind  in  an  age  of  intellectual 
decadence.      But,    as    low   as    the    level   of 


MODERN    TERIOD.  115 

Whately's  logic  was,  it  was  too  high  for  tlic 
empiric  spirit  of  a  Sensational  philosophy. 
Mr.  John  S.  Mill,  in  his  Logic,  Ratiocinative 
and  Inductive,  dragged  down  logic  into  the 
very  mire  of  empiricism.  Taking  Brown, 
Avho,  we  have  seen,  makes  consciousness  con- 
vertible with  feeling,  as  his  guide  in  the  philo- 
sophy of  the  mind,  he  constructed  a  system 
of  logic  in  which  the  higher  faculties  of  the 
mind  are  ignored.  While  Whately,  with 
some  show  of  reason,  resolved  induction  into 
deduction  or  syllogism  proper,  Mill  most  pre- 
posterously resolved  all  deduction  into  induc- 
tion; and  thereby  consummated  the  degradiv 
tion  of  logic.  Mr.  Mill  rej)udiates  entirely  all 
necessary  truths;  consequently  ignores  the 
formal  laws  of  thought,  of  which  pure  logic  is 
the  science,  and  reduces  all  thought  to  the 
uncertainty  of  the  empirical  conditions  of  ob- 
servation. He  ignores  all  distinction  between 
the  apodictic  and  the  hypothetical  exercise  of 
the  understanding.  He  seems  never  to  con- 
sider, that  the  determinations  of  the  under- 
standing are  often  effected  solely  by  the  rela- 
tion in  which  intelligence  stands  to  itself  in 
thought.     He  maintains  that  deduction  is  but 


116  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

/  an  extension  of  induction,  and  from  the  begin- 
/^  ning  to  the  end  of  his  exposition  confounds 
it  inference  with   deduction.     The   intrusion    of 
'-  matter  between  the  premises  and  the  conclu- 
sion of  a  syllogism,  which  is  the  cardinal  error 
to  be  guarded  against  in  logic,  is  the  very 
thing  which  Mr.  Mill  strives  to  effect  as  the 
great  end  and  consummation  of  correct  reason- 
ing.    The  syllogism  is  founded  upon  matter 
which  it  passively  receives.     It  does  not  even 
develop  potential  knowledge  into  actual,  but 
merely  evolves  implicit  knowledge  into  ex- 
plicit.    The  conclusion  is  alread}^  known  be- 
fore the  syllogism  is  formed.     Ratiocination 
is  determined  by  the  relations  into  Avhich  in- 
telligence puts  itself  to  itself  in  regard  to  some 
objeci>matter.     Such  Ijeing  the  nature  of  ratio- 
cination, its  very  form  in  the  syllogism  ex- 
cludes everything  intrusive  between  the  pre- 
mises and  the  conclusion.     In  a  word,  Mr. 
;  Mill  does  not  discriminate  pure  logic,  wherein 
^  the  mental  determinations  are  eifected  by  the 
\  formal  laws  of  thought,  from  concrete  or  modi- 
I  ficd  logic,  wherein  the  mental  determinations 
I  are  effected  under  the  laws  of  thought,  modi- 
fied  by   the   empirical   circumstances   under 


MODERN    PERIOD.  117 

wliicli  we  exert  our  faculties.     But  even  in 
concrete  or  modified  logic,  thought  is  not  con- 
sidered as  applied  to  any  particular  matter,, 
but  the  necessary  are  considered  in  conjunc-/ 
tion   with   the   contingent   conditions   under  j 
Avhicli  thought  is  actually  exerted.     Mr.  Mill 
does  not  even  discriminate  pure  from  applied 
logic,  formal  from  material  illation,  but  con- 
founds even  these. 

It  may  be  said,  in  answer  to  these  stric- 
tures, that  Mr.  Mill  defines  in  the  beginning 
of  his  treatise  Avhat  scope  he  intends  to  give 
it,  and  that  the  olycction  we  make  is  one 
merely  of  the  meaning  of  words.  This  mode 
of  answering  our  oljjection,  while  it  has  the 
air  of  looking  at  the  subject  from  a  more  com- 
prehensive point  of  view,  is  a  sheer  evasion. 
Mr.  Mill  has  not  the  right  to  confuse  the 
boundaries  of  a  science.  Logic  is  found  l)y 
reflective  analysis  as  well  as  by  the  indica- 
tions of  its  history  to  be  confined  to  the  formal 
laws  of  thought  as  its  adequate  object-matter; 
else  all  the  material  sciences  must  be  intruded 
into  it.  Mr.  Mill,  therefore,  by  taking  into 
logic  so  much  foreign  matter,  is  like  a  geo- 
grapher who  should  take   into   the   map  of 

10 


118  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

America,  the  continent  of  Europe.  But  Mr. 
Mill's  is  not  merely  an  error  of  boundary :  it 
is  a  blunder  in  all  the  fundamental  doctrines 
of  logic,  leading  him  to  repeat,  with  emphasis, 
the  stale  misapprehension,  that  Bacon's  method 
is  one-sided,  excluding  deduction  altogether 
as  a  process  of  investigation.  Playfair,  in  his 
celebrated  Dissertation  on  the  Progress  of  the 
Mathematical  and  Physical  Sciences,  pro- 
nounced the  same  judgment,  and  disparaged 
Bacon's  method  as  Mr.  Mill  does,  by  saying 
that  it  ignored  the  process  which  in  the  ad- 
vanced stage  of  the  sciences  becomes  the  most 
important  and  effective.  Whereas,  what  Mr. 
Mill  and  his  forerunners  in  the  error  call  de- 
duction, is  not  deduction,  a  demonstrative 
process,  at  all,  but  is  what  Bacon  means  by 
the  descending  scale  of  induction,  being  in 
fact  a  hypothetical  and  not  an  apodictic  pro- 
cess, and  is  sometimes,  as  we  have  already 
shown,  called  the  synthetical  process  of  induc- 
tion. The  blunder  of  Mr.  Mill  is  thus  a 
double  one;  first,  in  supposing  the  process  to 
be  deduction  when  it  is  not;  secondly,  in  sup- 
posing that  Bacon  excluded  it  from  his  method. 
The  truth  is,  Bacon  strode  with  such  colossal 


.    A 

<u. 

l^xV^t 

\i  ^-^^^    ^ 

MODERN    PERIOD.  119 

steps  along  the  paths  of  philosophy,  that  hut 
few  have  been  able  to  step  in  his  exact  foot^ 
prints,  and  of  these  few  Mr.  Mill  is  not  one, 
as  his  numerous  misapprehensions  of  Bacon's 
method  show. 

But  the  most  mischievous  error  which  de- 
rationalizes  Mr.  MilVs  logic,  is  the  notion,  that 
"  Deduction  is  the  great  scientific  work  of  the 
present  and  future  ages;"  and  that  "a  revolu- 
tion is  peaceably  and  progressively  effecting 
itself  in  philosophy,  the  reverse  of  that  to 
which  Bacon  has  attached  his  name."  This 
doctrine,  assuming  as  it  does,  that  the  highest 
generalities  have  been  reached,  evinces  a  nar- 
rowness of  comprehension,  which  of  itself 
would  put  Mr.  Mill  below  any  very  high  ele- 
vation as  a  thinker;  but  when  it  is  also  a 
broad  contradiction  of  the  fundamental  doc- 
trine of  his  system  of  logic,  which  resolves 
deduction  into  induction,  Mr.  Mill  stands  re- 
vealed as  a  thinker  who  does  not  understand 
himself,  but  crosses  his  own  path  in  his  expo- 
sition of  doctrines;  and  the  best  refutation  is 
to  leave  him  in  the  entanglement  of  his  own 
contradictions. 

Induction  has  been  also  signally  corrupted 


120  PROGRESS    or   PHILOSOPHY. 

by  Dr.  Whewell,  in  his  Philosophy  of  the  In- 
ductive Sciences.  The  inductive  process,  ac- 
cording to  Dr.  Whewell,  consists  in  selecting 
conceptions  which  exist  in  the  mind  anterior 
to  all  experience,  and  by  these  binding  to- 
gether the  objects  of  observation,  in  conformity 
with  certain  relations  subsisting  between  the 
percepts  derived  from  the  objects,  and  the 
conceptions  or  ideas  of  colligation.  The  ope- 
ration proceeds  by  trying,  first,  one  concep- 
tion, or  idea  of  colligation,  and  then  another, 
mitil  the  right  one  is  found.  Now,  if  the  pro- 
cess of  induction  were  that  of  binding  pheno- 
mena together  by  certain  innate  ideas  or 
conceptions,  as  Whewell  contends,  it  would 
be  just  as  easy  to  find  the  proper  idea  of 
colligation  on  seeing  a  few  phenomena,  as  on 
seeing  many.  Because  it  seems  sufficiently 
manifest,  that  a  number  of  instances  outside 
of  the  mind  could  in  no  way  enable  us  any 
more  readily  to  find  the  idea  of  colligation 
amidst  the  multitude  of  such,  which,  ex  lijjpo- 
tliesi,  exist  in  the  mind,  to  bind  together  the 
given  instances,  than  the  given  instances 
themselves  would.  For,  in  the  given  instances 
themselves,  the  fitness  of  the  idea  of  colliga- 


MODERN    PERIOD.  121 

tion  must  appear;  and  yet,  the  inductive  in- 
ference or  idea  of  colligation  is  only  suggested 
by  many  instances.  In  this  truth  alone,  is 
found  a  sufficient  refutation  of  Whewell's 
theory  of  the  idea  of  colligation. 

The  tendency  of  this  doctrine  of  Dr.  Whe- 
well's, is  to  set  up  in  the  mind  a  phj-sical 
standard  of  things,  and  thus  commute  the 
subjective  with  the  objective.  The  doctrine 
springs  out  of  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
manner  in  which  the  mind  comes  by  con- 
cepts, or,  as  Dr.  Whewell  improperly  calls 
them,  conceptions.  The  mind  cannot  em- 
brace many  objects  at  once;  it  must  single 
out  one,  and,  when  this  is  done,  all  others  are 
excluded.  The  product  of  the  mind,  when 
attention  is  thus  given  to  one  object  only,  is 
a  percept.  But  the  mind  strives  to  com^Dre- 
hend  many  objects  also.  It,  therefore,  by 
comparing  objects,  discovers  similarities  be- 
tween them,  and  it  dwells  upon  the  cha- 
racters which  constitute  their  similarity  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  characters  which  consti- 
tute their  dissimilarity,  and  identifies  the 
similarities,  and  expresses  the  identification 
by  a  general  term.     The  product  of  the  mind, 

10* 


122  PROGRESS   OP    PHILOSOPHY. 

in  such  identification  of  similarities,  is  a  con- 
cept. Now,  Dr.  Wlie^vell's  ideas  of  colliga- 
tion are  only  these  concepts  empirically 
formed  from  observation ;  and  the  colligation 
of  which  he  speaks  is  done  in  the  very  act 
of  conception — is,  in  fact,  the  concept  itself. 
The  concept  thus  formed  may  then  be  used 
in  binding  together  similar  objects  or  phe- 
nomena. His  doctrine  of  ideas  of  colligation 
is,  therefore,  a  gross  absurdity,  which  vitiates 
his  whole  philosophy,  and,  together  with 
other  similar  errors,  degrades  him  to  a  low 
level  as  an  expounder  of  logical  philosophy. 
In  truth.  Dr.  Whewell  is  as  crude  and  con- 
fused a  thinker  as  ever  aspired  with  such 
laborious  ambition  to  be  a  philosopher. 

The  philosophy  of  the  Absolute  and  In- 
finite, has,  too,  its  own  pretended  method, 
called  the  ontological  method.  In  this  phi- 
losophy, logic,  in  any  proper  sense,  is  done 
away  with.  Assuming  a  faculty  of  intellec- 
tual intuition,  by  which  the  absolute  and  the 
infinite  are  immediately  perceived,  it  repudi- 
ates altogether  as  beneath  the  high  purposes 
of  philosophy,  the  grovelling  method  of  in- 
duction.     Its  method  of  investigation,  if  it 


MODERN   PERIOD.  J  123 

can  be  called  so,  is  not  a  process  of  inference 
founded  upon  evidence,  but  is  an  immediate 
intuition,  where  reasoning  becomes  only  trac- 
ing, intellectually,  the  order  of  creation  as  it 
proceeded  by  evolution  from  its  primordial 
element  of  absolute  being.  This  method 
claims  to  evolve  all  human  knowledge,  and 
all  that  is  knowable,  out  of  one  fundamental 
entity,  in  which  subject  and  object,  God  and 
man.  Creator  and  creature,  are  identified. 
Its  process  of  evolution  is  identical  with  the 
process  of  creation.  As  creation  is  the  pro- 
cess of  Almighty  thought,  resulting  in  all 
that  exists,  so  human  thought,  in  the  onto- 
logical  method,  is  the  similar  process  of  a 
finite  mind,  resulting  in  the  knowledge  of  all 
that  exists — the  same  process  of  the  finite 
mind  being  subordinated  to  result  only  in 
knowledge,  while  that  of  the  infinite  results 
in  creation.* 

Such  is  as  articulate  a  statement  as  we  are 
able  to  give  of  the  method  of  a  philosophy 
which  commutes  the  nescience  of  man  with 
the  omniscience  of  God;    and  which,  when 

*  The  Hegelians  say,  the  end  of  philosophy  is  to  re- 
think the  great  thought  of  creation. 


124  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

sifted  to  the  bottom,  is  found  to  be  an  an- 
tithesis of  the  broadest  contradictions. 

We  have  now  exhibited  the  state  of  phi- 
losophy, that  has  resulted  from  both  the 
Baconian  and  Cartesian  movements.  The 
Scotch  philosopher.  Sir  William  Hamilton, 
had  begun  a  reclamation  of  philosophy.  We 
will  consider,  his  labours,  in  the  second  part 
of  this  tract.  We  designate  the  time  in 
which  he  flourished,  and  which  is  still  in  pro- 
gress, as  a  reactionary  ejDoch.  Our  criticisms 
will,  therefore,  be  both  retrospective  and  pro- 
spective. Topics  already  passed  in  review 
will  be  considered,  though  in  new  relations. 


PEOGllESS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


^itrt  St  CO  lib. 

KEACTIONAKY   EPOCH. 

Though  of  Lord  Bacon  it  was  said,  by  his 
friend,  Dr.  Harvey,  the  discoverer  of  the  cir- 
culation of  the  blood,  "he  writes  philosophy 
like  a  Lord  Chancellor,"  it  must  be  admitted, 
Sir  William  Hamilton  writes  it  like  a  philoso- 
pher. For  he  both  thinks  and  writes,  more 
like  a  pure  intelligence,  than  any  man  in  the 
history  of  speculation.  In  the  first  place,  his 
diction  is  the  most  concise,  the  most  accurate, 
the  most  direct,  the  most  compact,  and  the 
most  vigorous  ever  used  by  any  writer  on 
philosophy.  Familiar  with  all  systems  of 
philosophy  ever  proposed,  and  their  criticisms 
expository,  supplementary  and  adverse,  and 

125 


126  PROGKESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

a  master  of  the  languages,  in  which  both  the 
philosophies  and  the  criticisms  have  been 
written;  he  has  discovered  how  much  of 
their  errors  can  be  ascribed  to  the  deficiencies 
of  language,  both  as  an  instrument  and  as  a 
vehicle  of  philosophical  thought ;  and  he  has, 
accordingly,  formed  a  language  for  himself, 
adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  the  highest 
thinking,  in  the  new  career  of  philosophy 
which  he  has  inaugurated.  And  his  learn- 
ing, in  every  department  of  knowledge  sup- 
plementary of  philosophy,  or  auxiliary  to  it, 
is  so  abundant,  that  there  seems  to  be  not 
even  a  random  thought  of  any  value,  which 
has  been  dropped  along  any,  even  obscure, 
path  of  mental  activity,  in  any  age  or  coun- 
try, that  his  diligence  has  not  recovered,  his 
sagacity  appreciated,  and  his  judgment  hus- 
banded in  the  stores  of  his  knowledge.  And, 
in  discussing  any  question  of  philosophy,  his 
ample  learning  enables  him  to  classify  all  the 
different  theories  which  have,  at  successive 
periods,  been  invented  to  exi:)lain  it;  and 
generally,  indeed  we  may  say  always,  he  dis- 
covers, by  the  light  reciprocally  shed  from 
the  theories,  ideas  involved  in  them  which 


REACTIONARY  EPOCH.  127 

their  respective  advocates  had  not  discrimina- 
ted; thereby  giving  greater  accuracy  to  the 
theories  than  they  had  before.  By  this  mode 
of  discussion,  we  have  the  history  of  doctrines 
concentrated  into  a  focus  of  ekicidation.  And 
the  uses  of  words,  and  the  mutations  in  their 
meaning,  in  different  languages,  are  articu- 
lately set  forth;  thereby  enhancing  the  accu- 
racy and  certainty  of  our  footsteps  on  the 
slippery  paths  of  speculation.  And  his  own 
genius  for  original  research  is  such,  that  no 
subtlety  of  our  intelligent  nature,  however 
evasive,  no  relation  however  indirect  or  re- 
mote, no  manifestation  however  ambiguous 
or  obscure,  can  escape  or  elude  his  critical 
diagnosis.  Add  to  all  this;  his  moral  consti- 
tution, Ijoth  by  nature  and  by  education,  is 
harmonious  with  his  intellectual,  imparting 
to  his  faculties  the  energy  of  a  well-directed 
will,  and  the  wisdom  of  a  pure  love  of  truth. 
Therefore  it  is,  that  in  the  writings  of  Sir 
AVilliam  Hamilton  there  is  nothing  of  that 
vacillation  in  doctrine  which  results  from  un- 
balanced faculties.  He  has  built  upon  the 
same  foundation  from  the  beginning.  An- 
other notable  characteristic  is  his  extraordi- 


128  PROGRESS   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

nary  individuality.  He  seems,  in  no  degree, 
under  the  influence  of  what  is  called  the  doc- 
trine of  the  historical  development  of  human 
intelligence.  He  confronts  the  whole  history 
of  doctrines,  and  with  a  cold  critical  eye  sur- 
veys them  as  the  products  of  individual  minds, 
and  not  as  the  evolutions  of  a  total  humanity. 
Of  eclecticism,  there  is  in  his  creed,  not  the 
smallest  taint.  Truth  seems  to  him  the  same 
everywhere,  unmodified  by  times.  Such  is 
the  marvellous  man,  of  whose  philosophy  we 
propose  to  give  some  account. 

The  history  of  philosophy  seems,  to  the 
superficial  observer,  but  the  recurrence  of  suc- 
cessive cycles  of  the  same  problems,  the  same 
discussions,  and  the  same,  opinions.  He  sees, 
in  modern  philosophy,  only  the  repetition  of 
the  dreams  of  the  earliest  Greek  speculators. 
Philosophy  is  to  him  but  labour  upon  an  in- 
soluble problem.  To  the  competent  critic, 
lioAvever,  it  presents  a  far  different  view.  He 
sees,  in  each  cycle,  new  aspects  of  the  pro- 
blems, new  relations  in  the  discussions,  and 
new  modes  in  the  opinions — all  indicating  an 
advancement,  however  unequal  and  halting 
at  times,  towards  the  truth.     Here  then  is,  at 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  129 

once,  evinced  the  supreme  importance  of  an 
enlightened  philosophical  criticism.  It  is  the 
preparative  and  precursor  of  further  progress. 
The  different  doctrines  which,  in  successive 
ages,  have  been  elicited,  are  so  many  experi- 
ments, furnisliing,  to  the  enlightened  critic, 
indications  more  or  less  obvious  of  the  true 
solutions  of  the  problems  of  philosophy. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  is  the  prince  of  critics 
in  philosophy.  In  him  philosophical  criticism 
has  compassed  its  widest  scope,  and  reached 
its  highest  attainments.  He  is  the  critic  of 
all  ages,  equally  at  home  in  all.  He  has  sifted 
all  of  ancient,  all  of  mediaeval,  and  all  of 
modern  thought,  with  the  most  delicate  sieve 
ever  used  by  any  critic;  and  while  he  has 
winnowed  away  the  chaff",  he  has  lost  not  a 
grain  of  truth.  The  barriers  of  different  lan- 
guages have  not  excluded  him  from  a  single 
field:  he  unlocked  the  gates  of  one  as  easily 
as  another,  and  entered  where  he  list.  With 
principles  of  criticism  as  broad  as  nature,  with 
learning  as  extensive  as  the  whole  of  what 
has  been  written  on  philosophy,  with  a  know- 
ledge of  words,  and  of  the  things  which  they 
denote  or  are  intended  to  denote,  marvellously 

11 


130  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

accurate  and  coextensive  with  the  whole 
literature  of  speculation,  with  a  logic  both  in 
its  pure  theory  and  modified  applications,  ade- 
quate to  every  need  of  intelligence,  whether 
in  detecting  the  fallacies  or  expounding  the 
truths  of  doctrine,  and  with  a  genius  exactly 
suited  to  use,  with  the  greatest  effect,  these 
manifold  accomplishments,  he  stands  pre-emi- 
nent amongst  the  critics  ^of  philosophy.  As 
we  have  seen  how  he  unravels  the  network  of 
entangled  discussions,  discriminating  the  con- 
fusions by  purifying  the  doctrines  through  a 
more  adequate  conception  and  expression  of 
them,  often  correcting  the  text  of  the  Greek 
writer,  which  for  centuries  had  baffled  the 
grammarians,  by  the  light  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  author,  and  in  the  sequel  making  the 
-truth  educed  the  starting-point  for  new  de- 
velopment of  doctrine,  we  have  admired  the 
matchless  abilities  of  the  critic,  until  we  should 
have  been  exhausted  in  being  dragged  along 
the  labyrinths  of  his  mighty  ratiocination,  had 
we  not  been  refreshed  at  every  turn  by  the 
new  light  of  truth  disclosed  by  the  master 
who  was  conducting  the  marvellous  enterprise 
of  thought.     Bentley  did  not  do  more  to  en- 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  131 

large  the  scope,  and  enrich  the  learning  of 
British  literary  criticism,  when,  by  his  disser- 
tations on  the  Epistles  of  Phalaris,  he  raised 
it  from  the  platitudes  of  the  grammarian  and 
the  rhetorician  to  the  compass,  the  life,  the 
interest,  and  the  dignity  of  philological  and 
historical  disquisition,  than  Sir  William  Ha- 
milton has  done  to  give  profundity,  subtlety, 
comprehensiveness,  and  erudition  to  British 
philosophical  criticism,  by  his  contributions  to 
the  Edinburgh  Revieio.  These  articles  mark 
an  era,,  not  only  in  British  but  in  European 
criticism  in  every  department  of  philosophy — 
metaphysics,  psychology,  and  logic.  They 
were  translated  into  the  languages  of  the  con- 
tinent, and  their  stupendous  learning,  match- 
less subtlety,  and  ruthless  ratiocination,  re- 
ceived everywhere  unljounded  admiration. 
The  very  first  article,  the  one  on  the  doctrine 
of  the  infinito-absolute  of  Cousin,  utterly  sub- 
verted the  fundamentals  of  the  proud  specula- 
tions of  German}',  and  fully  exposed  the  ab- 
surdity of  the  attempt  of  Cousin  to  conciliate 
them  with  the  hupible  Scottish  philosophy  of 
common  sense.  The  continental  philosophers 
saw  that  a  critic  had  arisen,  who,  by  the 


132  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

miglit  and  the  majesty  of  his  intellect,  and 
the  vastness  of  his  erudition,  gave  dignity  to 
the  humble  doctrine  Avhich  he  advocated,  and 
they  had  all  along  despised.  They  began  to 
feel, 

"  A  cWel's  amang  us  takin'  notes, 
And  faith,  he'll  prent  it." 

But  Sir  William  Hamilton,  the  critic,  is 
only  the  precursor  of  Sir  William  Hamilton 
the  philosopher.  His  criticism  is  but  the  pre- 
parative of  his  philosophy.  They,  however, 
move  on  together.  The  state  of  the  philoso- 
phy of  the  world  made  this  necessary.  The 
calling  of  Socrates  was  not  more  determined 
by  the  condition  of  thought  in  his  time,  than 
the  labours  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  are  by 
the  philosophical  needs  of  this  age.  His  eru- 
dition and  critical  skill  are  as  much  needed 
as  his  matchless  genius  for  original  specula- 
tion. Either,  without  the  other,  would  have 
been  comparatively  barren  of  results.  And 
his  preference,  like  Aristotle,  for  logic  rather 
than  the  other  branches  of  philosophy,  is  the 
very  afl'ection  that  is  desiderated  in  the  great 
thinker  of  this  age.     It  seems  to  be  supposed 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  133 

by  some,  who  even  pretend  to  have  studied 
the  philosophy  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  that 
he  has  merely  rehal)ilitated  the  doctrines  of 
Reid  and  Stewart.  It  might,  with  much  more 
show  of  truth  be  said,  that  Newton  only  re- 
produced the  discoveries  of  Copernicus  and 
Kepler.  For  the  philosophy  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton  is  a  greater  stride  beyond  that  of 
his  Scottish  predecessors^  than  the  discoveries 
and  deductions  of  Newton  are  beyond  those 
of  Copernicus  and  Kepler.  Let  us  then,  as 
far  as  his  published  writings  and  our  limits 
will  permit,  shoV  what  Sir  William  has  done 
directly  to  advance  philosophy. 

With  Bacon  began  a  movement  in  modern 
philosophy,  which  parallels  that  begun  by 
Aristotle  in  ancient.'-'     Aristotle  inaugurated 

*  When  we  say  that  Bacon  and  Aristotle  began  these 
respective  movements,  we  do  not  mean  literally,  that  the 
movements  originated  with  them,  but  only  that,  like 
Luther's  in  the  Reformation,  their  labours  were  so  signal 
and  paramount,  in  these  movements,  as  to  be  associated 
pre-eminently  with  them.  No  great  change  ever  origi- 
nates with  the  person  who  becomes  the  most  conspicuous 
in  it,  in  the  great  spectacle  of  history.  It  always  has 
antecedents,  produced  by  the  agency  of  inferior  persons. 
We,  therefore,  beg,  that  everywhere,  in  this  tract,  the 

11* 


134  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

the  deductive  process ;  Bacon  inaugurated  the 
inductive.  These  are  the  distinctive  features 
of  those  systems  of  philosophy  which  they 
advocated;  and  they  are  in  accordance  with 
the  spirit  of  philosophizing  in  the  respective 
periods  to  which  they  belonged,  Ancient  philo- 
sophy was  more  a  deduction  from  principles; 
modern  philosophy  is  more  an  inquiry  into 
principles  themselves.  Aristotle  and  Bacon 
both  make  logic  the  paramount  branch  of 
philosophy ;  and  the  forms  of  the  understand- 
ing the  limits  of  the  knowable.  Sir  William 
Hamilton's  philosophy  is  a  preparative  and  an 
initial  towards  the  conciliation  of  the  systems 
of  Aristotle  and  Bacon.  Logic,  with  him  as 
with  them,  is  the  paramount  branch  of  philo- 
sophy; and  his  labours  all  tend  to  reconcile 
induction  with  deduction,  and  unify  in  one 
method  these  two  great  processes  of  thought. 
His  philosophy  is,  in  fact,  a  climateric  recla- 
mation, vindication,  and  development  of  the 
one  perennial  philosophy  of  common  sense, 

principle  of  this  note  may  qualify  our  general  remarks, 
even  in  regard  to  the  claims  of  originality,  which  we 
prefer  for  Sir  William  Hamilton,  unless  our  remarks 
precludn  qualification. 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  135 

Avliifli,  like  the  one  true  faitli,  is  preserved 
amidst  all  schismatic  aberrations,  and  vindi- 
cated as  the  only  true  philosophy. 

It  is  in  the  essential  unity  of  human  reason 
returning  again  and  again,  from  temporary 
aberrations  in  different  ages,  into  the  same 
discernments  and  convictions,  that  we  have 
the  means  of  verifying  the  true  catholic  philo- 
sophy. Though  there  may  be  nothing  in  the 
mutual  relations  of  men,  at  any  given  time, 
nor  in  the  mutual  relations  of  successive  gene- 
rations, that  necessarily  determines  an  unin- 
terrupted advance  towards  truth,  yet,  not- 
withstanding the  occasional  wade-spread  and 
long  protracted  prevalence  of  error,  the  reason 
of  man  has  hitherto  vindicated  itself  in  the 
long  run,  and  proved  that,  though  the  newest 
phase  of  thought  may  not,  at  all  times,  be  the 
truest,  yet  the  truest  will  prevail  at  last,  and 
come  out  -at  the  goal  of  human  destiny,  tri- 
'  umphant  over  all  errors.  This  is  the  drift  of 
the  history  of  human  opinion  as  interpreted 
by  enlightened  criticism.  Sometimes  skepti- 
cism, recognizing  no  criterion  of  truth;  some- 
times idealism,  knowing  nothing  but  images 
in   ceaseless   change;    sometimes   pantheism. 


136  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

dissolving  all  individuality,  both  material  and 
sjDiritnal,  in  the  tides  of  universal  being; 
sometimes  materialism,  believing  nothing  be- 
yond material  nature,  and  that  man  is  only  a 
more  perfect  species  of  mammalia,  and  human 
affairs  but  the  highest  branch  of  natural  his- 
tory; and  other  forms  of  error,  each  with  its 
peculiar  momenta  and  criteria  of  knowledge, 
have  in  reiterated  succession,  in  different  ages 
vof  the  world,  prevailed  as  systems  of  j^hiloso- 
phy;  yet  the  reason  of  man  has,  nevertheless, 
under  the  guidance  of  some  master  mind,  re- 
turned to  the  one  perennial  philosophy  of 
common  sense,  and  reposed  in  the  natural 
conviction  of  mankind,  that  an  external  w^orld 
exists  as  the  senses  testify,  and  that  there  is 
in  man  an  element  which  lifts  him  above  the 
kingdom  of  nature,  and  allies  him  in  respon- 
sible personal  individuality  with  a  divine, 
eternal,  and  j)ersonal  God. 

The  great  office  of  the  critic  of  philosophy, 
at  this  day,  is  to  trace  the  footstej^s  of  this 
perennial  philosophy  through  the  history  of 
human  opinion  in  all  its  manifold  mutations, 
perversions,  and  aberrations ;  and  to  note  its 
features,  observe  the  paths  it  walks  in,  and 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  137 

its  metliod  and  criteria  of  truth.  This  Sir 
William  Hamilton  has  done.  He  has  shown 
that  the  doctrine  of  common  sense,  as  the 
basis  of  all  philosophy,  has  prevailed  for  more 
than  two  thousand  years.  He  has  adduced 
one  hundred  and  six  witnesses,  Greek,  Roman, 
Arabian,  Italian,  Spanish,  French,  British, 
German,  and  Belgian,  to  its  truth.  Amongst 
the  many  Greek  witnesses,  Aristotle  is  found ; 
amongst  the  Roman,  Cicero;  amongst  the 
Italians,  Acpiinas;  amongst  the  French,  all 
the  great  philosophers  from  Des  Cartes  to 
Cousin,  both  inclusive ;  amongst  the  Germans, 
Leibnitz,  Kant,  Jacobi,  and  even  Fichte,  with 
a  host  of  others ;  thus  showing,  that  what  is 
sometimes  thought,  even  by  those  from  whom 
we  might  expect  better  things,  to  be  the  super- 
ficial foundation  of  British  philosophy,  is  in 
truth  the  only  foundation  on  which  the  reason 
of  man  can  repose.  Philosophers,  amidst  all 
their  efforts  to  break  away  from  the  common 
beliefs  of  mankind,  have  at  last  been  com- 
pelled to  come  back  to  them  as  the  only  ulti- 
mate criterion  of  truth.  "Fichte  (says  Sir 
W.  Hamilton)  is  a  more  remarkable,  because 
a  more  reluctant  confessor  to  the  paramount 


138  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

authority  of  belief  than  even  Kant.  Depart- 
ing from  the  principle  common  to  him,  and 
philosophers  in  general,  that  the  mind  cannot 
transcend  itself,  Fichte  developed,  with  the 
most  admirable  rigour  of  demonstration,  a 
scheme  of  idealism  the  purest,  simplest,  and 
most  consistent  which  the  history  of  philoso- 
phy exhibits.  And  so  confident  was  Fichte 
in  the  necessity  of  his  proofs,  that  on  one  oc- 
casion he  was  provoked  to  imprecate  eternal 
damnation  on  his  head,  should  he  ever  swerve 
from  any,  even  the  least  of  the  doctrines 
which  he  had  so  victoriously  established.  But 
even  Fichte,  in  the  end,  confesses  that  natural 
belief  is  paramount  to  every  logical  proof,  and 
that  his  own  idealism  he  could  not  believe." 

With  the  great  fact  before  us,  so  trium- 
phantly reclaimed  and  vindicated  by  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton,  that  philosophers  have  never 
been  able  to  find  any  other  criterion  of  truth 
than  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  we  will 
now  proceed  to  show  what  is  its  doctrine. 

The  philosophy  of  common  sense  is  the 
doctrine,  in  its  development  and  applications, 
that  our  primary  beliefs  are  the  ultimate  cri- 
terion of  truth.     It  postulates,  that  conse- 


IIEACTIONARY    EPOCH.  130 

qiients  cannot,  by  an  iniinite  regress,  be 
evolved  out  of  antecedents  :  but  that  demon- 
stration must  ultimately  rest  upon  proposi- 
tions which,  in  the  view  of  certain  primary 
beliefs  of  the  mind,  necessitate  their  own  ad- 
mission. These  primary  beliefs,  as  primary, 
must  of  course  be  inexplicable,  Ijeing  the  high- 
est light  in  the  temple  of  mind,  and  borrow- 
ing no  radiance  from  any  higher  cognition  by 
w^liich  their  own  light  can  be  illuminated. 
Behind  these  primary  beliefs  the  mind  cannot 
see — all  is  negation;  because,  while  these  pri- 
mary beliefs  are  the  first  energy  of  the  mind, 
they  are  also  its  limitation.  The  primary 
facts  of  intelligence  would  not  be  original, 
were  they  revealed  to  us  under  any  other 
form  than  that  of  necessary  belief. 

As  elements  of  our  mental  constitution,  as 
essential  conditions  of  intelligence  itself,  these 
primary  beliefs  must,  at  least  in  the  first  in- 
stance, be  accepted  as  true.  Else,  we  assume 
that  the  very  root  of  our  intelligence  is  a  lie. 
All  must  admit  some  original  bases  of  know- 
ledge in  the  mind  itself,  and  must  assume  that 
they  are  true. 

The  argument  from  common  sense  is  there- 


140  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

fore  simply  to  show,  that  to  deny  a  given 
proposition  would  involve  a  denial  of  a  pri- 
mary belief,  an  original  datum  of  conscious- 
ness; and  as  the  primary  belief  or  original 
datum  of  consciousness  must  be  received  as 
veracious,  the  proposition  necessitated  by  it 
must  be  received  as  true  also. 

It  is  manifest,  that  in  arguing  on  the  basis 
of  our  primary  beliefs,  they  cannot  be  shown 
to  be  mendacious,  unless  it  be  demonstrated 
that  they  contradict  each  other,  either  imme- 
diately in  themselves  or  mediately  in  their 
consequences.  Because,  there  being  no  higher 
criterion  by  which  to  test  their  veracity,  it 
can  only  be  tested  by  agreement  or  contradic- 
tion between  themselves. 

We  will  now  apply  this  doctrine,  and  in 
discussing  the  aj^plication,  we  will  explicate 
the  doctrine  more  fully.  In  the  act  of  sensi- 
ble perception  we  are,  equally  and  at  the 
same  time,  and  in  the  same  indivisible  act  of 
consciousness,  cognizant  of  ourself  as  a  per- 
ceiving subject,  and  of  an  external  reality  as 
the  object  perceived,  which  are  apprehended 
as  a  sjnthesis  inseparable  in  the  cognition, 
but  contrasted  to  each  other  in  the  concept  as 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.    ^  141 

two  distinct  existences.  All  this  is  incontes- 
tibly  the  deliverance  of  consciousness  in  the 
act  of  sensible  perception.  This  all  ])liiloso- 
phers,  Avithout  exception,  admit  as  a  ftwt. 
But  then  all,  until  Reid,  deny  the  truth  of  the 
deliverance.  They  maintain  that  we  only 
perceive  representations  within  ourselves,  and 
by  a  perpetual  illusion  we  mistake  these  re- 
presentations for  the  external  realities.  And 
Reid  did  not  fully  extricate  himself  from  the 
trammels  of  this  opinion.  For  while  he  re- 
pudiated the  notion,  that  we  25erceive  repre- 
sentations distinct  from  the  mind  though 
within  the  mind,  he  fell  into  the  error,  that 
we  are  only  conscious  of  certain  changes  in 
ourselves  which  suggest  the  external  reality. 
But  Sir  William  Hamilton  has,  by  the  most 
masterly  subtlety  of  analysis,  incontestibly 
shown,  that  we  are  directly  conscious  of  the 
external  objects  themselves,  according  to  the 
belief  universal  in  the  common  sense  of  man- 
kind. 

It  is  manifest,  that  the  whole  question  re- 
solves itself  into  one  of  the  veracity  of  con- 
sciousness. All  admit  that  consciousness  does 
testify  to  the  fact  that  we  perceive  the  exter- 

12 


142  PROGEESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

nal  reality.  To  doubt  this  is  to  doubt  the 
actuahty  of  the  fact  of  consciousness,  and 
consequently  to  doubt  the  doubt  itself,  which 
is  a  contradiction,  and  subverts  itself.  The 
data  then  of  consciousness,  simply  as  facts,  or 
actual  manifestations  and  deliverances,  cannot 
be  denied  without  involving  a  contradiction; 
and  therefore,  the  principle  of  contradiction, 
which  we  have  shown  is  the  only  one  to  be 
aj)plied  to  the  solution  of  the  question,  recoils 
upon  the  skeptic  himself,  and  makes  doubt 
impossible.  But  then,  the  facts  or  deliver- 
ances of  consciousness  considered  as  testimonies 
to  the  truth  of  facts  heyond  tJwir  own  phenomi- 
nal  reality,  are  not  altogether  to  be  excluded 
from  the  domain  of  legitimate  philosophical 
discussion.  For  this  proposition  by  no  means, 
like  the  other,  involves  a  self-contradiction; 
and  thereby  repels  even  the  possibility  of 
doubt.  Therefore  philosophers,  while  they 
admit  the  fact  of  the  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness, deny  its  truth.  The  dispute  is  not  as  to 
what  is  said,  but  as  to  the  truth  of  what  is 
said. 

As,  then,  it  has  been  admitted  that  the  fact 
is  an  affirmation  of  our  intelligent  nature,  its 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  143 

mendacity  cannot  be  consistently  assumed; 
for  upon  the  principle  of  faJsus  in  uno,  falsus 
in  omnibvs,  it  would  impeach  the  fcwt  itself  as 
an  affirmation  of  nature,  Avliich  we  have 
shown  involves  a  contradiction,  and  is  there- 
fore impossible.  It  is  clear,  then,  that  the 
burden  of  proof,  in  impeaching  the  absolute 
veracity  of  consciousness,  lies  upon  those  de- 
nying it.  And  as  Ave  have  shown  that  the 
attempt  to  prove  its  mendacity  has  in  all  ages 
failed,  and  that  all  the  most  schismatic  and 
skeptical  have  at  last  found  repose  for  the 
struggling  intellect  only  in  the  testimony  of 
our  primary  beliefs,  we  are  compelled  by  ana- 
lysis, and  by  history,  to  acknowledge  the  doc- 
trine of  common  sense  the  one  catholic  and 
perennial  philosophy. 

Here  the  question  obtrudes  itself  into  our 
view,  What  is  tlie  logical  significance  of  our 
'primary  beliefs?  and  it  is  a  question  of  para- 
mount importance.  Perhaps,  in  the  answer 
to  this  question,  we  may  differ  from  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton ;  and  therefore  it  is  that  we 
wish  to  signalize  it. 

It  is  implied  in  the  doctrine  of  primary  be- 
liefs, that,  at  the  root  of  every  primordial  act 


144  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  mind,  there  is  a  principle  or  law  guar- 
anteeing the  procedure.  For  example,  the 
initial  act,  from  which  induction  starts,  is 
guaranteed  by  such  a  principle  or  law  of  in- 
telligence— the  iwinci2i>le  of  ijldlosopliical  pre- 
sumption. Now,  in  order  to  distinguish  these 
principles  or  laws  from  the  universal  truths 
which  are  generahzed  from  individual  truths 
of  fact,  they  are  called  universal  truths  of 
intelligence.  Now,  we  prefer  to  call  these 
principles  laws  of  intelligence,  as  more  expres- 
sive of  their  real  character,  rather  than  truths 
of  intelligence ;  because,  in  the  operations  of 
the  mind,  they  are  regulative  and  not  cogita- 
ble, being  in  fact  the  poles  on  which  thought 
turns.  They  are,  in  our  thinking,  silent  in 
laws,  rather  than  articulate  in  propositions. 

We  think  that  this  is  a  discrimination  that 
ought  not  to  be  slighted ;  and  we  venture  to 
find  fault  that  Sir  William  Hamilton  uses  the 
expressions,  "fundamental  facts,"  "beliefs," 
"primary  propositions,"  "cognitions  at  first 
hand,"  as  denoting  the  same  primary  data  of 
consciousness,  only  from  difierent  points  of 
view.  We  are  not  convinced  of  the  propriety 
of  his  opinion  implied  in  such  various  desig- 


REACTIOXARY   EPOCH.  145 

nations ;  and  are  constrained  to  believe  that 
the  confusing  the  distinction,  which  we  have 
endeavoured  to  indicate,  is  the  initial,  the  root 
of  that  cardinal  heresy  in  philosophy  which 
makes  all  cognition  encentric — makes  thought 
start  out  from  a  general  notion  native  to  the 
mind.  We  repudiate  the  doctrine  that  there 
ever  is  a  belief  or  a  cognition  of  the  mind 
without  its  corresponding  object.  The  deli- 
verance of  the  primary  and  most  incompre- 
hensible belief  is.  That  its  object  is.  Thought 
never  evades  the  fundamental  antithesis  of 
subject  and  object,  which  is  the  primary  law 
of  consciousness  itself.  In  no  instance  is  a 
notion,  not  even  that  of  cause,  time,  or  space, 
native  to  the  mind,  acquired  from  no  ade- 
quate object,  but  purely  subjective  and  regu- 
lative, imposing  upon  objective  thought. an 
illusive  interpolation  of  itself 

We  therefore,  repeat,  that  our  jDrimary 
beliefs  are  not  within  consciousness  as  com- 
prehended thought,  but  in  consciousness  as 
bases  of  thought.  We  cannot  therefore  as- 
sent, that,  in  different  points  of  view,  they 
may  or  may  not  be  regarded  as  cognitions  or 
propositions.     We  think  they  have  not  the 

12* 


146  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

equivocal  character,  which  the  ambiguous 
and  various  designations  apphed  to  them,  by 
Sir  WiUiam  Hamilton,  seem  to  us  to  indicate. 
They  are  but  modes  of  one  unifying  con- 
sciousness, not  rising,  in  degree  of  intellec- 
tion, to  cognitions. 

But  to  call  them,  "primary  propositions," 
is  what  we  chiefly  object  to.  There  are  pri- 
mary propositions,  undoubtedly,  which  in 
the  view  of  our  primary  beliefs,  necessitate 
their  own  admission :  but  then,  they  are  not 
to  be  confounded  with  the  primary  beliefs 
themselves.  They  are  made  up  of  a  plu- 
rality of  primary  beliefs  unified  in  a  common 
conviction  in  consciousness,  and  articulated 
in  language.  The  point  of  our  objection  is, 
to  every  form  and  semblance  of  the  doctrine, 
that  all  hnmoing  is  through  j^revious  knowledge, 
(which  will  be  considered  in  the  sequel),  in- 
stead of  merely  through  the  patDer  of  hnmcing. 

But  to  return  from  this  digression:  And 
while  Sir  William  Hamilton  thus  points  out 
the  bases  and  the  elements  of  truth,  he  ex- 
hibits the  canons  by  which  philosophical  re- 
search is  to  be  conducted.  As  Bacon,  in  the 
first   lioolc  of  the  Novum   Organvm,  exposed 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  147 

the  sources  of  error  in  physical  inquiry,  and 
laid  down  precautionary  rules  for  conducting 
future  investigation,  so  Sir  William  Hamilton 
has  enounced  maxims  for  conducting  the 
loftier  and  far  more  difficult  research  into  our 
intellectual  nature.  And  his  philosophy  is, 
in  this  particular,  the  consummation  of  that 
of  Bacon.  It  explores  the  depths  of  con- 
sciousness, and  educes  those  primary  )jeliefs 
and  fundamental  laws  of  intelligence  which 
Bacon  merely  assumed  in  his  philosophy. 
Sir  William  Hamilton  has  lighted  his  torch 
at  the  lamps  of  both  induction  and  deduc- 
tion, and  it  burns  with  their  combined  light ; 
and  therefore  it  is,  that  he  has  been  able  to 
penetrate  depths  in  the  abysses  of  thought, 
which  to  Bacon  and  Aristotle  were  unfathom- 
able darkness.  How,  in  the  spirit  of  Bacon, 
is  the  following  admonition!  "No  philoso- 
pher has  ever  formally  denied  the  truth,  or 
disclaimed  the  authority  of  consciousness; 
but  few  or  none  have  been  content  implicitly 
to  accept,  and  consistently  to  follow  out  its 
dictates.  Instead  of  humbly  resorting  to 
consciousness  to  draw  from  thence  his  doc- 
trines and  their  proof,  each  dogmatic  specula- 


148  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

tor  looked  only  into  consciousness,  there  to 
discover  his  preadopted  opinions.  In  philoso- 
phy men  have  abused  the  code  of  natural,  as 
in  theology,  the  code  of  positive  revelation; 
and  the  epigraph  of  a  great  Protestant  divine 
on  the  book  of  Scripture  is  certainly  not  less 
applicable  to  the  book  of  consciousness: 

Hie  liber  est  in  quo  quajrit  sua  dogmata  quisque ; 
Invenit  et  pariter  dogmata  quisque  sua." 

And  Hamilton,  like  Bacon,  is  not  at  all  dis- 
mayed by  the  past  failures  in  philosophy;  but 
with  the  proud  hopes  of  a  great  mind,  con- 
scious of  the  power  of  truth,  he  anticipates 
mighty  triumphs  in  future  for  that  philoso- 
phy which  he  has  shown  to  have  prevailed 
for  more  than  two  thousand  years.  "And 
yet,  (says  he)  although  the  past  liistor}-  of 
philosophy  has,  in  a  great  measure,  been  only 
a  history  of  variation  and  error;  yet  the  causQ 
of  the  variation  being  known,  we  obtain  a 
valid  ground  of  hope  for  the  destiny  of  phi- 
losophy in  future.  Because,  since  philosophy 
has  hitherto  been  inconsistent  with  itself, 
only  in  being  inconsistent  with  the  dictates 
of  our  natural  beliefs — 

'For  Trnth  is  fatlinlio  and  TVnturo  one;' — 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  149 

it  follows,  that  philosophy  has  simply  to  re- 
turn to  natural  consciousness,  to  return  t(3 
unity  and  truth. 

"In  doing  this,  we  have  only  to  attend  to 
three  maxims  or  precautions : 

"1.  That  we  admit  nothing,  not  either  an 
original  datum  of  consciousness,  or  the  legiti- 
mate consequence  of  such  datum; 

"  2.  That  we  embrace  all  the  original  data 
of  consciousness,  and  all  their  legitimate  con- 
sequences; and 

"  3.  That  we  exhibit  each  of  these  in  its 
individual  integrity,  neither  disturljcd  nor 
mutilated,  and  in  its  relative  place,  whether 
of  pre-eminence  or  subordination." 

But  Sir  William  does  not  stop  his  direc- 
tions for  investigation  with  these  maxims. 
He  gives  marks,  by  which  we  can  distinguish 
our  original  from  our  derivative  convictions 
— by  which  we  can  determine  what  is,  and 
what  is  not,  a  primary  datum  of  conscious- 
ness. These  marks  or  cliaracters  are  four; — 
1st,  their  incoinpreJienslb'dity — 2d,  iJieir  sim- 
2^licity — 3d,  their  necessity  and  absolute  imi- 
vei'saliti/ — 4  th,  their  comparative  evidence  and 
certainty.     These   characters   are   explicated 


150  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

by  him,  and  rendered  entirely  capable  of  ap- 
plication to  the  purpose  of  analyzing  thought 
into  its  elements. 

But,  besides  these  positive  directions  for 
ascertaing  truth,  Sir  William  Hamilton  ex- 
poses the  very  roots  of  the  false  systems  of 
philosophy  w]iich  have  prevailed  in  different 
times.  As  he  shows,  by  the  most  searching 
analysis,  that  the  philosophy  of  common 
sense  has  its  root  in  the  recognition  of  the 
absolute  veracity  of  consciousness  in  sensible 
perception;  so  he  shows,  that  all  philosophi- 
cal aberrations,  or  Mse  systems  of  philoso- 
phy, have  their  respective  roots  either  in  a 
full  or  partial  denial  of  its  veracity.  And 
he  does  not  deal  merely  in  generalities;  but 
he  articulately  sets  forth  five  great  variations 
from  truth  and  nature,  which  have  prevailed 
as  systems  of  philosophy,  and  shows  the 
exact  degree  of  rejection  of  the  veracity  of 
consciousness  which  constitutes  the  root  of 
each.  "We  are  thereby  enabled  to  see  the 
roots  of  these  great  heresies  laid  bare,  and 
can  extirpate  them,  by  the  argument  from 
common  sense. 

Such    are    the    rules   which    Sir  William 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  151 

Hamilton  lays  down  for  conducting  inquiry 
in  the  province  of  mind.  They  are  a  de- 
velopment of  the  method  of  Bacon  in  its  ap- 
plication to  psycholog}^,  the  highest  branch 
of  phenomenal  philosophy. 

We  now  approach  a  new  development  of 
the  philosophy  of  common  sense,  called  the 
philosophy  of  the  conditioned.  It  constitutes 
the  distinguishing  feature  of  the  philosophi- 
cal system  of  Sir  William  Hamilton;  and 
was  developed  by  him  to  satisfy  the  needs  of 
intelligence  in  combating  the  proud  and  vain- 
glorious philosophy  of  Germany.  It  is  a  re- 
markable monument  of  the  largeness,  the  pro- 
fundity, and  the  penetrating  acuteness  of  his 
intellect.     . 

The  philosophy  of  common  sense  assumes, 
that  consciousness  is  the  supreme  faculty — 
in  fact,  that  it  is  the  complement  of  all  the 
faculties — that  what  are  called  faculties  are 
but  acts  of  consciousness  running  into  each 
other,  and  are  not  separated  by  those  lines  of 
demarcation  which  are  imposed  upon  them 
by  language  for  the  needs  of  thinking  about 
our   intelligent   nature.      The   supremacy  of 


152  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

consciousness  was  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle, 
of  Des  Cartes,  and  of  Locke.  Reid  and 
Stewart  reduced  consciousness,  in  their  sys- 
tem, to  a  special  faculty  only  co-ordinate  with 
the  others.  This  heresy  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton, amongst  his  innumerable  rectifications 
and  developments  of  Reid's  philosophy,  has 
exposed,  and  by  a  singular  felicity  of  analysis 
and  explication,  has  restored  consciousness  to 
its  fightful  sovereignty  over  the  empire  of 
intelligence. 

Having  postulated  that  consciousness  is 
the  highest,  and  fundamental  faculty  of  the 
human  mind,  it  becomes  necessary,  in  order 
to  determine  the  nature  of  human  knowledge, 
to  determine  the  nature  of  consciousness. 

Now,  consciousness  is  only  possible  under 
the  antithesis  of  the  thinking  mental  self, 
and  an  object  thought  about,  in  correlation 
and  limiting  each  other.  It  is,  therefore, 
manifest,  that  knowledge,  in  its  most  funda- 
mental and  thoroughgoing  analysis,  is  dis- 
criminated into  two  elements  in  contrast  of 
each  other.  These  elements  are  appropriately 
designated,  the  subject  and  the  ohject,  the  first 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  153 

applying  to  the  conscious  mind  knowing,  and 
the  List,  to  that  which  is  known.  And  all 
that  pertains  to  the  first  is  called  suhjectlve, 
and  all  that  pertains  to  the  last  is  called  oh- 
jective. 

Philosophy  is  the  science  of  knowledge. 
Therefore,  philosophy  must  especially  regard 
the  grand  and  fundamental  discrimination  of 
•  the  two  primary  elements  of  the  subjective  and 
objective,  in  any  theory  of  knowledge  it  may 
propound. 

Now,  the  first  and  fundamental  problem, 
which  presents  itself  in  the  science  of  know- 
ledge is,  What  can  we  kn(yio?  Upon  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  philosophy  of  common  sense,  the 
solution  of  the  problem  is  found,  by  showing 
what  are  the  conditions  of  our  knowledge. 
These  conditions,  according  to  the  thorough- 
going fundamental  analysis  of  our  knowledge 
just  evinced,  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  both 
of  the  two  elements  of  our  knowledge,  the 
subjective  and  the  objective. 

Aristotle,  who  did  so  much  towards  ana- 
lyzing human  thought  into  its  elements,  strove 
also  to  classily  all  objects  real  under  their 

•      -  13 


154  PKOGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

ultimate  identifications  or  categories  «in  rela- 
tion to  thought.  In  modern  times,  Kant 
endeavoured  to  analyze  intelligence  into  its 
ultimate  elements  in  relation  to  its  objects, 
and  to  show  in  these  elements  the  basis  of  all 
thinking,  and  the  guarantee  of  all  certainty. 
Aristotle's  categories,  though  extremely  incom- 
plete, and  indeed,  we  may  say  bungling,  as 
they  confound  derivative  with  simple  notions, 
did  something  for  correct  thinking  in  pointing 
out,  with  more  exactness,  the  relations  of 
objects  real  to  thought.  But  Kant,  making  a 
false  division  of  intelligence  itself  into  reason 
and  understanding,  blundered  at  the  threshold, 
and  while  he  analyzed  reason  into  its  supposed 
peculiar  elements,  to  which  he  gave  the  Pla- 
tonic name  of  Ideas,  he  analyzed  understand- 
ing into  its  supposed  peculiar  elements,  and 
gave  them  the  Aristotelic  name  of  Categories. 
Kant's  analysis  of  our  intelligence  into  its 
pure  forms,  made  the  human  mind  a  fabric  of 
mere  delusion.  The  ideas  of  reason  he  pro- 
posed as  purely  subjective  and  regulative,  and 
yet  delusively  positing  themselves  objectively 
in  thought.  And  so  too,  in  like  manner,  are 
his  categories  of  understanding  expounded  as 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  155 

deceptive.  His  philosophy  is  thus  rendered, 
at  bottom,  a  system  of  absohite  skepticism. 

It  is  seen,  from  this  account  of  them,  that 
Aristotle's  Categories  or  Predicaments,  are 
exclusively  objective,  of  things  understood; 
and  that  those  of  Kant  are  exclusively  sub- 
jective, of  the  mind  understanding.  Each  is 
therefore  one-sided. 

Sir  William  Hamilton,  discriminating  more 
accurately  than  his  predecessors,  the  dual  na- 
ture of  thought,  has  distinguished  its  two 
fundamental  elements,  the  subjective  and  the 
objective,  by  a  thoroughgoing  analysis,  and  at 
the  same  time  has  observed  that  these  ele- 
ments are  ever  held  together  in  a  synthesis 
which  constitutes  thought  in  its  totality.  He 
has  therefore  endeavoured  to  accomplish,  in 
one  analysis  of  thought,  what  Aristotle  and 
Kant  failed  to  do  by  their  several  but  partial 
analyses.  As  thought  is  constituted  of  both 
a  subjective  and  an  objective  element,  the 
conditions  of  the  thinkable  or  of  thinkino; 
must  be  the  conditions  of  both  knowledge  and 
existence — of  the  possibility  of  knowing,  both 
from  the  nature  of  thought,  and  from  the 
nature  of  existence;  and  must  therefore  em- 


156  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

brace  intelligence  in  relation  to  its  objects, 
and  objects  in  relation  to  intelligence,  and 
thus  supersede  the  one-sided  jDredicaments  of 
Aristotle  and  Kant. 

The  first  stej)  towards  discriminating  the 
fundamental  conditions  of  thought,  is  to  re- 
duce thought  itself  to  its  ultimate  simplicity. 
This  Sir  William  Hamilton  has  done,  by 
showing  that  it  must  be  either  positive  or 
negative,  when  viewed  subjectively,  and  either 
conditioned  or  unconditioned  when  viewed 
objectively.  And  he  has  discriminated,  and 
signalized  the  peculiar  nature  of  negative 
thought,  by  showing  that  it  is  conversant 
about  the  unconditioned,  while  positive  thought 
is  conversant  about  the  conditioned.  This  is 
a  salient  point  in  Sir  William's  philosophy. 
He  shows  that  the  Kantean  Ideas  of  pure 
reason,  are  nothing  but  negations  or  impo- 
tences of  the  mind,  and  are  swallowed  up  in 
the  unconditioned;  and  that  the  Kantean 
Categories  of  the  understanding  are  but  sub- 
ordinate forms  of  the  conditioned.  And  while 
he  thus  reduces  the  Predicaments  of  Kant  to 
ultimate  elements,  he  annihilates  his  division 
of  our   intelligence   into  reason   and   under- 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  157 

standing.  He  shows  that  what  Kant  calls 
the  reason  is  in  fact  an  impotence,  and  what 
he  calls  the  understanding  is  the  whole  in- 
tellect. 

It  had  been  shown  by  Aristotle,  that  nega- 
tion involves  affirmation — that  non-existence 
can  only  be  predicated  by  referring  to  exist- 
ence. This  discrimination  has  become  a  fruit- 
ful principle  in  the  philosoph}'  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton.  He,  therefore,  begins  the  an- 
nouncement of  the  conditions  of  the  think- 
able, by  showing  the  nature  of  negative 
thought.  He  shows  that  negative  thought  is 
realized  only  under  the  condition  of  relativity 
and  positive  thinking.  For  example:  we  try 
to  think — to  predicate  existence,  and  find 
ourselves  unable.  We  then  predicate  incogi- 
tability.  This  incogitability  is  what  is  meant 
by  negation  or  negative  thought. 

If  then  negative  thinking  be  the  opposite 
of  positive  thinking,  it  must  be  the  violation 
of  one  or  more  of  the  conditions  of  positive 
thinking.  The  conditions  of  positive  thinking 
are  two;  1st.  The  condition  of  nonrcontradic- 
tion :  2d.  The  condition  of  relativity.  To  think 
at  all,  (that  is  positively,  for  positive  thinking 

13* 


158  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

is  properly  the  only  thinking,)  our  thinking 
must  not  involve  a  contradiction,  and  it  must 
involve  relativity.  If  it  involve  contradic- 
tion, the  impossible  both  in  thought  and  in 
reahty  results.  If  the  condition  of  relativity 
be  not  purified,  the  impossible  in  thought 
only  results. 

Now  the  condition  of  non-contradiction  is 
brought  to  bear  in  thinking  under  three 
phases  constituting  three  laws: — 1st.  The  law 
ofidentity ;  2d.  The  law  of  contradiction ;  3d. 
The  law  of  excluded  middle.  The  science  of 
these  laws  is  Logic.  Thus,  is  shown  the  ulti- 
mate condition  of  the  thinkable  on  which  de- 
pends the  science  of  explicative  or  analytical 
reasoning.  This  we  shall  show  fully  in  the 
sequel,  when  we  come  to  treat  of  what  Sir 
William  Hamilton  has  done  for  Logic. 

The  condition  of  non-contradiction  is  in  no 
danger  of  being  violated  in  thinking;  there- 
fore its  explication  is  only  of  theoretical  im- 
portance. 

The  condition  of  relativity  is  the  important 
one  in  thought.  Tliis  condition,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  necessary,  is  brought  to  bear  under  two 
principal  relations;  one  of  which  arises  frjom 


REACTIONARY   EPOCn.    .  159 

the  subjective  element  of  thought,  the  mind 
thinking,  (called  the  Relation  of  Knmoledge ;) 
the  other  arises  from  the  objective  element  of 
thought,  the  thing  thought  about,  (called  the 
Relation  of  Existence.)  ■    • 

The  relation  of  Knaivledge  arises  from  the 
reciprocal  relation  of  the  subject  and  the  ob- 
ject of  thought.  Whatever  comes  into  con- 
sciousness is  thought,  by  us,  as  belonging  to 
the  mental  self  exclusively,  or  as  belonging  to 
the  not-self  exclusively,  or  as  belonging  partly 
to  both. 

The  relation  of  Existence  arising  from  the 
object  of  thought  is  two-fold:  this  relation 
being  sometimes  intrinsic,  and  sometimes  ex- 
trinsic ;  according  as  it  is  determined  by  the 
qualitative  or  quantitative  character  of  exist- 
ence. Existence  conceived  as  substance  and 
quality,  presents  the  intrinsic  relation,  called 
qitalitative;  substance  and  quality  are  only* 
thought  as  mutual  relatii-es  inseparable  in  con- 
ception. We  cannot  think  either  separate 
from  the  other. 

All  that  has  thus,  ftir  been  said  appHes  to 
both  mind  and  matter. 

The  extrinsic  relation  of  Existence  is  three- 


160  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

fold;  and  as  constituted  by  three  species  of 
quantity,  it  may  be  called  quantitative.  It  is 
realized  in  or  by  the  three  quantities,  time, 
space,  and  degree,  called  respectively,  pro- 
tensive,  extensive  and  intensive  quantity. 
The  notions  of  time  and  space  are  the  neces- 
sary conditions  of  all  positive  thought.  Posi- 
tive thought  cannot  be  realized  except  in  time 
and  space.  Degree  is  not,  like  time  and  space, 
an  absolute  condition  of  thought.  Existence 
is  not  necessarily  thought  under  degree.  It 
applies  only  to  quality  and  not  to  quantity; 
and  only  to  quality,  in  a  restricted  sense 
which  Sir  William  Hamilton  has  explicated 
in  his  doctrine  of  the  qualities  of  bodies,  di- 
viding them  into  primary,  secundo-primary, 
and  secondar}^ 

Of  these  conditions  and  their  relations  in 
their  proper  subordinations  and  co-ordinations 
Sir  William  has  presented  a  table,  which  he 
calls  the  Alphabet  of  Thought. 

Out  of  the  condition  of  relativity  springs 
the  science  of  metaphysics^  just  as  we  have 
indicated  that  logic  springs  out  of  the  condi- 
tion  of  non-contradiction.  Thus  the  respec- 
tive roots  of  the  two  great  cognate  branches 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  IGl 

of  philosophy  are  traced  to  their  psychological 
bases  in  the  alphabet  of  thought. 

We  will  now  exhibit  the  metaphysical  doc- 
trine, which  Sir  William  Hamilton  educes 
from  the  analysis  of  thought  which  we  have 
endeavoured  to  present.  And  here  he  elevates 
the  philosophy  of  common  sense  into  the  philo- 
sophy of  the  conditioned,  borrowing  this  ap- 
pellation from  the  different  point  of  view  from 
which  philosophy  is  considered.  The  former 
a23pellation  is  derived  from  a  psychological 
point  of  view,  the  latter  from  a  metaphysical — 
the  former  from  a  subjective,  the  latter  from 
an  objective. 

It  is  sufficiently  apparent  that  the  condi- 
tion of  relativity  limits  our  knowledge.  This 
is  the  fundamental  fact  which  it  is  proposed 
to  establish.  It  is  proposed  to  show  that  of 
the  absolute  we  have  no  knowledge,  but  only 
of  the  relative.  This  is  the  whole  scope  of 
the  philosophy  of  the  conditioned. 

With  a  view  of  showing  the  argument 
from  the  philosophy  of  the  conditioned,  let 
us  turn,  for  a  moment,  to  the  philosophy  of 
the  absolute,  the  unconditioned,  which  is  the 
reverse   doctrine,  and  for  the   refutation  of 


162  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

which  the    conditions  of  the   thinkable  are 
adduced  as  a  basis. 

From  the  dawn  of  philosophy  in  the  school 
of  Elea,  the  absolute,  the  infinite,  the  uncon- 
ditioned has  been  the  highest  principle  of 
speculation.  The  great  master  amongst  an- 
cient philosophers,  Aristotle,  in  accordance 
with  the  general  drift  of  his  philosophy, 
denied  that  the  Infinite  is  even  an  object 
of  thought,  much  less  of  knowledge.  And 
that  profound,  and  subtle,  but  perverse  and 
paradoxical  genius,  Kant,  who,  towards  the 
close  of  the  eighteenth  century,  made  the  first 
serious  attempt  ever  made,  to  investigate  the 
nature  and  origin  of  the  notion  of  the  Infi- 
nite, maintained  that  the  notion  is  merely 
regulative  of  our  thoughts;  and  declared  the 
Infinite  to  be  utterly  beyond  the  sphere  of 
our  knowledge.  But  out  of  the  philosophy 
of  Kant,  from  a  hidden  germ,  grew  a  more 
extravagant  theory  of  the  absolute  than  any 
which  had  before  perplexed  and  astounded 
the  practical  reason  of  man.  It  was  main- 
tained by  Fichte  and  Schelling — who  fell 
back  on  the  ancient  notion,  that  experience, 
because  conversant  only  about  the  phenome- 


KEACTIONARY   EPOCH.  163 

» 

nal  and  transitory,  is  unworthy  of  the  name 
of  philosophy  as  incapable  of  being  a  valid 
basis  of  certainty  and  knowledge — that  man 
has  a  faculty  of  intellectual  intuition  which 
rises  above  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  as 
well  as  of  sense,  and  enthroning  the  reason 
of  man  on  the  seat  of  Omniscience,  with 
which  it  in  fact  becomes  identified,  surveys 
existence  in  its  all-comprehensive  unity  and 
its  all-pervading  relations,  and  unveils  to  us 
the  nature  of  God,  and,  by  an  ontological 
evolution,  explains  the  derivation  of  all 
things,  from  the  greatest  to  the  very  least. 

This  philosophy  captivated  the  brilliant 
and  sympathetic  genius  of  M.  Cousin,  of 
France,  who  strove  to  conciliate  and  harmo- 
nize it  with  the  Scottish  philosophy  of  expe- . 
rience  as  promulgated  by  Reid,  with  which 
M.  Cousin  had  been  imbued.  He  denied  the 
intellectual  intuition  of  the  German  philoso- 
phers, and  claimed  that  the  Infinite  is  given 
as  a  datum  in  consciousness  along  with  its 
correlative  the  Finite;  that  these  two  notions, 
being  necessarily  thought  as  mutual  relatives, 
must  therefore  be  both  equally  objectively 
true.     These  two  notions  and  their  relations 


164  PROGRESS    or    PHILOSOPHY. 

to  each  other  are,  at  once,  the  elements  and 
the  laws  of  the  reason  of  both  man  and  God, 
and  that  all  this  is  realized  in  and  through 
consciousness.  This  theory  M.  Cousin  pro- 
claimed as  a  powerful  eclecticism,  which  con- 
ciliated not  only  what  had  been  before  con- 
sidered counter  and  hostile  in  the  reflections 
of  individual  philosophers,  but  also,  in  the 
different  systems  of  philosophy  preserved  in 
the  history  of  the  science.  Thus,  the  history 
of  philosophy,  with  its  various  systems,  was 
shown  to  be  but  the  growth  of  one  regularly 
developed  philosophy,  gradually  culminating 
towards  that  one  consummate  knowledge  com- 
pleted in  the  all-comprehending  eclecticism 
inaugurated,  in  the  central  nation  of  Europe, 
by  M,  Cousin  in  a  splendour  of  discourse 
worthy  of  the  grand  doctrine  which  makes 
the  proud  rationalism  of  Germany  acknow- 
ledge its  doctrinal  affiliation  with  the  humble 
Scottish  philosophy  of  observation.  When 
this  doctrine  reached  Scotland,  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  at  once,  entered  the  great  olympic 
of  philosophical  discussion,  and  stood  forth, 
as  the  champion  of  the  humble  doctrine  of 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  165 

cuinmon  sense,  against  the  host  of  continental 
thinkers. 

And  now,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history 
of  philosophy,  the  doctrine  of  the  Absolute, 
the  Infinite,  the  Unconditioned,  was  made 
definite.  It  was  shown,  by  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  that  so  far  from  the  Absolute  and 
the  Infinite  meaning  the  same  thing  or  no- 
tion, they  were  contradictory  opposites;  the 
Absolute  meaning  the  unconditional  affirma- 
tion of  limitation,  while  the  Infinite  means 
the  unconditional  negation  of  limitation — the 
one  thus  an  affirmative,  the  other  a  negative. 
And  he  further  showed,  that  both  were  but 
species  of  the  unconditioned.  The  question 
being  thus  purified  from  the  inaccuracy  of 
language  and  the  confusion  of  thought;  and 
it  being  shown  that  the  unconditioned  must 
present  itself  to  the  human  mind  in  a  plural 
form;  it  was  seen  that  the  inquiry  resolves 
itself  into  the  problem,  whether  the  uncon- 
ditioned, as  either  the  Absolute  or  the  Infinite 
can  be  realized  to  the  mind  of  man.  Sir 
William  Hamilton  shows  that  it  cannot.  He 
demonstrates  that  in  order  to  think  either 
alternative,  we  must  think  away  from  those 

14 


166  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

conditions  of  thought  under  which  thought 
can  alone  be  reahzed;  and  that,  therefore, 
any  attempt  to  think  either  the  Absolute  or 
the  Infinite  must  end  in  a  mere  negation  of 
thought.  These  notions  are  thus  shown  to 
be  the  results  of  two  counter  imbecihties  of 
the  mind — the  mabihty  to  reahze  the  uncon- 
ditionally limited,  and  the  unconditionally 
unlimited.  The  doctrine  of  M.  Cousin  is 
shown  to  be  assumptions,  inconsequent,  and 
self-contradictory.  His  Infinite  is  shown  to 
be,  at  best,  only  an  Indefinite,  and  therefore 
a  relative.  And  it  is  shown,  by  a  compre- 
hensive application  of  the  AristoteHc  doctrine, 
that  the  knowledge  of  ojDposites  is  one,  that 
so  far  from  the  fact,  of  the  notions  of  the  In- 
finite and  Finite  mutually  suggesting  each 
other,  furnishing  evidence  of  the  objective 
reality  of  both,  it  should  create  a  susj)icion 
of  the  reverse.  The  truth  is,  the  searching 
analysis,  to  which  the  doctrine  of  M.  Cousin 
is  subjected,  clearly  evinces  that  he  did  not 
at  all  apprehend  the  state  of  the  question 
discussed,  and  in  fact  was  confusing  himself 
in  a  vicious  circle  of  words. 

And  the  Intellectual  Intuition  of  Fichte  and 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  167 

Sclielling  is  sliowii  to  be  a  mere  chimera ;  and 
his  Absolute,  a  mere  nothing.  As  Schelling 
could  never  connect  his  Absolute  with  the 
Finite  in  any  doctrinal  affiliation,  so  he  was 
unaljle  to  discover  any  cognitive  transition 
from  the  Intellectual  Intuition  to  personal 
consciousness.  This  hiatus  in  his  theory 
could  not,  of  course,  escape  the  penetrating 
sagacity  of  Sir  Wilham  Hamilton.  It  was  at 
once  demonstrated  as  the  Intellectual  Intui- 
tion is  out  of  and  above  consciousness,  and  to 
be  realized,  the  philosopher  must  cease  to  be 
the  conscious  man  Schelling,  that  if  even  the 
Intellectual  Intuition  were  possible,  still  it 
could  only  be  remembered,  and  ex  hypotliesi, 
it  could  not  be  remembered,  for  memory  is 
only  possible  under  the  conditions  of  the 
understanding  which  exclude  the  Absolute 
from  knowledge.  By  this  analysis  the  AIjso- 
lute  is  shown  to  be  a  mere  mirage  in  the 
infinite  desert  of  negation,  conjured  up  by 
a  self-delusive  imagination,  conceiting  itself 
wise  above  the  possibilities  of  thought.  It 
may  also  be  argued  against  the  Intellectual 
Intuition,  that  it  is  only  through  the  organ- 
ism of  sense,  that  the  mind  realizes  form,  the 


168  PROaRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

image  of  an  object;  for  consciousness  in  and 
of  itself  is  not  an  imaging  faculty.  Now  the 
Intellectual  Intuition  realizes  image  in  the 
Absolute.  It  therefore  partakes  of  the  cha- 
racter of  sensation;  and  it,  in  fact,  by  this 
analysis  stands  revealed  as  a  sublimated  sense 
postulated,  by  reason  overleaping  itself,  in 
the  attempt  to  clear  the  circle  of  the  think- 
able. The  doctrine  of  the  Absolute  is  thus 
proved  to  be  a  sensational  philosophy,  dis- 
guised under  terms  of  supposed  high  spiritual 
import.  And  thus,  it  is  demonstrated,  that 
to  abandon  consciousness  as  the  highest 
faculty,  is  to  necessitate  a  fall  into  sensuism, 
though  we  imagine,  all  the  while,  we  are  soar- 
ing on  the  wings  of  reason,  above  the  region 
of  consciousness.  Schelling  and  Condillac 
are  thus  found  in  the  darkness  of  a  common 
error  listening  to  the  same  oracle.  And  this 
analysis  is  confirmed,  by  the  fact,  that  Oken, 
who,  next  to  Ilegel,  was  the  most  distin- 
guished disciple  of  Schelling,  in  his  Physio- 
Philosophy,  makes  the  Absolute  nothing,  zero; 
and  then,  by  pure  reason,  evolves,  out  of  it, 
all  physics;  thus  ascribing  to  a  faculty,  above 
consciousness,  the  imaging  power  of  the  senses. 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  169 

And  Oken  thus  enthrones  the  physical  sci- 
ences, as  he  imagines,  on  a  seat  above  con- 
sciousness, when  it  is,  in  fact,  the  footstool  of 
consciousness,  the  senses,  on  which  they  sit 
the  while.* 

Thus  was  trampled  down,  this  proud  doc- 
trine which  had  misled  speculation;  and  phi- 
losophy was  again  brought  back  from  its 
aberrations  into  the  sober  paths  of  common 
sense.  And  never  before  did  so  mighty  a 
champion  lead  it.  For  whatever  else  may 
be  thought,  in  comparing  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton with  other  philosophers,  it  must  be  ad- 

*  It  is  true  that  Sclielling  makes  the  manner  of  know- 
ing the  absolute  presentative,  by  the  fiction  of  an  in- 
tellectual intuition  emancipated  from  the  conditions  of 
time  and  space,  while  Hegel  makes  this  manner  of  know- 
ing representative,  by  the  fiction  of  a  logical  reason 
emancipated  from  the  laws  of  thought.  Yet  I  am  right 
in  saying  that  the  intellectual  intuition,  if  possible,  must 
possess  an  imaging  power  and  therefore  is  sensational ; 
because  in  knowing  the  absolute,  imagination  and  con- 
ception must  concur,  for  the  absolute  must  be  considered 
individual.  It  may  be  said  however,  that  the  intellec- 
tual intuition  assumes  that  both  conception  and  imagina- 
tion do  not  belong  to  its  manner  of  knomng.  This  is 
only  further  evidence  that  it  is  a  fiction. 

14* 


170  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

mitted  that  as  a  man  of  hostilities,  a  dialec- 
tician and  a  critic,  he  is  altogether  matchless. 

Having  given  an  all-comprehensive  example 
of  the  argument  from  the  philosophy  of  the 
conditioned,  we  will  now  proceed  to  expound, 
in  outline,  the  philosophy  of  the  conditioned. 
The  distinguishing  feature  of  this  philosophy, 
the  one  which  most  articulately  enounces  its 
character,  is  the  doctrine  of  a  mental  Impo- 
tence.    This  doctrine  we  will  now  expound. 

The  problem  most  fruitful  of  controversy  in 
philosophy  is  that  of  the  distinction  between 
experiential  and  non-experiential  notions  and 
judgments.  Some  philosophers  contend  that 
there  is  no  such  distinction ;  but  that  all  legi- 
timate notions  and  judgments  are  experien- 
tial. And  those  who  have  admitted  the  dis- 
tinction have  quarrelled  about  the  criterion  of 
the  distinction.  Leibnitz,  at  last,  established 
the  quality  of  necessity,  the  necessity  of  so 
thinking,  as  the  criterion  of  our  non-experi- 
ential notions  and  judgments.  Afterwards 
Kant,  in  his  Critic  of  Pure  Reason,  developed 
and  applied  this  criterion.  And  it  may  now 
be  considered  as  the  acknowledged  test  of  our 
unacquired  cognitions  amongst  those  who  ad- 


REACTIONARY   EPOCU.  *  171 

• 

mit  that  there  are  non-experiential  notions 
and  judgments.  Now,  it  is  in  relation  to 
this  fundamental  distinction,  that  Sir  William 
Hamilton  has  developed  the  philosophy  of  the 
conditioned.  He  admits  that  we  have  non- 
experiential  notions  and  judgments,  (we  pre- 
fer to  call  the  two  classes  of  notions  and 
judgments,  'prhnary  and  secondary^  as  we 
think  both  classes,  from  a  certain  point  of 
view,  can  appropriately  be  considered  as  ex- 
periential in  a  restricted  sense,)  and  he  con- 
curs with  Leibnitz  and  Kant,  that  necessity  is 
their  distinctive  quality.  But  then,  he  main- 
tains that  the  doctrine,  as  developed  by  all 
previous  philosophers,  is  one-sided,  when  it 
should  be  two-sided.  And  the  side  of  the 
doctrine,  which  philosophers  have  overlooked, 
is  the  important  one.  The  doctrine,  as  here- 
tofore enounced  and  recognized,  is  that  the 
necessity  is  a  positive  one,  so  to  thinA;  and  is 
determined  by  a  mental  power.  But  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton  considers,  and  very  justly,  that 
this  is  only  half  of  the  truth,  and  the  least 
important  half;  because  this  necessity  is 
never  illusive,  never  constrains  to  error;  while 
the  necessity  which  he  indicates  is  naturally 


172  PROGRESS   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

illusive.  His  doctrine  is,  that  this  necessity 
is  both  positive  and  negative  :  "  The  one,  the 
necessity  of  so  thinking  (the  impossibility  of 
not  so  thinking,)  determined  by  a  mental 
power,  the  other  the  necessity  of  not  so  think- 
ing (the  impossibility  of  so  thinking,)  deter- 
mined by  a  mental  impotence."  This  negative 
necessity,  which  has  been  overlooked  by  phi- 
losophers, plays  an  important  part  on  the 
theatre  of  thinking.  It  is  to  the  development 
of  its  function  in  our  mental  economy,  that 
the  philosophy  of  the  conditioned  is  directed. 
As  philosophy  stood,  the  very  highest  law  of 
intelligence,  wliich  asserts  that  of  two  contra- 
dictories, both  cannot,  but  one  must,  be  true, 
led  continually  to  the  most  pervasive  and 
fundamental  errors.  Because  when  one  alter- 
native was  found  incogitable,  the  mind  imme- 
diately recoiled  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
other  contradictory  must  be  true.  When,  for 
example,  in  examining  the  doctrine  of  the 
will,  it  was  discovered  that  the  freedom  of  the 
will  was  incomprehensible,  could  not  be  spe- 
culatively construed  to  the  mind,  the  inquirer 
immediately  recoiled  to  the  alternative,  of  the 
necessity  of  human   actions ;   and  so  on  the 


REACTIONARY    EPOCU.  173 

other  hand,  when  the  necessity  of  the  will 
was  found  incogitable,  the  inquirer  fell  back 
upon  the  alternative  of  liberty.  So  that  phi- 
losophers, like  Milton's  fallen  angels,  had 

" _ reason'd  high 

Of  Providence,  foreknowledge,  will,  and  fate, 
Fixt  fate,  freewill,  foreknowledge  absolute. 
And  found  no  end,  in  wandering  mazes  lost." 

Thus  the  negative  necessity,  of  not  so  tldnl^ 
ing,  which  was  not  ever  even  suspected  to 
exist,  had  been  a  source  of  constant  errors 
utterly  incapable  of  solution.  But  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton  has  discovered,  that  we  may 
be  negatively  unable  to  think  one  contradic- 
tory, and  yet  find  ourselves  equally  impotent 
to  conceive  the  opposite.  To  this  fundamental 
psychological  fact  he  has  applied  the  highest 
law  of  intelligence,  that  of  two  contradictories , 
one  must  of  necessity  he  true;  and  that  there- 
fore, there  is  no  ground  for  inferring  a  fact  to 
be  impossible,  merely  from  our  inability  to 
conceive  its  possibility.  And  thus  is  disclosed 
the  hidden  rock  on  which  speculation,  in  its 
highest  problems,  had  foundered. 

The  philosophy  of  the  conditioned  is  the 
development  and  application  of  this  Negative 


174  PROaRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

Necessity  in  combination  with  the  Positive. 
In  order  to  give  precision  to  the  doctrine  of 
the  conditioned,  the  conditions  of  the  thinka- 
ble are  evoked  and  systematized  under  the 
two  fundamental  categories  of  positive  and 
negative  thinking.  And  these  categories  are 
themselves  subdivided  in  order  to  bring  out 
their  import  in  generic  instances  of  their  ap- 
plication in  practical  thought.  These  condi- 
tions of  the  thinkable  we  have  exhibited; 
but  it  now  becomes  necessary  to  recur  to  them, 
for  the  needs  of  the  discussion  and  exposition 
on  which  we  now  enter. 

The  most  important  and  comprehensive 
question  in  metaphysics  is,  The  origin  and 
nature  of  tJie  causal  judgmeiit.  No  less  than 
seven  theories  had  been  propounded  on  the 
problem ;  and  now,  Sir  William  Hamilton  has 
propounded  an  eighth,  entirely  new.  He  at- 
tempts to  resolve  the  causal  judgment  into  a 
modification  of  the  law  of  the  conditioned, 
which  is  so  obtrusive  in  his  view  of  philoso- 
phy. He  makes  the  causal  judgment  a  mere 
inability  to  think  an  absolute  beginning: — 
a  mere  necessity  to  deny  that  the  object, 
which   we    apprehend   as   beginning   to    be, 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  175 

really  so  begins: — an  inaljility  to  construe 
it  in  thought,  as  possible,  that  the  comple- 
ment of  existence  has  been  increased  or  di- 
minished : — a  mere  necessity  to  ailhnn  the 
identity  of  its  present  sum  of  being,  with  the 
sum  of  its  past  existence.  The  supposed 
connection  between  cause  and  effect  is  in 
its  last  analysis,  resolved  into  a  mental  im- 
potence, the  result  of  the  law  of  the  condi- 
tioned. 

It  is  manifest,  that  in  this  theory,  the  fact 
of  our  inability  to  conceive  the  complement 
of  existence,  either  increased  or  diminished, 
is  the  turning  point  in  the  question.  That, 
because  we  are  unable  to  construe  it,  in 
thought,  that  such  increase  or  diminution  is 
possible,  we  are  constrained  to  refund  the  pre- 
sent sum  of  existence  into  the  previous  sum 
of  existence,  is  given  as  an  explanation  of  the 
causal  judgment. 

Now,  it  seems  to  us  that  this  solution  avoids 
the  important  element  in  the  phenomenon  to 
be  explained.  The  question  in  nature,  is  not 
whether  the  present  complement  of  existence 
had  a  previous  existence — has  just  begun  to 
be?    but,  how   comes   its   new   appearance? 


176  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY, 

The  obtrusive  and  essential  element,  is  the 
neic  appearance,  the  change.  This  is  the  fact 
which  elicits  the  causal  judgment.  To  the 
change  is  necessarily  prefixed,  by  the  under- 
standing, a  cause  or  potence.  The  cause  is 
the  correlative  to  the  change,  elicited  in 
thought  and  posited  in  nature.  The  question 
as  to  the  origin  of  the  sum  of  existence,  does 
in  no  way  intrude  into  consciousness,  and  is 
not  mvolved  in  the  causal  judgment.  Such  a 
question  may,  of  course,  be  raised ;  and  then 
the  theory  of  Sir  Wilham  Hamilton  is  a  true 
account  of  what  would  take  place  in  the  mind. 
And  this  is  the  question,  which,  it  seems  to  us, 
Sir  William  has  presented  as  the  problem  of 
the  causal  judgment.  His  statement  of  the 
problem  is  this :  "  When  aware  of  a  new  ap- 
pearance, we  are  iinahle  to  conceive  that 
therein  has  originated  any  new  existence,  and 
are  therefore  constrained  to  think  that  what 
now  appears  to  us  under  a  new  form,  had 
previously  an  existence  under  others — others 
conceivable  by  us  or  not.  We  are  utterly 
unable  to  construe  it  in  thought,  as  possible 
that  the  complement  of  existence  has  been 
increased  or  diminished." 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  177 

This  seems  to  us,  not  a  proper  statement  of 
the  problem  of  causation.  This  problem  does 
not  require  the  complement  of  existence  to  be 
accounted  for ;  but  the  new  form  to  be  ac- 
counted for;  and  a  new  form  must  not  be 
confounded  with  an  entirely  neio  existence. 
Causation  must  be  discriminated  from  crea- 
tion; in  the  first,  clianrje  only,  in  the  last,  the 
complement  of  existence,  is  involved.  If  we 
attempt  to  solve  the  problem  of  creation,  the 
notion  of  an  absolute  beginning  is  involved; 
consequently,  a  negative  impotence  is  expe- 
rienced, as  we  cannot  think  an  absolute  be- 
ginning, and  we  would  fall  back  on  the  notion 
of  causation — would  stop  short  at  the  causal 
judgment,  unable  to  rise  to  a  higher  cognition 
— the  cognition  of  creation. 

The  causal  judgment  consists  in  the  neces- 
sity we  are  under  of  prefixing  in  thought  a 
cause  to  every  change,  of  which  we  think. 
Now  change  implies  previous  existence ;  else 
it  is  not  change.  Of  what  does  it  imply  the 
previous  existence  ?  Of  that  which  is  changed, 
and  also  of  that  by  which  the  change  is  eftect- 
ed.  Now  change  is  effect.  It  is  the  result  of 
an  operation.     Operation  is  cause  (potence) 

15 


178  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

realizing  itself  in  effect.     It  seems  to  us,  by 
this  somewhat  tautological  analysis,  that  cause 
and  effect  necessarily  imply  each  other,  both 
in  nature  and  in  thought.    Causality  is  thought 
both  as  a  law  of  things  and  a  law  of  intelli- 
gence.    When  we  attempt  to  separate  effect 
from   cause,    in    our    thought,    contradiction 
emerges.     It  is  realized  to  consciousness  in 
every  act  of  will,  and  in  every  act  of  positive 
thinking  as  both  natural  and  rational.    Cause 
and  effect  are  related  to  each  other,  as  terms 
in  thought,  as  well  as  realities  in  existence. 
Causality   is   primarily   natural,    secondarily 
rational.     The  Avoof  of  reasoning,  into  wdiich 
its  notion  is  Avoven,  has  the  two  threads  of 
the  material  and  the  rational  running  toge- 
ther, by  which   existence    and   thought   are 
harmonized  into  truth ;  the  objective  respond- 
ing to  the  subjective.     If  this  were  not  the 
law  of  material  thinking,  we  do  not  see  how 
there  could  be  any  consecutive  thinking  about 
nature.     The  notion  of  cause   always  leads 
thought  in  material  reasoning — always  deter- 
mines the  mental  conclusion,  as  the  notion  of 
reason  does  in  formal  or  pure  reasoning.    The 
law  of  cause  and  effect  is,  in  material  thought, 


KEAOTIONARY   ErOCH.  179 

what  the  law  of  reason  and  consequent  is  in 
formal  thought. 

It  is  doubtless  true,  that  the  negative  impo- 
tence to  think  an  absolute  beainnin";  necessa- 
rily   connects  in  thought  present  with  past 
existence;  and  as  all  change  must  take  place 
in  some  existence,  the  change  itself  is  con- 
nected in  thought  with  something  antecedent; 
and,  therefore,  the  mind  is  necessitated  by 
the  negative  impotence  to  predicate  something 
antecedent  to  the  change.     But,  then,  as  a 
mere  negative  impotence  cannot  yield  an  athr- 
mative  judgment,  it  cannot  connect  present 
with  past  existence,  in  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect,  but  only  in  sum  of  existence  which 
it  is  unable  to  think  either  increased  or  dimi- 
nished.    The  causal  judgment  is  determined 
by  a  mental  power  elicited  into  action  by  an 
observed  change,  and  justified  thereby  as  an 
affirmation  of  a  potence  evinced  in  the  changed 
existence;   and  it  matters   not  whether  the 
change    be    the    result    of   many    concurring 
causes,  or  of  one;  still  the  notion  of  potence 
cannot   but  be   thouirht   as  involved    in   the 
phenomenon.     When  we  see  a  tree  shivered 
to  atoms  by  a  flash  of  lightning,  it  is  difficult 


180  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

to  be  convinced,  that  the  causal  judgment 
elicited  by  the  phenomenon,  is  merely  the 
impotence  to  think  an  absolute  beginning. 

We  are  conscious  that  we  are  the  authors 
of  our  own  actions;  and  this  is,  to  be  con- 
scious of  causation  in  ourselves.  But  if  we 
attempt  to  analyze  this  fact  in  consciousness 
by  considering  it  as  made  up  of  two  elements 
related  in  time,  we  confuse  ourselves  by  the 
impotence  to  conceive  any  causal  nexus  be- 
tween the  supposed  antecedent  and  conse- 
quent. The  fact  is,  that  they  are  a  simulta- 
neous deliverance  of  consciousness  realizing 
an  antithesis  in  one  inseparable  act;  because 
cause  and  effect  are  never  realized  separately, 
but  conjointly.  Efficiency  is  twofold,  partly 
cause,  partly  effect,  and  cannot  be  thought 
otherwise  without  contradiction.  Cause  is 
thus  thought  as  an  indefinite,  as  not  having 
either  an  absolute  beginning  or  ending.  Ab- 
solute beginning  is  not  more  necessary  to  the 
notion  of  cause  than  to  that  of  time.  Both 
are  thought  as  quantities,  and  though  both 
are  tliounht  as  indetcrminates,  like  all  inde- 
terminates,  are  capable  of  a  determinate  ap- 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  181 

plication.     And  while  realized  as  particular, 
they  are  thought  as  universal. 

We  are  prone  to  postulate  principles  more 
absolutely  than  they  are  warranted  by  nature. 
Therefore  it  is,  that  the  subtleties  of  nature 
so  often   drop   through   the   formulas   of  the 
logician;    and   he   retains  in  their  stead  ab- 
stractions not  corresponding  with  existence. 
Excessive  study  of  formal  logic  tends  to  lessen 
the  capacity  for  appreciating  the  imports  of 
intuition.     The  apodictic  character  of  logical ( 
relations  is  so  different  from    that  of  mere 
material  relations,  that  a  mind,  long  addicted  ■ 
to  the  estimation  of  the  former,  cannot  but  { 
contract  a  fallacious  bias  somewhat  like  tliat^ 
of  the  mere  analytical  mathematician,  but  of  ? 
course  to  a  much  less  degree.     And  on  the 
other  hand,  a  metaphysician,  who  like  Locke, 
is  deficient  in  a  knowledge  of  logic,  and  un- 
practised in  its  precise  -distinctions  and  forms, 
becomes  loose,  inconsequent,  and  contradictious 
in  his  opinions.     We  venture  to  suggest,  that 
the  former  of  these  biases  is  apparent  in  the 
application  of  the  law  of  the  conditioned  to 
the  causal  judgment,  by  Sir  William  Hamilton. 
lie  postulates  it  too  unrpialifiedly. 

15* 


182  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

The  doctrine  of  the  conditioned  rescues 
thouo'ht  from  otherwise  insoluble  contradic- 
/  tions,  by  carrying  up  the  contradictory  phe- 
'  nomena  into  a  common  principle  of  limitation 
,  of  our  faculties.  For  example :  If  we  attempt 
to  think  an  absolute  beginning,  we  find  it  im- 
possible; and  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  at- 
tempt to  think  its  contradictory  opposite,  an 
infinite  non-beginning,  we  find  it  equally  in- 
cogitable.  If  therefore,  both  be  received  as 
positive  affirmative  deliverances  of  our  intelli- 
gence, then  our  minds  testify,  by  necessity,  to 
lies.  But  the  philosophy  of  the  conditioned 
emphatically  forbids  us  to  confound,  as  equiva- 
lent, non-existence  with  incogitability;  be- 
cause it  does  not  make  the  human  mind  the 
measure  of  existence,  but  just  the  reverse. 
It  postulates  as  its  fundamental  principle,  that 
the  incogitable  may  and  must  be  necessarily 
true  upon  the  acknowledged  highest  principle 
of  intelligence,  that  of  two  contradictories  one 
must,  but  both  cannot  be  true.  Thus  by 
carrying  up  these  contradictions  into  the  com- 
mon principle  of  a  limitation  of  our  faculties, 
intelligence  is  shown  to  be  feeble,  but  not 
false;   and  the  contradictory  phenomena  are 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  183 

rescued  from  contradiction,  hy  showing  that 
one  must  be  true.  And  by  this  doctrine,  the  . 
moral  responsibility  of  man  is  vindicated  from 
all  cavil.  Thus  while  the  liberty  of  the  will  • 
is  inconceivable,  so  is  its  contradictory  oppo-  • 
site,  the  necessity  of  human  actions.  As  then, 
these  two  negations  are  at  e({uipoise,  and  can 
neither  prove  nor  disprove  anything,  the  testi- 
mony of  consciousness,  that  we  are,  though 
we  know  not  how,  the  real  and  responsible 
authdrs  of  our  actions,  gives  the  affirmance  to 
our  accountability.  And  out  of  this  moral 
germ  springs  the  root  of  the  argument  for  the 
existence  of  God,  Avhich  combined  with  the 
lately  too  much  disparaged  argument  from 
design,'^'  constitutes  a  valid  basis  for  the  doc- 
trine of  natural  Theology.  Thus  are  vindi- 
cated, by  this  now  development  of  the  philo- 
sophy of  common  sense,  the  great  truths  of  . 

*  The  evidences  of  design  in  nature  have,  in  all  ages 
and  with  all  orders  of  minds,  done  more  to  uphold  natu- 
ral, or  rational  theology  than  all  other  evidences  put 
together.  The  argument  founded  in  our  moral  nature, 
so  much  in  vogue  with  those  who  aspire  to  the  subtleties 
of  Kant,  is  wholly  incompetent  without  the  argument 
from  design  to  coiToborale  it. 


184  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

our  practical  reason,  as  they  have  been  called ; 
and  speculation  and  practice  are  reconciled. 
And  the  doctrine  that  God  is  incognizable  is 
demonstrated ;  and  that  it  is  only  through  the 
analogy  of  the  human  with  the  divine  nature, 
that  we  are  percipient  of  the  existence  of  God. 
Power  and  knowledsxe,  and  virtue  cognized  in 
ourselves,  and  tending  to  consummation,  re- 
veal the  notion  of  God.  For  unless  all  ana- 
logy be  rejected,  the  mind  must  believe  in  that 
first  cause,  which  hy  the  limited  nature  of 
our  fjiculties  we  cannot  l'nou\  In  the  lan- 
guage of  the  great  Puritan  divine,  John  Owen : 
"All  the  rational  conceptions  of  the  minds  of 
men  are  swallowed  up  and  lost,  when  they 
would  exercise  themselves  directly  on  that 
which  is  absolutely  immense,  eternal,  infinite. 
When  we  say  it  is  so,  we  know  not  what  we 
say,  but  only  that  it  is  not  otherwise.  What 
we  deny  of  God  we  kiit)w  in  some  measure — 
but  wdiat  we  affirm  we  know  not;  only  we 
declare  what  avc  believe  and  adore." 

While   therefore,   this   ])liil()sopliy   confines 

our  knowlech/e  U)  tlie   conditioned,   it   leaves 

\faitli  free    about   the    unconditioned;    indeed 

constrains  us  to  ])elieve  in  it,  by  the  highest 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  185 

law  of  our  intcllitrcncc.     This    fundamental 
truth  of  his  philosophy  Sir  William  Hamilton 
has  enounced   in   this  comprehensive   canon : 
"Thou<;ht  is  possible  only  m  the  c(mditioned 
interval  between  two  unconditioned   contra- 
dictory extremes  or  ]wles,   each   of  which  is 
altogether  inconceivable,  but  of  which,  on  tlie 
principle  of  Excluded  Middle,  the  one  or  the 
other  is  necessarily  true."     As  therefore  the 
unconditioned,  as  we  have  seen,  presents  itself 
to  the  human  mind,  under  a  plural  form  of 
contradictory  opposites,  as  either  the  absolute 
or  the  infinite,  the  problem  comes  under  this 
canon,  and  the  unconditioned  is  established 
as  a  verity,  incognizable  but  helievahle.     Thus,, 
in  the  very  fact  of  the  limitation  of  our  know- 
ledge,  is  discovered  the   alfirmation,  by  thej 
highest  law  of  our  intelligence,  of  the  trans- 
cendent nature  of  faith.     There  is  no  ])]iilo-y 
sophy,  which  in  its  spirit,  its  scope,  and  its 
doctrines,  both  positive  and  negative,  so  con- 
ciliates and  u]>liolds  revealed  religion,  as  that 
which  is  based  on  this  great  canon  of  Meta- 
physics.    The  conditions  on  which  revelation 
with  its  complement  of  doctrines,  is  offered  to 


18G  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

our  belief,  are  precisely  those  which  this 
canon  enounces. 

Having  exhibited  an  outline  of  what  Sir 
William  Hamilton  has  done  for  Metaphysics, 
we  will  now  proceed  to  show  what  he  has 
done  for  Logic. 

Li  what  we  have  said  about  the  relation, 
which  the  philosophy  of  Sir  William  Hamilton 
bears  to  that  of  Bacon,  we,  by  no  means,  in- 
tend to  affirm,  that  there  is  much  intellectual 
sympathy  between  the  two  great  thinkers. 
It  is  quite  otherwise.  Bacon  was  preemi- 
nently objective,  exhausting  his  great  powers 
chiefly  in  the  field  of  physics,  because,  in  his 
time,  there  lay  the  needs  of  truth;  while 
Hamilton,  rather  turning  his  back  on  physics, 
because  of  their  now  extravagant  cultivation, 
is  supremely  subjective,  throwing  his  vast 
energies  upon  inquiries  in  the  province  of  in- 
tellectual philosophy.  And  though  Sir  William 
Hamilton  does  not  directly  dis2)arage  the  la- 
bours of  Bacon,  yet  he  vaunts  those  of  Des 
Cartes  at  then'  expense,  and  certainl}'  nowhere 
does  those  of  ]5acon  justice.  But  still  the 
phil(jHophies  of  Bacon  and  of  Hamilton  are 
concordant  developments  of  the  one  philosophy 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  187 

of  common  sense,  and  are  affiliated  in  unity 
of  fundamental  doctrine.  Bacon  is  the  fore- 
runner, in  that  great  intellectual  movement, 
to  which  Hamilton  has  communicated  such  a 
mighty  energy  of  thought,  contributed  the 
liiiht  of  such  vast  erudition,  and  adduced  such 
stringent  historical  proofs  of  its  perennial  ex- 
istence. It  is  the  inductive  branch  of  Logic 
with  its  kindred  doctrines,  which  Sir  William 
Hamilton  has  brought  out  into  bold  relief, 
from  the  subordination  in  which  it  was  held 
by  Aristotle :  while,  at  the  same  time,  he  has 
so  developed,  and  simplified  by  a  completer 
analysis,  the  deductive  branch,  that  the  Stagi- 
rite  only  retains  his  superior  fame  by  being 
the  precursor.  And  it  is,  by  his  successful 
labours  upon  these  two  great  branches  of 
LoQ;ic,  that  Sir  William  Hamilton  conciliates 
the  philosophies  of  Aristotle  and  Bacon;  and 
gives  to  modern  thought  a  force  of  reasoning, 
through  the  practical  application  of  nicer  dis- 
criminations of  the  forms  of  thought,  and  more 
adequate  logical  expression,  which  elevates 
this  century  to  a  higher  intellectual  platform. 
All  this  shall  sufliciently  appear  in  the  se- 
quel. 


»  V 


188  ,  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

When,  in  the  year  1833,  Sir  WiUiam  Ha- 
milton published  in  the  Edinburgh  Review,  his 
criticism  on  Whately's  Logic,  there  was  pre- 
valent in  Britain,  total  ignorance  of  the  higher 
logical  philosophy.  The  treatise  of  Whately 
was  the  highest  logical  standard ;  which, 
though  in  ability  it  is  much  above  mediocrity, 
in  erudition  is  far  below  the  literature  of  the 
subject.  The  article  of  Sir  William  elevated 
the  views  of  British  logicians  above  the  level 
of  Whately,  and  gave  them  glimpses  of  a 
higher  doctrine.  But  the  chief  service  ren- 
dered by  this  masterly  criticism,  was  the  pre- 
cision with  which  it  defined  the  nature  and 
the  object  matter  of  logic,  and  discriminated 
the  whole  subject  doctrinally  and  historically, 
in  the  concentrated  light  of  its  literature. 

The  treatise  of  Whately  presents  indistinct, 
ambiguous  and  even  contradictory  views  of 
the  proper  object  matter  of  logic.  Sometimes 
it  makes  the  process  or  operation  of  reason- 
ing, the  total  matter  about  which  logic  is  con- 
versant; at  other  times,  it  makes  logic  en- 
tirely conversant  about  language.  Now, 
though  it  involves  a  maniiest  contradiction  to 
say,  that  logic  is  exclusively  conversant  about 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  189 

each  of  two  opposite  things,  yet  Whately  was 
praised,  by  British  logicians  for  the  clearness 
with  which  he  dispLayed  the  true  nature  and 
oihce  of  logic.  In  the  low  state  of  logical 
knowledge  in  Britain,  which  these  facts  indi- 
cate, it  behooved  whoever  undertook  to  point 
out  Whatelv's  blunders  to  enter  into  the  most 
elementary  discussion  of  logic,  both  name  and 
thing.  This  Sir  William  Hamilton  did  in  the 
article  now  under  consideration. 

Aristotle  designated  logic  by  no  single  terra. 
He  employed  difierent  terms  to  designate  par- 
ticular parts  or  applications  of  logic ;  as  is 
shown  by  the  names  of  his  several  treatises. 
In  fact,  Aristotle  did  not  look  at  logic  from 
any  central  point  of  view.  And,  indeed,  his 
treatises  are  so  overladen  with  extralogical 
matter,  as  to  show  that  the  true  theoretical 
view  of  logic  as  an  independent  science  had 
not  disclosed  itself  to  its  great  founder.  In 
fact,  it  has  only  been  gradually,  that  the  pro- 
per view  of  the  science  has  been  speculative- 
ly adopted — practically  it  never  has  been; 
and  no  contribution  to  the  literature  of  the 
subject  has  done  so  much  to  discriminate  the 
true  domain  of  logic,  as  this  article  of  Sir 

16 


190  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

William  Hamilton.  It  marks  an  era  in  the 
science.  Mounting  up  to  the  father  of  logic 
himself,  it  showed  that  nineteen-twentieths  of 
his  logical  treatises,  treat  of  matters  that 
transcend  logic  considered  as  a  formal  science. 
It  is  shown  that  the  whole  doctrine  of  the 
modality  of  syllogisms  does  not  belong  to 
logic ;  for  if  any  matter,  be  it  demonstrative 
or  probable,  be  admitted  into  logic,  none  can 
be  excluded.  And  thus,  with  the  considera- 
tion of  the  real  truth  or  falsehood  of  proposi- 
tions, the  whole  body  of  real  science  must 
come  within  the  domain  of  logic,  obliterating 
all  distinction  between  formal  and  real  infer- 
ence. 

The  doctrine  maintained  in  this  article  is, 
that  logic  is  conversant  about  the  laws  of 
thought  considered  merely  as  thought.  The 
import  of  this  doctrine  we  will  now  attempt 
to  unfold.  The  term  thought  is  used  in  several 
significations  of  very  different  extent.  It  is 
sometimes  used  to  designate  every  mental 
modification  of  which  we  are  conscious,  in- 
cluding will,  feeling,  desire.  It  is  sometimes 
used  in  the  more  limited  sense  of  every  cogni- 
tive fact,  excluding  will,  feeling,  desire.     In 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  191 

its  most  limited  meaning,  it  denotes  only  the 
acts  of  the  understanding  or  faculty  of  com- 
parison or  relation,  called  also  the  discursive 
or  elaborative  faculty.  It  is  in  this  most  re- 
stricted sense  that  the  word  tlioiujit  is  used  in 
relation  to  logic.  Logic  supposes  the  mate- 
rials of  thought  already  in  the  mind,  and  only 
considers  the  manner  of  their  elaboration. 
And  the  operation  of  the  elaborative  faculty 
on  these  materials  is  what  is  meant  by  iliowjlit 
jproper.  And  it  is  the  laws  of  thought,  m 
this,  its  restricted  sense,  about  which  logic  is 
conversant. 

It  must  be  further  discriminated,  that  logic 
is  conversant  about  thought  as  a  product,  and 
not  about  the  producing  operation  or  process; 
this  belongs  to  psychology.  Logic,  therefore, 
in  treating  of  the  laws  of  thought,  treats  of 
them  in  regard  to  thought  considered  as  a 
product.  What,  then,  is  thought  ?  In  other 
Avords,  wdiat  are  the  acts  of  the  elaborative 
faculty?  They  are  three,  conception,  judg- 
ment, reasoning.  These  are  all  acts  of  com- 
parison— gradations  of  thought.  Of  these,  as 
producing  acts,  psychology  treats.  Logic 
treats  of  the  products  of  these,  called  respect- 


192  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

ivelj,   a  concept,   a  judgment,   a   reasoning. 
The  most  articulate  enunciation,  therefore,  of 
the  intrinsic  nature  of  logic  is,  the  science  of 
the  formal  laws  of  thought  considered  as  a  pro- 
duct, and  not  as  a  process. 

But  we  will  show  still  further  what  a  form 
of  thought  is.  In  an  act  of  thinking  there 
are  three  things,  which  we  can  discriminate 
in  consciousness.  First,  there  is  a  thinking 
subject ;  second,  an  object  which  Ave  think, 
called  the  matter  of  thought ;  and  third,  the 
relation  subsisting  between  the  subject  and 
oljject  of  which  we  are  conscious — a  relation 
always  manifested  in  some  mode  or  manner. 
This  last  is  the  form  of  thought.  Now  logic 
takes  account  only  of  this  last — the  form  of 
thought.  In  so  far  as  the  form  of  thought  is 
viewed  in  relation  to  the  subject,  as  an  act, 
operation,  or  energy ,  it  belongs  to  psychology. 
It  is  only  in  reference  to  what  is  thought 
about,  only  considered  as  a  product,  that  the 
form  of  the  act,  or  operation,  or  energy,  has 
relation  to  logic. 

With  this  explanation,  we  will  now  enounce 
the  laws  of  thought,  of  which  logic  is  the 
science. 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  193 

In  treating  of  the  conditions  of  the  think- 
able, as  systematized  by  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton, we  have  pointed  out  the  fact,  that  it  is 
shown,  that  logic  springs  out  of  the  condition 
of  non-contradiction ;  for  that  this  condition 
is  brought  to  bear  only  under  three  phases 
constituting  three  laws  :  1st,  the  law  of  Iden- 
tity;  2d,  the  law  of  Contradict  km ;  od,  the 
law  of  Excluded  Middle:  of  which  laws  logic 
is  the  science.  Of  these  laws  we  will  treat  in 
their  order,  and  explicate  the  import  or  logical 
significance  of  each. 

The  principle  of  Idenlity  expresses  the  rela- 
tion of  total  sameness,  in  which,  a  product  of 
the  thinking  faculty,  be  it  concept,  judgment, 
or  reasoning,  stands  to  all,  and  the  relation  of 
partial  sameness,  in  which  it  stands  to  ea(;h, 
of  its  constituent  characters.  This  principle 
is  the  special  application  of  the  absolute  equi- 
valence of  the  whole  and  its  parts  taken  to- 
gether, applied  to  the  thinking  of  a  thing,  by 
the  attribution  of  its  constituent  or  distinctive 
characters.  In  the  [)redicate,  the  whole  is 
contained  explicitly,  and  in  the  subject  im- 
plicitly.    The  logical  signilicance  of  the  law 

16* 


194  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

lies  in  this — that  it  is  the  principle  of  all  logi- 
cal affirmation — of  all  logical  definition. 

The  second  law,  that  of  Contradiction,  is 
this  :  What  is  contradictory  is  unthinkable. 
Its  principle  may  be  thus  expressed:  When  a 
concept  is  determined  by  the  attribution  or 
affirmation  of  a  certain  character,  mark,  note, 
or  quality,  the  concept  cannot  be  thought  to  be 
the  same  when  such  character  is  denied  of  it. 
Assertions  are  mutuall}'  contradictory,  when 
the  one  affirms  that  a  thing  possesses,  or  is 
determined  b}',  the  characters  which  the  other 
affirms  it  does  not  possess  or  is  not  determined 
by.  The  logical  significance  of  this  law  con- 
sists in  its  being  the  principle  of  all  logical 
negation,  or  distinction. 

The  laws  of  Identity  and  Contradiction  are 
co-ordinate  and  reciprocally  relative:  and  nei- 
ther can  be  deduced  from  the  other ;  for  each 
supposes  the  other. 

The  third  law,  called  the  principle  of  Ex- 
cluded Middle,  embraces  that  condition  of 
tliought  which  compels  us,  of  two  contradic- 
tory notions  (which  cannot  both  exist  by  the 
law  of  contradiction)  to  think  either  the  one 
or  the  other  as  existing.    By  the  laws  of  Iden- 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  105 

titi/  and  Contratlicilon,  we  are  warranted  to 
conclude  from  the  truth  of  one  contradictory 
to  the  falsehood  of  the  other;  and  by  the  law 
of  Excluded  Middle,  we  are  warranted  to  con- 
clude from  the  falsehood  of  one,  to  the  truth 
of  the  other.  The  logical  significance  of  this 
law  consists  in  tliis — that  it  determines  that, 
of  two  forms  given  in  the  laws  of  Idcut'dij  and 
Cordradlction,  and  by  these  laws  aftirmed  as 
those  exclusively  possible,  that  of  these  two 
only  possible  forms,  the  one  or  the  other  must 
be  aflirmed,  as  necessary,  of  every  object. 
This  law^  is  the  principle  of  disjunctive  judg- 
ments, which  stand  in  such  mutual  relation, 
that  the  aflirmation  of  the  one  is  the  denial 
of  the  other.  .       v,        , 

These  tliree  laws  stand  to  each  other  in  re- 
lation like  the  three  sides  of  a  triangle.  They 
are  not  the  same,  not  reducible  to  unity,  yet 
each  giving,  in  its  own  existence,  that  of  the 
other.  They  form  one  principle  in  different 
aspects. 

These  laws  are  but  phases  of  that  condition 
of  the  thinkable  which  stipulates  for  the  abso- 
lute absence  of  non-contradiction.  Whatever, 
therefore,  violates  these  laws  is  impossible  not 


196  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

only  in  thought  but  in  existence;  and  they 
thus  determine,  for  us,  the  sphere  of  possi- 
bihty  and  impossibility,  not  merely  in  thought 
but  in  reality.  They  are  therefore  not  wholly 
logical  but  also  metaph^^sical.  To  deny  the 
universal  application  of  these  laws  is  to  sub- 
vert the  reality  of  thought;  and  as  the  sub- 
version would  be  an  act  of  thought,  it  annihi- 
lates itself.     They  are  therefore  insuperable. 

There  is  a  fourth  law  which  is  a  corollary 
of  these  three  primary  laws,  called  the  law 
of  Reason  and  Consequent,  which  is  so  obtru- 
sive in  our  reasoning  that  it  needs  to  be  spe- 
ciallv  considered.  The  logical  siGrnificance  of 
this  law  lies  in  this,  that  in  virtue  of  it, 
thought  is  constituted  into  a  series  of  acts  in- 
dissolubly  connected,  each  necessarily  infer- 
ring the  other.  The  mind  is  necessitated  to 
this  or  that  determinate  act  of  thinking,  by 
a  knowledge  of  something  different  from  the 
thinking  process  itself  That  which  deter- 
mines the  mind  is  called  the  reason,  tliat  to 
which  the  mind  is  determined  is  called  the 
conse([uent,  and  the  relation  between  the  two 
is  called  the  consequence.  By  reason  of  our 
intelligent   nature,  there  is  a  necessary  de- 


p 

REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  197 

pendence  of  one  notion  upon  another,  from 
whieli  all  logical  inference  results  as  an  inevi- 
table consequent.  This  inference  is  of  two 
kinds.  It  must  proceed,  from  the  whole  to 
the  parts,  or  i'roni  the  parts  to  the  whole. 
When  the  determining  notion  (the  reason)  is 
conceived  as  a  whole  containing  (under  it) 
and  therefore  necessitating  the  determined 
notion  (the  consequent)  conceived  as  its  cow- 
tained  pari  or  jyarts,  argumentation  proceeds, 
by  mental  analysis,  from  the  w^hole  to  the 
parts  into  which  it  is  separated.  When  the 
determining  notion  is  conceived  as  the  parts 
constituting,  and  therefore  necessitating  the 
determined  notion  conceived  as  the  consti- 
tuted whole,  argumentation  proceeds,  by  men- 
tal synthesis,  from  the  parts  to  the  whole. 
The  process  from  the  whole  to  the  parts  is 
called  deductive  reasoning;  the  other  process, 
from  the  parts  to  the  whole,  is  called  induc- 
tive reasoning.  There  is  therefore  in  logic  a 
deductive  syllogism  and  an  inductive  syllo- 
gism. The  former  is  governed  by  the  rule : — 
What  belongs  (or  does  not  belong)  to  the  contain- 
ing whole,  belongs  [or  does  not  belong)  to  each 
and  all  of  the  contained  parts.     The  latter  by 


198  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

the  rule: — What  belongs  (or  does  not  helony) 
to  all  the  constituent  parts,  belongs  [or  does  not 
''belong)  to  the  constituted  whole.  These  rules 
exclusively  determine  all  formal  inference; 
whatever  transcends  or  violates  them,  trans- 
cends or  violates  logic. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  was  the  first  to  dis- 
criminate accurately  the  difference  between 
the  deductive  and  inductive  syllogism.  All 
that  had  been  said  by  logicians,  except  Aris- 
totle, and  he  is  brief,  and  by  no  means  unam- 
biguous, on  logical  induction,  is  entirely  erro- 
neous; for  they  all,  including  Whately,  con- 
found logical  or  formal  induction,  with  that 
which  is  philosophical,  and  material,  and  ex- 
tralogical.  They  consider  logical  induction 
not  as  governed  by  the  necessary  laws  of 
thought,  but  as  determined  by  the  probabili- 
ties of  the  sciences  from  which  the  matter  is 
borrowed.  All  inductive  reasoning  logical 
and  material  proceeds  from  the  parts  (singu- 
lars) to  the  whole  (universal:)  but  in  the 
formal  or  subjective,  the  illation  is  different 
from  that  in  the  material  or  objective.  In 
the  former,  the  illation  is  founded  on  the  ne- 
cessary laws  of  thought;  in  the  latter,  on  the 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  199 

general  or  particul.'ir  analogies  of  nature. 
The  logician  knows  no  prin('ii)lc,  but  the  ne- 
cessary laws  of  thought.  Ilis  conclusions  are 
necessitated,  not  presumed. 

All  tliis  confusion  was  produced  by  the  in- 
troduction, into  formal  logic,  of  various  kinds 
of  matter.  Aristotle  himself,  corrupted  logic 
in  this  way;  and  Sir  WiUiani  Hamilton  has 
been  the  first  to  expel  entirely  this  foreign 
element,  and  to  purify  logic  from  the  result- 
ing errors,  though  Kant  had  done  much 
towards  the  same  result.  When  we  reflect, 
that  the  only  legitimate  illation  in  formal 
logic,  is  that  regulated  by  the  law  of  reason 
and  consequent,  which  connects  thought  into  a 
reciprocally  dependent  series,  each  necessarily 
inferring  the  other,  it  is,  at  once,  manifest, 
that  the  distinction  of  matter  into  possible, 
actual,  and  necessary,  is  a  doctrine  wholly 
extralogical.  Logical  illation  never  differs 
in  degree — never  falls  below  that  of  absolute 
necessity.  The  necessary  laws  of  thought 
constraining  an  inevitable  illation,  are  the 
only  principle  known  to  the  logician. 

We  have  just  seen  that  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton is  the  first  to  signalize  the  fact,  that  reason- 


200  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

ing  from  the  parts  to  the  whole,  is  just  as  ne- 
cessary, and  exclusive  of  material  considera- 
tions, as  reasoning  from  the  whole  to  the 
parts.  And  he  has  evolved  the  laws  of  the 
Inductive  Syllogism,  and  correlated  them 
wdth  those  of  the  Deductive  Syllogism. 

We  now  proceed  to  another  important  addi- 
*  tion  which  he  has  made  to  logic.  He  has 
^  shown  that  there  are  two  logical  wholes,  in- 
stead of  one,  as  the  logicians  had  supposed. 
These  two  wholes  are  the  whole  of  Compre- 
hension, called  by  Sir  William,  Depth,  and 
the  whole  of  Extension,  called  by  him, 
^  Breadth.  These  two  w^holes  are  in  an  in- 
verse ratio  of  each  other.  The  maximum  of 
depth  and  the  minimum  of  breadth  are  found 
in  the  concept  of  an  individual  (which  in  re- 
ality is  not  a  concept,  but  only  a  single  repre- 
sentation;) while  the  mininium  of  breadth  and 
the  maximum  of  depth  is  found  in  a  simple 
concept — the  concept  of  being  or  existence. 
Now,  the  depth  of  notions  affords  one  of  two 
branches  of  reasoning,  which,  though  over- 
looked by  logicians,  is,  at  least,  equally  im- 
portant as  that  afforded  by  their  l)readth, 
which  alone   has  been  developed  by  the  lo- 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  201 

gicians.  The  character  of  the  former  is  that 
the  predicate  is  contained  in  the  siihject ;  of 
the  latter,  that  the  subject  is  contained  under 
the  predicate.  All  reasoning,  therefore,  is 
either  from  the  whole  to  the  parts,  or  from 
the  parts  to  the  whole,  in  breadth;  or  from 
the  whole  to  the  parts,  or  from  the  parts  to 
the  whole,  in  depth.  The  quantity  of  breadth 
is  the  creation  of  the  mind,  the  quantity  of 
depth  is  at  once  given  in  the  very  nature  of 
things.  The  former  therefore  is  factitious, 
the  latter  is  natural.  The  same  proposition 
forms  a  different  premise  in  these  different 
quantities,  they  being  inverse  ratios;  the 
Sumption  in  Breadth  being  the  Subsumption 
in  Depth. 

Another  fundamental  development  of  logic, 
made  by  Sir  William,  is  that  the  Categorical 
Syllogism  though  mentally  one  (for  all  medi- 
ate inference  is  one  and  that  categorical,)  is 
either  Analytic  or  Synthetic,  from  the  ne- 
cessity of  adopting  the  one  order  or  the  other, 
in  compliance  with  that  condition  of  language 
which  requires  that  a  reasoning  be  distin- 
guished into  parts  and  detailed  in  order  of 
sequence.     Because  explication  is  sometimes 

17      . 


202  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

better  attained  by  an  analytic  and  sometimes 
by  a  synthetic  enouncement;  as  is  shown  in 
common  language.  The  Aristotelic  syllogism 
is  exclusively  synthetic.  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton thus  relieves  the  syllogism  from  a  one- 
sided view;  and  also  rescues  it  from  the  ob- 
jection of  Petitlo  Principii  or  of  an  idle  tau- 
tology, which  has  been  so  often  urged  against 
it.  Such  objection  does  not  hold  against  the 
analytic  syllogism,  in  which  the  conclusion  is 
expressed  first,  and  the  premises  are  then 
stated  as  its  reasons.  And  this  form  of 
reasoning  being  shown  to  be  valid,  the  objec- 
tion of  Petitio  Principii  is,  at  once,  turned  off 
as  applicable  only  to  the  accident  of  the  ex- 
ternal expression,  and  not  to  the  essence  of  the 
internal  thought.  The  analytic  syllogism  is 
not  only  the  more  natural,  but  is  presupposed 
by  the  synthetic.  It  is  more  natural  to  ex- 
press a  reasoning  in  this  direct  and  simple 
way,  than  in  the  round-about  synthetic  way. 

We  will  next  consider  the  most  important 
doctrine,  perhaps,  which  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton has  discovered  in  the  domain  of  logic. 
Logicians  had  admitted  that  the  subject  of  a 
proposition   has   a   determinate    quantity  in 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  203 

thought,  and  this  was,  accordingly,  expressed 
in  language.  But  logicians  had  denied,  that 
the  predicate  in  propositions  has  a  determinate 
quantit}^  Sir  William  Hamilton  has,  there- 
fore, the  honour  to  have  first  disclosed  the 
principle  of  the  thorough-going  quantification 
of  the  predicate,  in  its  full  significance,  in 
both  affirmative  and  negative  propositions. 
By  keeping  constantly  in  view,  that  logic  is 
conversant  about  the  internal  thought  and 
not  the  external  expression,  he  has  detected 
more,  of  what  it  is  common  to  omit  in  ex- 
pression, of  that  which  is  efficient  in  thought, 
than  any  other  philosopher.  Inferences,  j  udg- 
ments,  problems,  are  often  occult  in  the 
thought,  which  are  omitted  in  the  expres- 
sion. The  purpose  of  common  language  is 
merely  to  exhibit  ivith  clearness  the  matter  of 
thought.  This  is  often  accomplished  best,  by 
omitting  the  expression  of  steps  in  the  mental 
process  of  thinking;  as  the  minds  of  others 
will  intuitively  supply  the  omitted  steps,  as 
they  follow  the  meaning  of  the  elliptical  ex- 
pression. This  elliptical  character  of  common 
language  has  made  logicians  overlook  the 
quantification  of  the  predicate.     The  purpose 


204  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  common  language  does  not  require  the 
quantity  to  be  expressed.  Therefore,  it  was 
supposed,  that  there  is  no  quantification  in 
the  internal  thought.  When  we  reflect  that 
all  thought  is  a  comparison  of  less  and  more, 
of  part  and  whole,  it  is  marvellous  that  it 
should  not  have  been  sooner  discovered  that 
all  thought  must  be  under  some  determinate 
quantity.  And,  as  all  predication  is  but  the 
expression  of  the  internal  thought,  predica- 
tion must  have  a  determinate  quantity — the 
quantity  of  the  internal  thought.  But  such 
has  been  the  iron  rule  of  Aristotle,  that,  in 
two  thousand  years,  Sir  William  Hamilton 
has  been  the  first  logician,  who,  while  appre- 
ciating the  labours  of  the  Stagirite  in  this 
paramount  branch  of  philosophy,  has  been, 
in  no  degree,  enslaved  by  his  authority,  and 
has  made  improvements  in,  and  additions  to, 
logic,  which  almost  rival  those  of  the  great 
founder  of  the  science  himself 

The  office  of  logic  is  to  exhibit,  loith  exact- 
ness,  the  form  of  thouglit,  and  therefore  to  sup- 
ply, in  expression,  the  omissions  of  common 
language,  whose  purpose  is  merely  to  exliibit, 
with  clearness,  the  matter  of  thought.     Logic 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  20-5 

claims,  therefore,  as  its  fundamental  postulate. 
That  we  he  allmced  to  state,  in  lanrjiiage,  icJiat 
is  contained  in  t7iou(/7tf.  This  is  exemplified 
in  the  syllogism,  which  is  a  logical  statement 
of  the  form  of  thought  in  reasoning,  supplying 
in  expression,  what  has  been  omitted  in  com- 
mon language.  Apply  this  rule  to  propo- 
sitions; and  it  is  at  once  discovered,  that  the 
predicate  is  always  of  a  given  quantity  in  re- 
lation to  the  subject. 

Upon  the  principle  of  the  quantification  of 
the  predicate.  Sir  William  Hamilton  has 
founded  an  entirely  new  analytic  of  logical, 
forms.  The  whole  system  of  logic  has  been 
remodelled  and  simplified.  The  quantifica- 
tion of  the  predicate  reveals,  that  the  relation 
between  the  terms  of  a  proposition  is  one  not 
only  of  similarity,  but  of  identity;  and  there 
being  consequently  an  equation  of  subject  and 
predicate,  these  terms  are  always  necessarily 
convertible.  So  that  simple  conversion  takes 
the  place  of  the  complex  and  erroneous  doc- 
trine, with  its  load  of  rules.  Heretofore  taught 
by  logicians. 

By  the  new  analytic.  Sir  William  Hamilton 
has  also  amplified  logic.     The  narrower  views 

17* 


206  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

of  logicians,  in  accordance  with  which  an  un- 
natural art  had  been  built  up,  have  been 
superseded  by  a  wider  view  commensurate 
with  nature.  Logic  should  exhibit  all  the 
forms  of  thought,  and  not  merely  an  arbitrary 
selection;  and  especially  where  they  are  pro- 
claimed as  all.  The  rules  of  the  logicians 
ignore  many  forms  of  affirmation  and  nega- 
tion, which  the  exigencies  of  thinking  require, 
and  are  constantly  used,  but  have  not  been 
noted  in  their  abstract  generality.  Accord- 
ingly, Sir  William  Hamilton  has  shown  that 
there  are  eight  necessary  relations  of  propo- 
sitional  terms;  and,  consequently,  eight  pro- 
positional  forms  performing  peculiar  functions 
in  our  reasonings,  which  are  implicitly  at 
work  in  our  concrete  thinking;  and  not  four 
only,  as  has  been  generally  taught.  Logic 
has  been  rescued  from  the  tedious  minuteness 
of  Aristotle,  and  his  one-sided  view,  and  from 
the  trammels  of  technicality,  and  restored  to 
the  amplitude  and  freedom  of  the  laws  of 
thought. 

The  analysis  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  en- 
ables us  also  to  discrimhiate  the  class,  and  to 
note  the  differential  quality  of  each  of  those 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  207 

syllogisms,  whose  forms  are  dependent  on  the 
internal  essence  of  thought,  and  not  on  the' 
contingent  order  of  external  expression,  such 
as  the  disjunctive,  hypothetical,  and  dilj[em- 
matic  syllogism,  and  to  show  the  special  fun- 
damental law  of  thought  by  which  each 
distinctive  reasoning  is  more  particularly 
regulated.  And  those  forms  of  syllogism, 
which  are  dependent  on  the  contingent  order 
of  the  external  expression  embraced  in  the 
three  figures  of  Aristotle,  are  expounded  anew; 
and  while  their  legitimacy  is  vindicated,  the 
fourth  figure,  which  has  been  engrafted  on  the 
system  by  some  ahen  hand,  is  shown  to  be  a 
mere  logical  caprice.  But  we  cannot  particu- 
larize further.  Li  fact,  the  workshop  of  the 
understanding  has  been  laid  open,  and  the 
materials,  the  moulds,  and  the  castings  of 
thought,  in  all  their  variety  of  pattern  have 
been  exhibited,  and  the  great  mystery  of 
thinking  revealed  by  this  great  master,  on 
wdiom  the  mantle  of  Aristotle  has  fallen  in 
the  nineteenth  century. 

Logic  may  be  discriminated  into  two  grand 
divisions — the  Doctrine  of  Elements,  and  the 
Doctrine  of  Method.     Thought  can  only  be 


208  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

exerted  under  the  general  laws  of  Identit}^, 
Contradiction,  and  Excluded  Middle,  and 
Reason  and  Consequent;  and  through  the 
general  forms  of  concepts,  judgments,  and 
reasonings.  These,  therefore,  in  their  abstract 
generality,  are  the  elements  of  thought;  and 
that  part  of  logic,  which  treats  of  them,  is  the 
Doctrine  of  Elements.  To  this  part  of  logic, 
we  have  thus  far  confined  our  remarks.  And 
the  writings  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  treat 
only  of  this  part  of  logic.  But,  in  order  to 
show  the  historical  position  of  Sir  William, 
and  to  exhibit  the  relation,  which,  we  have 
said  his  philosophy  bears  to  the  philosophy  of 
Aristotle  and  the  philosophy  of  Bacon,  as  an 
initial,  or  step  of  progress  towards  harmonizing 
the  logic  of  the  one  with  the  Method  of  the 
other,  it  becomes  necessary  to  remark  briefly 
upon  the  second  part  of  Logic,  the  Doctrine 
of  Method. 

Method  is  a  regular  procedure,  governed  by 
rules  which  guide  us  to  a  definite  end,  and 
guard  us  against  aberrations.  The  end  of 
Method  is  logical  perfection,  which  consists  in 
the  perspicuity,  the  completeness,  and  the 
harmony    of  our   knowledge.     As   we   have 


REACTIONARY   EPOCU.  209 

shown,  our  knowledge  supposes  two  condi- 
tions, one  of  which  has  relation  to  the  think- 
ing subject,  and  supposes  that  what  is  known, 
is  known  clearly,  distinctly,  completely,  and 
in  connection ;  the  second  has  relation  to  what 
is  known,  and  supposes  that  what  is  known, 
has  a  veritable  or  real  existence.  The  former 
constitutes  the  logical,  or  formal  perfection  of 
knowledge ;  the  latter,  the  scientific,  or  mate- 
rial perfection  of  knowledge.  Logic,  as  we 
have  shown,  is  conversant  about  the  form  of 
thought  only;  it  is,  therefore,  confined  exclu- 
sively to  the  formal  perfection  of  our  know- 
ledge, and  has  nothuig  to  do  with  its  scientific, 
or  material  truth,  or  perfection.  Method, 
therefore,  consists  of  such  rules  as  guide  to 
logical  perfection.  These  rules  are,  defhiition, 
division,  and  concatenation,  or  probation.  The 
doctrine  of  these  rules  is  Method. 

Logic,  as  a  system  of  rules,  is  only  valu- 
able, as  a  mean,  towards  logic  as  a  habit  of 
the  mind — a  speculative  knowledge  of  its  doc- 
trines, and  a  practical  dexterity  with  which 
they  may  be  applied.  Logic,  therefore,  both 
in  the  doctrine  of  elements  and  the  doctrine 
of  method,  is  discriminated  into  abstract  or 


210  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

pure,  and  into  concrete  or  applied.  We  have 
thus  far,  only  had  reference  to  abstract  or 
pure  logic;  and  Sir  Wilham  Hamilton  treats 
only  of  this.  It  becomes,  however,  necessary 
for  our  purpose,  to  pass  mto  concrete  or  ap- 
phed  logic.  Now,  as  the  end  of  abstract,  or 
pure  logical  method  is  merely  the  logical  per- 
fection of  our  knowledge,  having  reference 
only  to  the  thinkmg  subject;  the  end  of  con- 
crete or  applied  logical  method,  is  real  or 
material  truth,  having  reference  only  to  the 
real  existence  of  what  is  thought  about.  Con- 
crete logic  is,  therefore,  conversant  about  the 
laws  of  thought,  as  modified  by  the  empirical 
circumstances,  internal  and  external,  in  which 
man  thinks;  and,  also,  about  the  laws  under 
which  the  objects  of  existence  are  to  be  kno^vn. 
We  beg  our  readers  to  remember  these  dis- 
tinctions, and  that  all  that  now  follows  is 
about  concrete  or  applied  logic. 

In  order  to  show  how  the  improvements 
and  developments  in  formal  logic,  which  we 
have  exhibited,  that  have  been  made  by  Sir 
William  Hamilton,  conciliate  the  deductive, 
or  explicative  logic  of  Aristotle,  with  the  in- 
ductive or  ampliative  logic  of  Bacon,  it  be- 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  211 

comes  necessary  to  state  the  difference  of  the 
philosophical  methods  of  the  two  philosophers. 
The  great  di(Kculty,  with  the  ancient  philo- 
sophers of  the  Socratic  School,  was  to  correlate 
logically,  the  a  priori  and  the  a  posteriori  ele- 
ments of  our  knowledge.  The  difhculty  seems 
to  have  been  suggested  by  the  question,  How 
can  we  know  a  thing  for  the  first  time?  This 
question  raised  the  doubt,  that  it  is  vain  to 
search  after  a  thing  which  Ave  know  not,  since 
not  knowing  the  object  of  our  search,  we 
should  be  ignorant  of  it  when  found,  for  we 
cannot  recognize  what  we  do  not  know.  Plato, 
and  Socrates  perhaps,  solved  the  difficulty  by 
the  doctrine,  that  to  discover,  or  to  learn,  is 
but  to  remember  what  has  been  known  by  us' 
in  a  prior  state  of  existence.  Investigation 
was  thus  vindicated  as  a  valid  process ;  and 
also  a  useful  one,  as  it  is  important  to  recall 
to  memory  what  has  been  forgotten.  Upon 
this  theory  of  knowledge,  Plato  made  intellect, 
to  the  exclusion  of  sense,  the  faculty  of  scien- 
tific knowledge,  and  ideas  or  universals  the 
sole  objects  of  philosophical  investigation. 
The  Platonic  philosophy,  called,  in  this  aspect 
of  it,  Dialectic,  had  for  its  object  of  investiga- 


212  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

tion,  the  true  nature  of  that  connection  which 
exists  between  each  thing  and  the  archetj'pal 
form  or  idea  which  makes  it  what  it  is,  and 
to  awaken  the  soul  to  a  full  remembrance  of 
what  had  been  kno^\Ti  prior  to  being  im- 
prisoned in  the  body. 

Aristotle  made  a  great  advance  beyond 
Plato,  towards  correlating  the  a  priori  and  a 
IMsteriori  elements  of  our  knowledge.  He 
rejected  the  Platonic  doctrine  of  Ideas,  as  uni- 
versals  existing  anterior  to  and  separate  from 
singulars;  and  thereby  ignored  the  Platonic 
doctrine  of  reminiscence.  Still,  he  did  not 
extricate  himself  out  of  the  difficulties  which 
environed  the  problem  of  human  knowledge. 
He  seems  to  have  believed  in  the  existence 
of  universals  or  forms,  not  apart  from,  but  in, 
particulars  or  singulars.  And  to  correspond 
with  this  metaphysical  doctrine,  he  made 
both  intellect  and  sense  important  faculties  in 
science.  He  maintained  an  a  priori  know- 
ledge paramount  to,  but  not  exclusive  of,  the 
a  posteriori.  That  while  universals  are  kno^vn 
\  through  the  intellect,  and  implicitly  contain 
particulars  or  singulars,  yet  we  may  be  igno- 
rant  of   the   singulars   or   particulars,  until 


/ 


^ 


REACTIONARY  EPOCH.  213 

realized  in  and  tlirougli  sense;  and  that, 
therefore,  though  all  knowing  is  through  pre-  / 
vious  knowledge,  yet  the  investigation  of  par-/ 
ticulars  is  not  superfluous;  because,  while  we  | 
may  know  the  universal,  we  may  be  ignorant  / 
of  the  particular.  Therefore,  intellect  and? 
sense  combine  in  framing  the  fabric  of  our/ 
know^ledge. 

The  Aristotelic  method  of  investi2;ation  is,  i 
therefore,  twofold,  Deductive  and  Inductive;) 
the  first  allied  w^th  intellect  and  with  uni-) 
versals,  the  latter  allied  with  sense  and  with } 
particulars.  Aristotle,  in  accordance  with '' 
this  doctrine  of  method,  seems  to  have  con- 
sidered syllogism  proper,  or  deduction,  no  less 
ampliative  than  induction — that  deductive  in- 
ference did,  in  some  way,  assure  us,  or  fortify 
our  assurance  of  real  truth.  We  greatly 
doul:>t  whether  he  discriminated  at  all,  the 
diflerence  between  formal  and  material  infer- 
ence; we  think  that  he  rather  referred  all 
diflerence  in  the  cogency  of  inference,  to  the 
diflerence  of  necessity  or  contingency  in  the 
matter.  He,  strangely  enough,  maintains  for 
the  syllogism  proper,  the  power  to  deduce 
true  conclusions  from  false  premises.     There- 

18 


214  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

fore,  the  syllogistic  inference  is  not  wholly 
dependent  on  the  premises.  And  conse- 
quently, Deduction  is  not  dependent  on  Induc- 
tion, whose  office  it  is  to  supply  the  premises. 
This  logical  doctrine  of  Aristotle  corresponds 
with  his  metaphysical,  and  his  psychological 
doctrine.  As  he  makes  universals  the  para- 
mount object  of  science,  and  intellect  its  para- 
mount principle,  so  does  he  make  syllogism 
the  paramount  process,  and  induction  the  in- 
ferior process  in  logic ;  for  though  intellect  is 
not  with  him  as  with  Plato,  the  sole  j)rinciple 
of  science,  but  conjunct  with  sense,  yet  sense 
is  logically  subordinate  to  intellect.  There 
are,  according  to  his  theory  of  knowledge, 
certain  universal  principles  of  knowledge  ex- 
isting in  the  mind,  rather  as  native  generali- 
ties than  as  mere  necessities  of  so  thinking, 
which  furnish  the  propositions  for  syllogism; 
therefore  syllogism  is  not  dependent  for  these 
on  induction.  It  is  nevertheless  true,  that 
according  to  the  Aristotelic  theory,  there  is 
perfect  harmony  between  intellect  and  sense, 
between  syllogism  and  induction.  And  though 
syllogism  is  the  more  intellectual,  the  more 
scientific;  yet  induction  can  be  legitimately 


REACTIONARY    EPOCH.  215 

used  as  corroborative  and  complemental  of 
syllogism,  and  particularly  by  weak  minds, 
who  can  discern  the  universal  in  the  particu- 
lars, but  cannot  apprehend  it  a  priori  as  a 
native  generality.  It  was  because  of  this 
theory  of  knowledge,  that  induction  iiolds  so 
sulDordinate  and  inferior  a  place  in  the  Aristo- 
telic  logic. 

Whether  our  account  of  Aristotle's  theory 
of  knowledge  be  the  true  one  or  not,  for  there 
is  much  obscurity  over  his  doctrine,  it  is  never- 
theless certain,  that  Aristotle  had  a  very  im- 
perfect insight  into  induction  as  an  objective 
process  of  investigation.  And  the  slighting 
manner,  in  which  he  passes  induction  over, 
shows  how  little  he  appreciated  it.  He  has 
made  a  crude  and  superficial  distinction, 
which  has  been  perpetuated  to  this  day,  be- 
tween the  universals  derived  from  induction, 
and  universals  derived  from  similars.  In  i 
other  words,  he  has  correlated  induction  and  \ 
analogy  as  different  kinds  of  reasoning.  And 
all  writers  on  logic,  including,  we  suspect, 
even  Sir  AVilliam  Hamilton,*  still  speak  of. 

*  Sir  William's  Class  Lectures  will,  doubtless,  give 
his  opinions  on  this  subject. 


216  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

reasoning  by  induction,  and  reasoning  by  ana- 
logy. This,  it  seems  to  us,  is  a  great  confu- 
sion and  error.  We  make  induction  the  pro- 
cess, and  analogy  or  similarity  the  evidence 
by  which  the  illation  is  warranted.  That 
analogy,  which  is  the  mere  resemblance  of 
relations,  has  nothing  to  do  with  philosophy; 
but  only  that  analogy,  which  consists  of  an 
essential  resemblance  or  similarity.  The  ten- 
dency to  generalize  our  knowledge,  by  the 
judgment,  that  loliere  j^9a?'//aZ  resemhlance  is 
found,  total  resemhlance  loill  he  found,  may  be 
called,  the  principle  of  philosophical  presump- 
tion. Upon  this  principle  the  objective  pro- 
cess of  induction  is  founded,  by  which  we 
conclude  from  something  observed,  to  some- 
thing not  observed;  from  something  within 
the  sphere  of  experience,  to  something  without 
its  sphere.  This  principle  of  philosophical 
presumption,  is  brought  to  bear  under  two 
objective  laws:  the  first  proclaims,  One  in 
many,  tlierefore  one  in  all;  the  second  pro- 
claims. Many  in  one,  tlierefore  all  in  one. 
Through  the  first  law,  we  conclude  from  a 
certain  attribute  being  possessed  by  many 
similar  things  or  things  of  the  same  class, 


REACTIONARY    EPOCU.  217 

that  the  same  attriljute  is  possessed  by  all 
similar  things  or  things  of  the  same  class. 
Through  tlie  second  law,  we  conclude  from 
the  partial  similarity  of  two  or  more  things 
in  some  respects,  to  their  complete  or  total 
similarity.  Both  laws  conclude  to  unity  in 
totality;  by  the  first,  from  the  recognized 
unity  in  plurality;  by  the  second,  from  the 
recognized  plurality  in  unity.  Both  of  the 
laws,  it  is  very  apparent,  are  phases  of  the 
principle  of  resemblance  or  analogy.  To  call 
the  first  of  these  laws  induction,  and  the  se- 
cond, analogy,  as  has  been  done,  destroys  the 
correspondence  between  abstract  or  pure,  and 
concrete  or  applied  logic.  In  abstract  or  pure 
logic,  induction  is  recognized,  but  analogy 
not;  therefore  analogy  cannot  rest  on  the 
same  basis  with  induction  in  concrete  or  ap- 
plied logic,  else,  like  induction,  it  would  have 
its  counterpart  in  abstract  logic. 

The  theory  of  knowledge,  which  we  have 
expounded  as  his,  in  which  the  a  ]priori  ele- 
ment is  so  paramount  to  the  a  posteriori,  pre- 
vented Aristotle  from  having  any  but  the 
shallowest  insight  into  the  scope  of  induction. 
The  inevitable  result  of  this  was  to  make  him 

18* 


218  PROaRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

slight  observation  tlirougli  sense ;  and  to  rely 
cliiefly  on  deduction  from  x^rincii^les  supplied 
by  the  intellect.     This  was  the  cardinal  vice 
of  Plato,  and  also  of  Aristotle  but  not  nearly 
to  so  great  an  extent.     The  philosophy,  there- 
fore, of  Aristotle,  is  rather  the  result  of  an 
analysis  of  the  contents  of  language,  than  a 
product  of  an  original  observation  of  nature. 
The  philosophy  of  Bacon  is  just  the  reverse — 
it  is  a  product  of  the  observation  of  nature, 
and  not  an  analysis  of  the  contents  of  lan- 
guage.    One  of  the  chief  precautions  of  the 
( Novum  Organum  is,  that  language  is  but  the 
''  registry  of  the  crude  notions  of  imperfect  ob- 
;  servation,  and  consequently  that  nature  her- 
,  self  must   be   interpreted,   to   ascertain   the 
truth.     The  logic  of  Aristotle  was  designed 
more  for  evolving,  sifting,  and  methodizing 
what  had  already  been  thought,  than  for  con- 
ducting new  investigations.     The  great  pur- 
pose of  Bacon  was  to  bring  philosophy  from 
books  and  tradition  to  nature,  from  words  to 
things,  from  the  Syllogism  to  Induction. 

The  true  excellence  of  the  Aristotelic  logic, 
therefore,  consists  in  its  being  considered  for- 
mal  and   not   material.     In   this  view,  the 


REACTIOXARY    EPOCH.  219 

Organon  of  Aristotle  is  conversant  about  the 
laws  under  which  the  subject  thinks;  while 
the  Novum  Organum  of  Bacon  is  conversant 
about  the  laws  under  which  the  object  is  to 
be  known.  Viewed  in  this  aspect,  the  two 
logics,  though  contrariant,  are  not  antago- 
nistic; but  are  the  complements  of  each  other. 
The  Aristotelic  wdthout  the  Baconian  is  null; 
the  Baconian  without  the  Aristotelic  is  defi- 
cient. The  Baconian  supplies  the  material  of 
the  Aristotelic ;  and  while  the  truth  of  science 
is  wholly  dependent  on  the  Baconian,  its  logi- 
cal perfection  is  wholly  dependent  on  the 
Aristotelic.  The  transition,  in  thinking,  from 
the  Baconian  to  the  Aristotelic  is  as  follows. 
The  process  of  Induction,  as  founded  on  pro- 
bability, is  relative,  but  its  conclusion  is  abso- 
lute. Similarities  or  analogies  retain  their 
character  of  difference  and  plurality  in  the 
inductive  process,  but  become  one  and  identi- 
cal in  the  conclusion,  or  class,  into  wdiich  they 
are  combined  by  an  act  of  abstraction  and 
generalization.  This  conclusion  becomes  the 
premise  of  Deduction.  It  is  then  within  the 
domain  of  formal  logic. 

That  Sir  William  Hamilton  has  done  much 


220  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

to  reconcile  the  Aristotelic  logic  with  the  Ba- 
conian, by  purifying  the  theory  of  both,  and 
showing  their  interdependence,  by  developing 
that  side  of  the  Aristotelic  wliich  lies  next  to 
particulars  and  induction,  (for  all  his  addi- 
tions to  logic  are  such,)  must  be  admitted  by 
those  who  can  appreciate  his  writings.  And 
nowhere,  in  the  historj^  of  philosophy,  is  there 
a  definition  of  Induction  which  reaches  so 
thoroughly  to  the  heart  of  the  thing,  the 
essential  nature  of  the  philosophical  inference 
of  the  universal  from  the  singular,  as  that 
which  Sir  William  has  given  to  discriminate 
the  Baconian  from  the  Aristotelic,  the  mate- 
rial from  the  formal.  His  definition  is  this : 
"A  material  illation  of  the  universal  from  the 
singular,  warranted  either  by  the  general 
analogies  of  nature,  or  by  special  presump- 
tions afibrded  by  the  object-matter  of  any  real 
science."  This  definition  shows  that  the  in- 
ductive process  of  Bacon,  is  governed  by  the 
laws,  not  of  the  thinking  subject,  ratione  formce, 
but  by  the  laws  of  the  object  to  be  known,  m 
materia^.  This  definition,  though  only  used 
to  discriminate  negatively  the  Aristotelic,  or 
formal  induction,  sheds  so  much  light  on  the 


REACTIONARY   El'OCU.  221 

Baconian  induction,  as  to  entitle  Sir  William 
Hamilton  to  the  praise  of  having  contributed 
to  a  true  theoretic  exposition  of  the  Baconian 
method,  by  showing  the  ultimate  basis  of  its 
validity,  in  disclosing  the  nature  of  the  deter- 
mining antecedent  and  the  determined  illa- 
tion. The  determining  antecedent  is  shown 
to  be  the  analogies  of  nature,  which  afford 
presumptions  varying  in  all  degrees  of  proba- 
bility, from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  certainty, 
that  what  is  found  in  the  singulars  observed 
is  in  all  the  singulars.  The  physical  observer 
asserts,  on  the  analogy  of  his  science,  that  as 
some  horned  animals  ruminate,  all  horned 
animals  ruminate.  The  logician  accepts  the 
conclusion,  all  horned  animals  ruminate,  and 
brings  it  under  the  laws  of  thought,  and  con- 
siders the  some  of  the  physical  observer  as 
equivalent  to  his  all.  Sir  William  thus  extri-/ 
cates  the  theory  of  material  induction  from/ 
the  syllogistic  fetters  in  which  the  logicians 
had  entangled  it.  His  design  was,  however, 
by  no  means,  to  exalt  the  dominion  of  Bacon; 
but  rather,  all  his  labours  are  designed  to 
draw  the  age  from  its  one-sided  culture — its 
too  exclusive  devotion  to  physics.     We,  there- 


222  PROGRESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

fore,  standing,  as  we  do,  at  the  Baconian  point 
of  view  of  philosophy,  step  forward  to  hail 
the  expositions  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  and 
concatenate  them  with  the  philosophy  of  Ba- 
con. So  that  the  Baconian  philosophy,  in 
the  future,  may  cease  to  he  "the  dirt  philo- 
sophy" which  some  of  its  heretical  disciples 
have  made  it,  and  may  embrace  all  the  grand 
problems  of  thought  which  Sir  William  Ha- 
milton has  brought  within  the  philosophy  of 
common  sense,  and  which  Bacon  certainly  in- 
tended his  philosophy  to  comprehend. 

Having  now  indicated  the  point  of  concili- 
ation, between  the  loirics  of  Aristotle  and  of 
Bacon  through  that  of  Hamilton,  we  will 
suggest  the  course  of  development  which  the 
conciliated  doctrine  must  take. 

The  laws  of  thought,  in  their  relation  to 
the  condition  of  relativity,  have  not  been  ex- 
pounded by  Hamilton  or  any  other  philoso- 
pher. Indeed,  this  aspect  of  the  laws  of 
thought  seems  to  have  been  entirely  over- 
looked. They  have  been  expounded  only  in 
their  relation  to  the  condition  of  non-contra- 
diction. Now,  in  the  inductive  process,  the 
condition  of  relativity  is  the  one  chiefly  to  be 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  223 

regarded ;  just  as  in  the  deductive  process, 
that  of  non-contradiction  is  the  important  one. 
Therefore,  in  giving  a  theoretical  explication 
of  induction,  we  must  consider  the  condition 
of  relativity.  This  condition,  as  we  have 
shown  in  expounding  Hamilton,  is  brought  to 
bear  in  thinking,  under  two  principal  rela- 
tions :  the  relation  of  hioivledge,  the  mind 
thinking;  and  the  relation  of  existence,  the 
thing  thought  about.  In  the  relation  of  know- 
ledge, the  mind  thinking,  the  laws  of  thought 
are  necessarily  involved ;  because  the  condi- 
tion of  non-contradiction  must  be  fulfilled  in 
all  thinking.  In  fact,  the  conditions  of  non- 
contradiction and  relativity  are  mutually  de- 
pendent and  reciprocally  relative.  But  hither- 
to, the  relation  of  existence,  the  thing  thought 
about,  has  been  considered,  in  explaining  the 
inductive  process,  to  the  total  neglect  of  the 
relation  of  the  mind  thinking.  The  objective '' 
element  of  thought  has  been  considered  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  subjective  element.  The 
objective,  it  is  true,  is  the  great  determining 
element  in  induction,  and  therefore,  the  more 
obtrusive  and  important,  and  very  properly 
and  naturally  first  attracted  reflective  atten- 


224  PROGKESS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

tion.  But  then,  in  giving  a  theoretical  expli- 
cation of  induction,  it  is  indisjDcnsable  that 
the  subjective  element  of  thought  be  regarded. 
In  this  aspect  of  the  problem  of  induction, 
the  condition  of  non-contradiction,  in  its  three- 
fold application  under  the  laws  of  identity, 
contradiction  and  excluded  middle,  must  be 
expounded. 

In  the  future,  therefore,  the  chief  point  of 
development,  in  applied  logic,  will  consist  in 
showing  the  empirical  application  of  the  laws 
of  thought  in  the  inductive  process.  Princi- 
ples, which  have  hitherto  been  considered 
primary  regulatives,  will  be  resolved  into  in- 
termediate axioms,  mere  special  applications 
of  the  law  of  identity  through  the  principle 
of  philosophical  presumption.  All  actual, 
positive  thinking  is,  the  identification  of  the 
plural  under  the  conditions  of  non-contradic- 
tion and  relativity.  In  the  deductive  process, 
which  is  especially  dependent  on  the  condition 
of  non-contradiction,  total  identity  is  the  ob- 
jective law;  and  therefore,  the  process  is  only 
explicative.  But  in  the  inductive  process, 
which  is  especially  dependent  on  the  condition 
of  relativity,  the  one  prime  law  of  the  objee- 


REACTIOxVARY    EPOCH.  225 

tive  on  which  the  process  is  dependent,  is 
analogy  or  partial  identity;  therefore,  the 
process  is  aniphative,  because  the  partial  iden- 
tity is  shown  in  the  totalizing  result  to  be 
total  identity  when  extricated  from  the  diver- 
sity which  modified  it  into  apparently  partial 
identity.  The  field  of  identity  is  thereby  en- 
larged, and  that  of  diversity  lessened — know- 
ledge is  increased  and  ignorance  diminished. 
The  judgment,  therefore,  called  tlie  principlG 
of  pliUosopliwal  jyvesumption,  that  where  par- 
tial resemblance  (partial  identity)  is  found, 
total  resemblance  (total  identity)  will  be 
found,  is  thus  shown  to  be  under  the  imme- 
diate guidance  of  the  law  of  identity  in  its 
empirical  application.  Hence,  the  principle 
of  philosophical  presumption  determined  by 
the  objective  law  of  analogy,  correlated  with 
the  laws  of  thought,  constitute  the  basis  of  a 
valid  theoretical  exposition  of  induction.  And 
the  details  of  a  practical  system  will  consist 
of  the  rules  of  all  special  judgments  deter- 
mined by  the  special  object  matters  or  ana- 
logies. 

The  logic  of  inference  has,  therefore,  for  its 
object  matter,  the  laws  of  thought  in  their 

19 


226  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

empirical    application.      In   developing    this 
logic,  truths  which  have  hitherto  been  consi- 
dered necessary,  will  be  found  to  be  only  ex- 
periential axioms  applied  in  actual  thinking 
under  the  guidance  of  the  laws  of  thought. 
Our  original  and  our  acquired  perceptions, 
and  our  necessary  and  our  experiential  notions 
are  so  interdependent  in  our  mental  opera- 
tions, that  reflective  analysis  has  as  yet  failed 
to  sufficiently  separate  them  in  thought.     A 
priori  principles  are  only  discovered  a  poste- 
riori.    Consciousness  is  only  cognizant  of  the 
individual  act,  and  has  not  before  it  the  a 
priori  principle  or  regulative  which  is  found 
by  reflective  analysis  to  be  the  pole  on  which 
the  thinking  turned.     This  is  the  case  of  the 
principle  of  the  uniformity  of  nature.     This 
principle,  as  a  known  truth,  is  only  an  empi- 
rical generalization.     The  law  of  identity  con- 
ducts thinking  to  the  same  affirmatives  with- 
out any  reference  either  implicit  or  explicit  to 
any  such  principle.    The  uniformity  of  nature 
is  an  after  reflection.     It  is  not  even  an  as- 
sumption, except  in  the  descending  scale  or 
process  of  induction.     The  principle  of  philo- 
sophical presumption  is  therefore  not  prompted 


REACTIONARY    EPOCU.  227 

by  the  assumption  of  the  uniformity  of  nature, 
but  is  under  the  guidance  of  the  law  of  iden- 
tity, and  is  but  a  modification  of  the  mental 
tendency  to  bring  multiplicity  to  unity. 

As  a  preparative  to  this  completer  logic  of 
inference,  criticism  must  ascertain,  distin- 
guish, and  correlate,  the  primary  beliefs  with 
the  several  cognitive  faculties  and  with  the 
laws  of  thought  in  their  empirical  application. 
The  primary  beliefs  are  not  near  so  numerous, 
as  the  spirit  of  the  Scotch  philosophy  and  its 
uncritical  state  in  this  respect,  seem  to  show. 

We  will  now  indicate  what,  we  think, 
should  be  the  future  course  of  metaphysics. 

The  criticism  by  Sir  William  Hamilton, 
which  we  have  exhibited,  has  established, 
that  we  can  Jcnaic  nothing  beyond  the  limita- 
tion of  consciousness.  Any  existence,  there- 
fore, beyond  this  limitation,  can  only  be  an 
object  of  faith.  Metaphysics  which  is  the 
science  of  that  which  transcends  knowledge 
must  rest  upon  faith.  But  then,  has  not  faith 
its  limits  ?  K  it  has  none,  then  it  is  as  legiti- 
mate to  believe  one  thing  as  another,  which 
is  equivalent  to  having  no  faith.  Therefore 
the  principle  of  contradiction,  which  is  a  limit 


228  PROGRESS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

to  the  possible  in  existence  as  well  as  in 
thought,  constrains  us  to  set  a  limit  to  faith. 
This  limit  is,  the  condition  of  relativitj^,  which 
is  the  condition  of  consciousness.  We  can 
only  believe  in  the  absolute  or  infinite  through 
the  relative  and  the  finite.  We  can  believe 
in  nothing  which  has  not  its  germ  in  some 
one  or  more  presentations  of  consciousness. 
AYe  therefore,  entirely  repudiate  all  that  wild 
faith  which  is  divorced  from  the  understand- 
ing. No  faith  is  valid  whose  object,  the  laws 
of  the  understanding  do  not  constrain  us  to 
infer,  from  data  of  consciousness,  as  existent. 
To  posit  in  existence  any  object  which  the 
understanding  does  not  place  there,  by  the 
constraint  of  its  laws  exercised  upon  the  data 
of  consciousness,  is  pure  conjecture.  The  laws 
of  the  understanding,  as  we  have  shown,  are 
regulatives  to  all  inferences  as  well  as  to  all 
deductions.  To  let  faith  go  in  a  direction 
which  they  do  not  indicate,  is  to  revolt  against 
reason  as  limited  in  man.  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton was  right,  therefore,  in  seeking  for  a 
logical  basis  for  his  metaphysics;  though, 
perhaps,  he  did  not  see  the  full  import  of  the 
doctrine.     He  found  this  basis  in  the  logico- 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  229 

metaphysical  principle  of  two  contradictory 
extremes  conditioning  thought.  And  by  ap- 
plying the  law  of  excluded  middle,  he  does 
not,  as  some  have  supposed,  get  a  mere  formal 
conclusion;  because  the  laws  of  thought,  as 
we  have  shown,  are  applicable  to  inference  or 
material  conclusion.  Nor  does  he  thereby 
surreptitiously  introduce,  as  has  been  said, 
what  he  has  explicitly  rejected;  for  he  does 
not,  thereby,  make  the  absolute  or  infinite  an 
object  of  knowledge,  but  only  of  faith. 

All  metaphysical  inquiry  is,  therefore,  con- 
fined to  the  question.  What  does  the  logical 
understanding  constrain  or  authorize  us  to 
believe  in  regard  to  the  transcendental?  It 
constrains  us:  1.  To  believe  that  time  and 
space  are  infinite.  Because  we  contradict 
ourselves,  in  attempting  to  think  that  either 
is  not  infinite.  This  settled :  2.  We  are  fur- 
ther constrained  to  think,  that  infinite  sub- 
stantive existence  is  possible.  Because,  time 
and  space  are  the  infinite  conditions  of  sub- 
stantive existence,  being  in  themselves  of  such 
a  nature  as  neither  to  exclude  each  other,  nor 
to  constitute  being  in  such  a  mode  as  to  ex- 
clude other  existences.     They  are  in  fact,  in 


230  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

their  relation  to  substantive  existence,  purely 
negative.  Here  the  question  emerges,  What 
existence  does  the  logical  understanding,  ex- 
ercised upon  the  data  of  consciousness,  con- 
strain us  to  project  into  the  unoccupied  con- 
ditions of  time  and  space?  It  certainly  does 
not  necessitate  us  to  fill  them  with  infinite 
worlds  or  with  a  supersensible  world.  It  does, 
however,  constrain  us  to  project  an  absolute 
cause;  for  in  thinking  about  causation  as 
given  in  consciousness,  we  contradict  our- 
selves by  attempting  to  think  it  as  absolutely 
beginning.  And  the  judging  facult}^,  from 
which  all  the  interpreting  light  must  come, 
reahzes,  that  its  thinking  about  finite  things 
is  not  logically  complete  unless  an  absolute 
cause  be  posited  in  existence.  An  infinite 
series  of  causes,  the  other  alternative,  does 
not  satisfy  the  understanding;  because  it  re- 
cedes in  endless  negation.  Metaphysics  there- 
fore culminates  in  theology.  The  moral  nature 
of  man,  supplemented  by  revelation,  becomes 
the  basis  for  determining  the  relation  between 
man  and  God. 

Such  is  the  limited  basis  of  the  metaphj-sics 
which  we  conceive  ought  to  be  developed  in 


REACTIONARY   EPOCH.  231 

the  future.  By  it,  reason  and  faitli  are  com- 
pletely reconciled.  And  tlie  doctrines  of  reve- 
lation can  be  grafted  on  the  doctrines  of  meta- 
physics without  discrepancy.  The  sinking 
and  rising  of  metaphysical  systems  in  the 
past  resulted  from  the  divorce  of  faith  from 
the  understanding. 

With  a  view  to  the  progress  of  rational 
philosophy  in  the  future,  consciousness  or  the 
intellectual  globe  may  be  divided  into  two 
grand  provinces,  logical  consciousness  and 
metaphysical  consciousness.  Logical  con- 
sciousness may  itself  be  divided  into  the 
understanding,  the  primary  beliefs,  the  in- 
ductive belief  or  principle  of  philosojihical 
presumption,  and  the  laws  of  thought.  Meta- 
physical consciousness  is  commensurate  with 
the  belief,  consequent  on  the  limitation  of  the 
understanding,  of  transcendental  existence; 
or  with  faith  as  discriminated  from  belief. 
The  moral  faculty,  the  feelings  and  the  will 
belong  not  to  rational  Ijut  to  moral  philosophy, 
and  therefore  are  not  delineated. 

We  have  thus  presented  such  an  outline  of 
the  progress  of  philosophy,  as  to  indicate  the 
true  perennial  doctrine  which  consists  of  the 


232  PROGRESS    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

results  of  the  consecutive  series  of  discussions 
elicited  more  or  less  by  the  circumstances  of 
successive  epochs.  And  we  have,  by  our  own 
criticisms  and  suggestions  of  new  doctrines, 
endeavoured  to  do  something,  towards  answer- 
ing the  demands  of  the  present  epoch,  so  re- 
markable for  earnest  speculation. 


FINIS. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  LOS  ANGELES 

THE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 

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